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Abstract 
Carey and Shugart (1995) suggest that under closed-list proportional representation 
(CLPR) legislators are more likely to seek votes based on their personal attributes as 
the number of seats per constituency (known as district magnitude or simply as M) 
decreases. By contrast, in open-list proportional representation (OLPR) the 
incentives for legislators to seek votes based on their personal reputation should 
increase as M increases. I test these scholars’ predictions and argue that regardless of 
the electoral system, legislators will focus on the provision of local public goods, 
known as pork-barrel politics, the smaller the M, because then it is easier to claim 
personal credit for projects for their constituencies. In OLPR the importance of 
pork-barrelling increases compared to CLPR; however, because the necessity to 
differentiate themselves from co-partisans increases as M grows, depending on their 
personal attributes legislators will choose to provide non-targetable goods or private 
goods instead. 
I study the case of Honduras to test this theory. This country used a CLPR 
system between 1989 and 2001. In 2004 the system changed to OLPR, keeping M 
fixed. The outcomes of the research are as follows. First, the results do not support 
the claims posed by Carey and Shugart (1995). Second, using different proxies of 
legislators’ behaviour, I found confirmation that pork-barrelling is more important 
the smaller the M. Third, the evidence regarding the provision of private goods does 
not support the claims on its own. However, when private goods and local goods 
were combined, some evidence was found that might indicate that, as expected, the 
change from CLPR to OLPR increases the likelihood that legislators will provide 
targetable goods the larger the M. By contrast, in CLPR the effect is the opposite. 
Finally, the results suggest that electoral systems interact with the personal attributes 
of legislators in ways that can be anticipated. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
In the early morning of Sunday 28th of June 2009, a group of soldiers from the 
Honduran Army raided the house of Manuel Zelaya-Rosales, who was serving his 
fourth year as President of Honduras. The President’s detention was ordered by the 
Supreme Court of Honduras in the aftermath of a conflict between the Executive, 
Legislative, and Judicial branches of government that also involved a number of civil 
organizations. That same morning he was put on a plane to Costa Rica, still wearing 
his pyjamas. In the afternoon, the President of the National Congress, the Liberal 
Party leader and Zelaya-Rosales’ former campaign manager, Roberto Micheletti, was 
sworn in as interim President of Honduras after the deputies present voted 
unanimously for the removal of Zelaya-Rosales from office. Several of the 
parliamentarians who supported the President’s impeachment had formed part of the 
faction that four years earlier had won the presidential nomination to represent the 
Liberal Party under the leadership of Zelaya-Rosales. 
The justifications that were initially given for this coup related to the president’s 
non-compliance with a Supreme Court decree that prevented the Executive from 
carrying out a plebiscite asking the citizenry whether they would agree on calling a 
constituent assembly (Rodríguez, 2011). However, another factor that might help 
explain the conflict between the three branches of power, and in particular between 
the Executive and the Legislative branches, could be the structural changes that came 
about in particular as a result of the approval of a new Electoral Law in 2004. Among 
other things, this law changed the electoral system from closed-list proportional 
representation (CLPR) to open-list proportional representation (OLPR). One could 
argue that the change to OLPR may have disrupted the unity of the political parties 
within the National Congress of Honduras, leading to internal conflicts between 
parliamentarians from the same party and with the presidential office. This seems to 
be the reason why, in February 2010, a bill was put before the Honduran Congress 
that aimed to once again reform the Electoral Law and convert the PR system into a 
mixed member electoral system which would combine members elected under 
2 
majority elections with other members elected by proportional representation. 
According to one of the proponents of that bill: 
The system used here at the moment is a system where the candidate 
who receive the most votes in the primary election (within the parties) 
advances to the general election, where again the person who receives 
the most votes wins, though an element of proportionality is involved. 
However, this system has generated a good deal of conflict among 
congressional candidates from the same party. That’s why we want to 
change to a system of election by districts, so that national interests and 
policies proposed by the president and the parties are also considered in 
Congress. […] The problem is that [OLPR] breaks party unity, because 
each candidate has to compete with the other candidates from her own 
party.1 
It can be inferred from this quote that in Honduras OLPR has produced 
conflicts within the parties that can be attributed to increased intraparty competition. 
It can also be surmised that legislators will attend to the interests of their 
constituencies—or as that legislator said, districts—but neglect the party authority 
and their legislative work in parliament. In an interview conducted with one member 
of the Central Committee of the Liberal Party of Honduras, he was asked to describe 
the effects of the change to OLPR. According to this party leader, the level of 
conflict within his party has increased as a consequence of the change to OLPR: 
The problem that has arisen lately is that [the candidates] are fighting 
amongst themselves. Before 2004, they were selected [by the leadership] 
and did not necessarily have to fight for positions within the party but 
instead competed with the opposition. The advantage of this was that 
there was no internal friction within the Liberal Party. Now, however, 
there is friction, because they try to politically destroy, belittle, and insult 
one another or a presidential candidate as well as the opposition parties.2 
A recent article establishes a connection between the electoral system type in 
Honduras and the 2009 coup. According to Taylor-Robinson and Ura (2013), the 
electoral system that resulted from the 2004 reform strengthened the Legislative’s 
independence from the Executive branch of government. They also argue that 
another set of institutional reforms gave the Judicial branch more autonomy.3 For the 
                                                 
1 Deputy of the National Party of Honduras, personal interview, 12th February 2010, own translation. 
2 Secretary of the Central Committee of the Liberal Party of Honduras, personal interview, 19th 
January 2010, own translation. 
3 In 2001 the Constitution was reformed to extend the Supreme Court Judges period of service from 
four to seven years. The nomination process also changed to make it less partisan. An Appointments 
Board comprised of different actors such as the Supreme Court itself, political parties, civil society, 
3 
authors, these two institutional changes provided increased incentive for the 
autonomy of the Legislative and the Judiciary, together with uncertainty about which 
side public opinion would fall on in the high-stakes issue of the plebiscite. In their 
words, “[t]hese changes limited the president’s ability to influence other politicians’ 
careers, creating the potential for real Congress and Court independence so that 
when a high-stakes policy conflict arose one branch of government might assert itself 
to obstruct another branch” (Taylor-Robinson and Ura, 2013, p. 114).  
It is not the aim of this dissertation to demonstrate a cause-and-effect 
connection between the overthrow of the President of Honduras in June 2009, 
supported by deputies of his own party, and a deterioration in party unity which 
could be associated with the electoral system change of April 2004.4 Instead, this 
anecdote serves to illustrate just one of the many aspects of Honduran politics that 
could have been affected by this institutional change, and to highlight the fact that, to 
my knowledge, no research has yet been conducted to evaluate the effects of the 
electoral system change in that country.  
Ever since the birth of modern democracies, and even before, politicians and 
scholars of politics around the world have debated the impact different institutional 
designs might have on the way legislators behave. For example, in the Federalist 
No. 10, one of the founding fathers of the United States, James Madison, wrote: 
“[a]mong the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none 
deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the 
violence of faction” (Madison, 2003[1788], p. 71), adding that “[b]y a faction I 
understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the 
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse or passion, or of 
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
interest of the community” (p. 72).  
A more contemporary student of politics, Sartori (1997, pp. 200–201) compares 
political institutions to engines that can be strategically designed to elicit particular 
types of behaviour among politicians and voters. However, some researchers believe 
that the effects of “electoral engineering” cannot be predicted in any context, 
                                                                                                                                     
and the National Autonomous University of Honduras propose the nominations of the new 
magistrates to the Honduran Congress. 
4 In Appendix 3.1 to Chapter 3 I provide more detailed information about the 2009 coup and the 
previous conflicts within the Liberal Party of Honduras. 
4 
especially where democracy has been the result of abrupt transitions rather than a 
natural evolution of institutions, like in most old capitalist democracies (Elster, 1988; 
Inglehart, 1997; 2005; Norris, 2004). The present work focuses on the effects of 
electoral institutions on the behaviour of legislators, a topic that has received little 
attention to date (Colomer, 2011; Shugart, 2005). More specifically, the research 
question of this dissertation is: Do electoral systems affect the way legislators behave? And if 
so, how can these effects be explained? In an attempt to provide an answer to this question, 
I investigate the case of Honduras, which changed its electoral system from a CLPR 
system to OLPR, two models that, as I will show throughout this dissertation, differ 
greatly in many ways. This rare occurrence provides quasi-experimental conditions 
which I can use to test my argument. 
1.1 Puzzle 
One of the most common assumptions that political scientists make in order to 
formulate their theories is that in democracies where it is permitted, re-election is the 
primary goal motivating elected representatives such as legislators (Cox & 
McCubbins, 2007; Downs, 1957; Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 1974). In Honduras 
legislators can (and often do) stand for re-election an indefinite number of times. In 
the sardonic words of one academic in reference to deputies who have died while in 
office, “there are people who have had to be taken out of Congress in a coffin!”5 The 
Ibero-American Institute at the University of Salamanca established a project called 
the Latin American Parliamentarian Elite Project (PELA), for which researchers have 
conducted four rounds of surveys. In the 2006 PELA survey, a sample of 91 out of 
128 Honduran parliamentarians were given a number of possible answers to the 
question, “what do deputies from your party do after they have completed their term 
in office?” Each answer had to be ranked in order of likelihood, with one being the 
least likely outcome and five the most likely. For the answer “get re-elected as a 
deputy”, 37 per cent chose four and 46 per cent chose five (Alcántara, 1994-2010). In 
other words, 90 per cent of the deputies surveyed declared that, when one term in 
office has been completed, re-election is the most common goal of Honduran 
legislators. 
                                                 
5 Professor of Politics and International Relations at the National Autonomous University of 
Honduras, personal interview, 19th November 2009, own translation. 
5 
If re-election is so important for legislators, then we might ask how they go 
about achieving that objective. Some academics believe that the answer to this 
question depends on the electoral system and the manner in which the parties select 
their candidates (Carey, 2009; Crisp et al., 2004; Golden & Picci, 2008; Hirano, 2006; 
Sieberer, 2010; Stratmann & Baur, 2002). In a very influential paper, Carey & Shugart 
(1995) proposed a ranking of electoral systems according to the incentives they 
would in theory produce for candidates to look for personal votes—i.e. votes that are 
based on their personal attributes. One of the most controversial aspects of their 
theory is the interactive relationship they establish between what they call ballot control 
and the number of seats in a constituency, which has come to be known as district 
magnitude and is abbreviated simply as M. They predict that in systems where the 
party leadership controls access to the ballot, candidates will have greater incentives 
to seek a personal vote the smaller M is. Conversely, when the party leadership has 
little or no control over who is entered on the ballot, voters have more influence on 
the electoral prospects of a candidate, including an incumbent’s chances of re-
election. Under these circumstances, the incentives to look for personal votes will 
increase as M gets larger.  
Carey & Shugart’s (1995) theory has attracted considerable attention in recent 
years. A growing number of researchers have subjected their arguments to empirical 
testing in both large-N and small-N investigations (André & Depauw, 2012; 
Hallerberg & Marier, 2004; Hicken & Simmons, 2008). Other scholars, however, 
look upon this theory with scepticism, and maintain that electoral systems are not the 
only potential explanatory factors that should be considered. There are other political 
institutions, such as the form of government, the structure of parliaments and factors 
related to political party organization, as well as political psychology, that could 
explain legislators’ behaviour (Crisp, Jensen & Shomer, 2007; Desposato, 2006; 
Martin, 2012; Samuels, 1999; Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008a). It is, however, generally 
acknowledged that too little is known about the effects of electoral systems on 
legislator’s behaviour (Colomer, 2011; Shugart, 2005). 
In the early 1990s Honduras had one of the most party-centred electoral 
systems, a fused system of elections (Cox, 1997, p. 42), in which voters cast a single 
vote for a presidential candidate and the list of deputy candidates. One scholar of 
Honduran politics has stated that if it were not for the factionalization of the two 
main political parties in Honduras, the use of the fused electoral system could have 
6 
produced what the political scientist Gary W. Cox (1987) termed an efficient secret, i.e. 
the near fusion of the executive and legislative branches in their regular work (Taylor, 
1996, p. 328).6  
Preliminary evidence suggests that there have been changes in the way 
legislators behave since the adoption of the new system which could be related to 
increased importance being attached to constituency service. During an interview 
conducted with one of the secretaries of the Liberal Party of Honduras’s Central 
Committee, he was asked about the role of pork-barrel politics under the OLPR 
system, and declared: “it’s part of the competition. If three or four deputies from a 
department want to run again they have to find resources for social development in 
their community; this is without a doubt the case. There are some who devote 
themselves only to legislative work [pauses], but the clever ones know that they have 
to do constituency service.” 7 8 Another deputy compares the before and after of the 
2004 electoral reform. According to him, the presidential candidate previously had a 
significant influence on the way people voted for the party list of legislative 
candidates. Under OLPR, however, legislators have to rely on their public image and 
constituency service record to gain votes. 
Previously, deputies were elected alongside the presidential candidate, 
which meant that deputies would be stuck like glue to the figure of the 
president during the presidential campaign. As it is now, we still have to 
work for the president, but the deputies also have their own work and 
obligations. We work together as a party, but each of us also has to work 
individually in order to get a seat in Congress… This means putting in 
twice as much effort, visiting one house after the other, supporting 
communities with projects. That is the only way you can actually win 
people’s votes.9  
Another issue that legislators must consider is the financing of their electoral 
campaigns. According to one legislator interviewed, campaigning is particularly 
important in large district magnitude constituencies, but it is also very expensive: 
                                                 
6 The term efficient secret was originally coined by Walter Bagehot in his classic work of 1867, The English 
Constitution. As quoted in Cox’s (1987) study of the development of the English political parties, 
Bagehot states that “[t]he efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close 
union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and the legislative powers… The connecting link is 
the cabinet” (p. vi, italics in original).   
7 Secretary of the Central Committee of the Liberal Party of Honduras, personal interview, 19th 
January 2010, own translation. 
8 In Honduras the electoral constituencies are the same as the provinces, which are called departments 
(see Chapter 3).  
9 Deputy of the National Party of Honduras, personal interview, 12th February 2010, own translation. 
7 
… [t]he process is onerous and costly. For example, look at the 
department of Francisco Morazán, which has 23 deputies, and the 
department of Cortés, which has 20 deputies. The country’s capital is 
located in Francisco Morazán, and [the city of] San Pedro Sula is in 
Cortés. The problem is that a congressional candidate is like a 
presidential candidate in the department. Francisco Morazán has 23 seats 
and has 28 municipalities, but as it happens 79 per cent of the electorate 
is concentrated in the capital and the other 21 per cent is spread out 
across the rest of the municipalities. So what happens then? I am a 
candidate in Francisco Morazán, which means I have to promote myself 
in the municipality where the 79 per cent is because that’s where most of 
the voters live in its neighbourhoods and suburbs, in the homes of 
migrants from the villages… But I can’t neglect the other 21 per cent 
either because every vote counts in politics. So what is the result? My 
campaign becomes very, very expensive because I have to visit all the 
people, and you realize that people expect you to be everywhere at once 
and you are asked for help everywhere you go. 
The following quote from a scholar of Honduran politics provides a description 
of the immediate consequences of the electoral system change and the incentives it 
created for legislators there to seek personal votes: 
Until 2005, aspiring politicians knew that the key to gaining nomination 
and election was to appeal to party leaders. A deputy from the 
president’s party could obtain government resources by being loyal to 
the president. Party leaders controlled whether a deputy would have a 
safe slot on the party’s list. Thus, deputies had a strong career incentive 
to demonstrate their loyalty to their party and its leaders. With both 
primaries and general elections being ‘open list’, party leaders can no 
longer guarantee re-election for loyal backbenchers. The president still 
controls access to executive branch resources, however, which are 
important assets for deputies planning a long-term political career. With 
the new electoral rules, a different set of incentives has been created, 
which may undermine the president’s traditional domination of the 
Congress (Taylor-Robinson, 2007, p. 524). 
These statements indicate that the electoral system change from CLPR to 
OLPR has had an effect on legislators’ behaviour which seems to be related to 
intraparty competition. Constituency service, and especially legislators’ provision of 
resources for their constituencies—an activity known as pork-barrel politics—
appears to predominate in Honduran politics under the OLPR system. However, it is 
obvious that a test of a theory cannot rely solely upon a few semi-structured 
interviews. Moreover, while constituency service seems to be important for 
legislators to improve their individual reputations and thereby win personal votes, to 
equate the personal vote to constituency service or pork-barrelling alone could be 
misleading (Martin, 2011). There are different factors that could help to improve a 
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legislators’ personal reputation, and win personal votes as a result; they could even 
use party votes—i.e. votes for the party—to secure re-election (Strøm, 1997). 
However, the literature on the influence of electoral systems on legislators’ behaviour 
remains quite theoretical and the evidence collected relies mainly on small-N 
comparisons and large-N statistical studies, which as I will explain in detail have 
significant shortcomings. The fact that Honduras changed from a CLPR system to 
OLPR while keeping the same district magnitude allows for quasi-experimental 
testing of the effects of two different electoral systems on legislators’ behaviour, 
while other factors can be kept relatively constant. In the next section I will explain 
what we can expect from the interaction between ballot type and district magnitude.   
1.2 Argument 
The theoretical basis of the present work comes from Carey & Shugart’s (1995) 
theory on the interaction between ballot type and district magnitude. Adopting their 
point of view, and assuming that legislators will seek re-election, we can expect that 
under CLPR the incentives to cultivate personal votes are greater the smaller the M, 
since legislators will be more likely to be recognized by their constituents and can 
thus use their personal reputations to attract votes. By contrast, under OLPR the 
incentives to seek personal votes are greater the larger M, because intraparty 
competition will probably be more pronounced in these districts. However, it is 
important to bear in mind Carey & Shugart’s caveat that their model “identifies the 
degree to which electoral systems reward politicians’ personal reputations, but does 
not distinguish as to how that reputation is most effectively developed” 
(1995, p. 419). In other words, their model does not explain what specific outcomes 
in the behaviour of legislators can be expected, or the ways in which legislators will 
seek to attract personal votes.  
For Cox & McCubbins (2001), when electoral systems create conditions 
conducive to seeking personal votes, the most efficient way to get them is by 
providing local public goods to constituencies and private goods to interest groups, 
rather than providing non-targetable public goods. Based on this argument and Carey 
& Shugart’s (1995) theory, Crisp et al. (2004) argue that under closed-list electoral 
systems legislators will be more likely to provide targetable local goods to their 
constituencies and targetable private goods to interest groups as M gets smaller. 
Conversely, when the party list is open, legislators will have greater incentives to 
provide targetable goods the larger M is.  
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As in Carey & Shugart’s (1995) work, the argument of this thesis is that, 
assuming that legislators are driven by a desire for re-election, under CLPR the 
incentives to seek personal votes should be greater the smaller the district magnitude, 
whereas under OLPR the incentives should increase as district magnitude gets larger. 
This effect is expected to occur because it is easier for voters to identify legislators in 
small-M districts than in large ones. Thus, in CLPR legislators will use their personal 
reputations to attract votes for their parties. Conversely, in OLPR they will compete 
within their parties to attract votes for themselves. Moreover, as M gets larger the 
number of competitors from the same party increases. 
In line with Cox & McCubbins (2001) and Crisp et al. (2004), I use the 
targetable/non-targetable goods framework. However, contrary to Crisp et al. (2004), 
I believe that putting local and private targetable goods together prevents us from 
identifying the causal mechanisms behind the decisions of legislators under the two 
different types of electoral system. In this regard, I argue that while we can expect 
that constituency service will be more important in smaller district magnitude 
constituencies in closed-list systems, the same cannot be expected for private goods. 
If private goods are understood as goods provided to interest groups, as Denzau & 
Munger (1986) and Bawn & Thies (Bawn & Thies, 2003) suggest, there should be 
less engagement between legislators and interest groups in small district magnitude 
constituencies, where pork-barrel politics tends to have more importance. I therefore 
expect that under CLPR legislators will tend to provide private goods to interest 
groups in larger district magnitude constituencies. Furthermore, it has been argued 
that even when the electoral system generates incentives to look for personal votes in 
large M constituencies it is probably more difficult to claim personal credit for pork-
barrel projects because different legislators could have been involved in providing the 
goods (Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, 2006; Carey & Shugart, 1995; Lancaster, 
1986). It is possible that this could discourage legislators from providing local public 
goods. Therefore, we cannot necessarily expect increased provision of local public 
goods as a function of increasing M. 
In Figure 1.1 bellow I schematize my argument. Specifically, I argue that under 
CLPR incumbent legislators and parties will focus more on the provision of local 
goods as M gets smaller, and on providing more private and non-targetable goods as 
M increases. In small-M constituencies legislators with a local background are more 
likely to provide local goods; whereas, as M increases those who are more likely to 
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provide private and non-targetable goods are legislators who have leadership 
attributes within their parties. Under OLPR, legislators will be more likely focus on 
pork-barrelling; however, as M increases some deputies will seek to differentiate 
themselves from their co-partisans by providing public goods. In addition, because in 
an OLPR system legislators need to reach broader publics in larger district magnitude 
constituencies, they will probably appeal to interest groups in order to finance their 
political campaigns. Once in office, they will be more likely to produce private goods 
than they would under CLPR. Finally, under OLPR, what determines whether 
legislators will focus on the provision of local public goods or non-targetable public 
goods in large-M constituencies is their own personal attributes. Legislators who are 
recognizable by broad sections of the public will be more likely to provide non-
targetable public goods, whereas those who have a more local background will focus 
on their constituency service work. 
Ballot M Type of goods 
Local Private Non-
targetable 
CLPR Decreasing Very likely 
IUPA 
Less likely Less likely 
Increasing Less likely More likely 
IUPA 
More likely 
IUPA 
OLPR Decreasing Very likely 
IUPA 
Less likely Less likely 
Increasing More likely 
IUPA 
More likely than 
in CLPR 
IUPA 
Less likely than 
in CLPR 
IUPA 
Figure 1.1. Theorized choice of strategy of legislators by type of ballot and district 
magnitude. The acronym IUPA stands for ‘increasing use of the legislators’ personal 
attributes’. IUPA indicates that it is expected that the legislator will be more likely to use her 
personal reputation as M increases or decreases, depending on the type of good she is 
delivering. Notice that, independently from the ballot used, I would expect that as M 
decreases legislators will be less likely to provide either private or non-targetable goods. 
1.3 Findings 
To measure the personal vote-seeking behaviour of legislators I use three proxies of 
legislators’ behaviour. First, I analyse the patterns of bill introduction in the 
Honduran Congress for each of the elected legislators between 1990 and 2010. 
Second, I use data from surveys conducted with Honduran legislators in the 
legislatures of 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010. The third type of data I employ relates to 
geographically-allocated spending at the Honduran Social Investment Fund, an 
institution created in 1990 to tackle poverty as a result of structural adjustment 
policies. In this case, the dataset is disaggregated at the sub-constituency level—i.e. 
by municipality—and runs from January 1990 to December 2009. 
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One of the main objectives of this dissertation was to test Carey and Shugart’s 
(1995) hypotheses that under CLPR the incentives to seek personal votes increase 
the smaller the district magnitude and that the opposite will happen in OLPR. From 
the results of the quantitative analyses we cannot confidently conclude that the 
change to OLPR in Honduras generated the incentives for legislators to seek 
personal votes in the way suggested by Carey and Shugart (1995) and later examined 
by Crisp et al. (2004) in a cross-country comparison. It was found that under CLPR 
legislators are more likely to provide targetable local and private goods the smaller 
the district magnitude. By contrast, under OLPR legislators in constituencies of all 
sizes tend to give more importance to pork-barrel politics and to the provision of 
private goods. However, while larger magnitude constituencies seem to have been 
more sensitive to the ballot type change, a significant cross-sectional variation was 
not found that could lead to the conclusion that OLPR increased intraparty 
competition in larger magnitude districts. It is clear, though, that under OLPR the 
provision of private and local public goods grew with increases in the number of 
seats per constituency. 
The same analysis revealed evidence in line with my expectation that the change 
to OLPR would cause legislators to attach lower levels of importance to the 
provision of non-targetable public goods. Finally, legislators whose personal 
attributes increase their recognizability are more likely to provide non-targetable 
public goods in OLPR than in CLPR.   
1.4 Thesis structure 
This dissertation comprises seven chapters. Chapter 2 has two main parts: the first 
part is dedicated a review of the literature on the relationship between electoral 
systems and the personal vote-seeking behaviour of legislators, as well as to 
providing alternative explanations for this behaviour. In the second part I develop 
my argument. In Chapter 3 I explain the research design. Considering the amount of 
empirical information collected for the present work, it was decided to dedicate 
Chapter 4 to the description of the dependent variables that are used to measure the 
legislators’ personal vote-seeking behaviour. Chapter 5 presents the analysis of bill 
initiation in the Honduran Congress, while Chapter 6 is dedicated to the analysis of 
parliamentarian elite survey data. Chapter 7 is the last of the empirical analysis 
chapters. There I use the data provided by the Honduran Social Investment Fund to 
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test hypotheses especially related to pork-barrel politics. In Chapter 8 I present the 
conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
Electoral systems and the incentives to seek 
personal votes 
 
 
Since the pioneering work of Duverger (1954), an extensive body of research has 
significantly improved our understanding of the effects of electoral formulas on the 
formation of party systems. However, and as has been noted by Colomer (2011) and 
Shugart (2005), it was not until very recently that social scientists began to pay 
particular attention to the implications of electoral systems on the intraparty 
dimension. I am particularly interested in the effects of electoral systems on the 
personal vote-seeking behaviour of legislators. The personal vote is understood as the 
“portion of a candidate’s electoral support which originates in his or her personal 
qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain et al., 1987, p. 9).  In contrast, 
the party vote is defined by Cain et al. (1987) as those votes motivated by 
non-candidate attributes, such as reactions to contemporary national economic and 
social issues and conditions.  
Significant theoretical and empirical contributions have been made in an effort 
to understand the effects of electoral systems on legislators’ behaviour. However, 
competing theories and a lack of sound empirical evidence have restricted their 
explanatory potential. In this chapter I aim to provide a model of the interaction 
between electoral systems and legislators’ behaviour. As I will further explain, what is 
known as pork-barrel (or simply pork) is one of the manifestations of legislators’ 
personal vote-seeking behaviour. But it is not the only one, even though more often 
than not in the specialized literature personal vote-seeking behaviour is equated with 
the provision of goods to constituencies (Martin, 2011). 
I contend that in the literature there has been a tendency to compartmentalize 
the potential effects that electoral systems can have on legislators’ work, leading to 
reductionist viewpoints; for example, by equating personal vote-seeking behaviour 
with pork-barrel politics. I argue that legislators choose among different behavioural 
strategies in order to seek personal votes, and that while pork-barrelling is one of the 
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most important of these strategies, it is not the only one. Some legislators will focus 
on non-targetable public goods, while others will favour interest groups. What 
determines the choice of strategy is a combination of the interaction between type of 
ballot and district magnitude, as well as the personal background of the legislator. My 
research focuses on two electoral systems: closed-list proportional representation 
(CLPR) and open-list proportional representation (OLPR). I expect that pork-barrel 
politics—which, as I will explain later, can be subsumed under the label constituency 
service—will increase as district magnitude (M) gets smaller. That effect will be 
stronger under CLPR than under OLPR. By contrast, the importance legislators give 
to providing non-targetable public goods increases with district magnitude, 
particularly under CLPR. I also expect that the provision of private goods to interest 
groups will be more important under OLPR than CLPR, especially as district 
magnitude increases. Finally, the personal background of legislators is a factor in the 
behavioural strategies they choose, especially in contexts of high intraparty 
competition, i.e. in medium and larger district magnitudes under OLPR. 
This chapter is divided into four major sections. In the first section, I set out 
the puzzle of the relationship between electoral systems and the personal vote, which 
is based on whether institutions can explain the behaviour of human beings, in this 
case in particular, politicians. In the second section, I describe the different strategies 
legislators can choose from when seeking the personal vote. I also review the 
relevant literature and show that the scholarly debate has focused on whether the 
interaction of district magnitude and ballot structure has a particular impact on 
legislators’ personal vote-seeking behaviour. In this literature review I present 
alternative explanations to the personal vote-seeking behaviour of legislators. The 
last part of this chapter is devoted to developing the main argument of this 
dissertation.  
2.1 A puzzle: rational choice, electoral systems, and the personal 
vote 
Within a rational choice new-institutionalist tradition, the effect of electoral systems 
on the actual behaviour of elected politicians towards their parties and towards those 
who voted for them has been much debated.10 Electoral systems can be understood 
                                                 
10 New Institutionalism is a term that encompasses several theories that stress the influence of formal 
and informal institutions on individuals’ behaviour. One of the trends within neo-institutionalism is 
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as formal institutions whose role is to “determine the means by which votes are 
translated into seats in the process of electing politicians into office” (Farrell, 
2011, p. 4).11 Shugart (2005) suggests the term intraparty effects to differentiate the 
possible consequences of electoral systems on the behaviour of legislators and 
candidates from the interparty effects, which describes how electoral systems affect 
party systems.12 Following this path of analysis, the way voters cast their votes for 
parties or for candidates might be a determining factor.  
Key theoretical contributions in the field of electoral systems and the personal 
vote make the assumption that legislators are primarily driven by a desire for re-
election. It is usually assumed that once in office, legislators will adapt their 
behaviour to favour strategies that maximize their chances of achieving that goal. 
Since electoral systems are the formal rules under which candidates compete for the 
votes that secure them seats, different electoral system types will lead to disparate 
strategies for obtaining votes (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Cox, 1987; Katz, 1980). 
Party-centred electoral systems, i.e. where leaders control access to the list, encourage 
                                                                                                                                     
rational choice institutionalism, which is inspired by theories developed in economics. As in 
institutional economics, rational choice political scientists make the assumption that, in politics, 
individuals pursue their self-interest and opt for those strategies that will most benefit them. In this 
regard, from a new-institutionalist perspective, formal and informal institutions set the rules of human 
interaction. Institutions provide individuals with information cues that enable them to make strategic 
decisions that minimize their losses and maximize their benefits to achieve their goals (Hall & Taylor, 
1996; North, 1990). 
11 This definition is shared by others (Cox, 1997; Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005b; Norris, 2004; 
Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). 
12 In terms of interparty effects, as Shugart (2005) explains, since Duverger’s (1954—originally 
published in French in 1952) canonical contribution an ever-growing literature on the topic has been 
produced. That literature has in part revolved around the discussion of what later came to be known 
as Duverger’s laws, which state that “the simple-majority single-ballot system (i.e. simple majority rule) 
favors the two-party system” and that “the simple-majority system with second ballot and 
proportional representation favors multipartyism” (quoted in Cox, 1997, p.14). This so-called 
mechanical effect seems to be confirmed by the actual observation of cases that use plurality and have 
two-party systems, notably the United States and Great Britain. However, these propositions have 
been disputed several times. One of the major debates comes from the identification of psychological 
effects that could be caused by electoral systems, or in Cox’s (1997, pp. 30–32) terms, the effects of 
strategic voting. This term describe a tendency among voters to cast their votes for candidates or parties 
that they believe have a potential to win even when their actual preference is for a different candidate 
or party. In other words, voters do not want to waste their vote on options that do not have the 
chance to win. Strategic voting is associated mainly with plurality rule systems; we can therefore 
surmise that this tendency towards strategic voting, and not the plurality rule, would explain the 
pattern that associates plurality with two-party systems. However, as Cox (1997) himself notes, on the 
basis of previous works by Leys (1959) and Sartori (1968), strategic voting also exists in PR systems. 
Another discussion has focused on PR systems, specifically on ways to predict and measure the 
proportionality of seat allocation among political parties using different electoral formulas (e.g. 
Gallagher, 1991; Lijphart, 1990). In addition, Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and Taagepera (2007) have 
theorized on the potential effects electoral systems have on the effective number of parties, which is a 
measure that “indicates the number of hypothetical equal-sized parties that would have the same 
effect on fractionalization of the party system as have the actual parties of varying sizes” (Taagepera & 
Shugart, 1989, p. 79). 
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party vote-seeking, while candidate-centred electoral systems―where some form of 
preferential vote is used―encourage personal vote-seeking behaviour in legislators 
(Hicken & Simmons, 2008).  
If the re-election seeking assumption is valid, electoral systems would be an 
important explanatory factor for the majority of legislators’ important daily decisions, 
with significant consequences for governments’ policies. For Cox & McCubbins 
(2001, p. 38), the degree to which electoral systems generate incentives to seek 
personal votes can determine major policy outcomes. According to these scholars, 
legislators’ personal vote-seeking behaviour is cultivated to a greater extent than any 
other strategy by: (1) providing private or local public goods and services to their 
constituents, and (2) providing particularistic favours to specific interest groups. It 
has been acknowledged in the literature that electoral systems where votes are cast 
for the candidate instead of the party encourage legislators to cultivate personal 
reputations. Thus, the provision of goods and services as described in (1) and (2) is 
more likely to occur in such systems than in situations where the electoral rules 
privilege party reputations, typically CLPR (Crisp et al., 2004; Shugart, 2005; 
Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). 
2.2 Forms of behavioural strategies 
As we noted in the previous section, for many scholars in the rational choice 
tradition, legislators’ desire to be re-elected is the key factor in explaining their 
personal vote-seeking behaviour. Strøm (1997), however, argues that legislators 
assume different roles in parliament and can be motivated by other institutional 
incentives, not just re-election. He uses the term behavioural strategies to describe the 
different roles parliamentarians can take on in pursuit of a specific goal (Strøm, 1997, 
p. 157). As previously explained, according to Cox & McCubbins’ (2001) theory, in 
candidate-centred systems the provision of local public and private goods and 
services to constituents and interest groups are the strategies with the most potential 
to bring in the votes that rational incumbent legislators need to win their re-election. 
However, what constitutes these activities and in relation to what they are preferable 
is not clear in their model.  
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Crisp et al. (2004) provide a classification of targetable and non-targetable 
parliamentarian behavioural outcomes.13 Targetable benefit is taken to mean private 
goods and local public goods, while non-targetable benefits refer to public goods (Crisp et 
al., 2004, p. 836; see also Persson & Tabellini, 2000, pp. 215-218). As I will explain in 
the following sections, the connection between legislators’ behaviour and targetable 
benefits is easier to understand, and the related literature, while it is diverse, has 
tended to focus on two major outcomes: the representation of interest groups and 
constituency service. In contrast, identifying the association between legislators’ 
behaviour and non-targetable benefits can be rather difficult. In the next two 
sections I will expand the discussion on these two issues. 
2.2.1 Targetable benefit strategies 
I classify targetable or particularistic benefit strategies into constituency service and the 
representation of interest groups. 
Constituency service 
Pork-barrel politics, brokerage, clientelism, and patronage can be subsumed into the 
comprehensive concept of constituency service. Based on an analysis of the behaviour of 
members of the United States Congress, Fenno (1978) puts forward the following 
definition of this concept: “[m]any activities can be incorporated under the rubric of 
‘district service’, or ‘constituent service,’ but the core activity is providing help to 
individuals, groups, and localities in coping with the federal government” (p. 101).  
While it is assumed that pork-barrelling, clientelism, and patronage are used to 
pursue a similar objective, which is to attract votes within an electoral district for a 
candidate or a party, I contend that these are different activities whose concepts 
should not be confused, and that researchers must be careful in considering their 
definitions. Pork-barrel can be understood as a form of particularism where 
legislators try to secure spending from a common-pool resource to invest in projects 
in their constituencies (Carey, 1996; Hallerberg & Marier, 2004; Persson & Tabellini, 
2000).14  
                                                 
13 They specifically analyse bills presented by legislators. In Chapter 4 I discuss Crisp et al.’s (2004) 
contribution because I employ a similar methodology to test the empirical implications of the theory 
developed in the present chapter. 
14 The term pork-barrel, according to Patrick, Pious and Ritchie (2001), originated during the pre-Civil 
War period in the United States (first half of the 1800s), when slaves working in plantations in the 
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Thus, pork-barrelling normally refers to the use of national funds to benefit a 
set of recipients in a given area or constituency. The set of recipients is usually 
constituted by diffuse groups within a constituency’s population. This means that, 
very often, some of them indirectly receive benefits without the existence of a 
previous agreement with the politician. For example, in a constituency voters can be 
divided between those who support the Red Party and those who support the Blue 
Party. A legislator from the Red Party who manages to secure funds for the 
construction of a school in that constituency is indirectly creating benefits for the 
Blue Party’s sympathizers. Another particularistic characteristic of pork-barrelling 
which distinguishes it from clientelism and patronage is that the goods and services 
for which the legislator seeks to provide funds are public goods and services. In this 
regard, when a legislator secures spending from the central government for the 
construction or maintenance of bridges, roads, schools, or clinics in her constituency, 
these remain public and do not belong to private individuals.   
In contrast, in clientelism and patronage politics, there is a relationship between 
patron and client, where the patron (i.e. a legislator) demands votes in exchange for 
favours. In the case of patronage the exchange is simpler to identify: politicians offer 
their supporters and voters public sector jobs if they vote for them or help them 
during their electoral campaigns (Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Golden, 2003; Gordin, 
2002). Clientelism often involves agreements between politicians and individual 
potential voters. Kitshelt & Wilkinson (2007) suggest that a clientelistic relationship 
usually involves a “direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct 
payments” (p. 2). Those payments can be in cash. For example, in Honduras, the 
President of the National Congress manages a discretionary budget that he 
distributes among legislators; those funds are called subsidios. Honduran deputies 
often give the money from subsidios to poor citizens, who use it for purposes such 
as buying medicines and even to pay the costs of transportation from their 
hometowns to the capital.15 The exchange between patron and client can also be in 
                                                                                                                                     
South would dip their hands into barrels of salted pork for food. The term has become normal usage 
in American English to describe when members of Congress, senators, and members of the House of 
Representatives try to secure federal funds to bring projects to their constituencies for re-election 
purposes. 
15 Since 2010, some Honduran deputies have begun posting their expense reports on their personal 
pages on the National Congress website. National Party legislator Donaldo Reyes-Avelar, for instance, 
provides a list of individuals to whom he directly conceded money from his 2010 subsidios fund, as 
well as the amount given in each case and what the funds were used for. Among other things, 
according to this expense report, individuals who asked for money from this deputy used it to pay for 
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kind; for example, a letter from a deputy may facilitate a constituency member 
getting an earlier appointment at a public clinic. 
A fourth term connected with constituency service is brokerage. This concept is 
rather elusive and easy to confuse with clientelism or pork-barrel politics. For 
Gallagher & Komito (2009), however, the terms have different meanings. According 
to these scholars, and in reference to the constituency service experience of TDs 
(members of Dáil Éireann, the Irish lower house of parliament), one of the 
parliamentarian roles of TDs is to represent their constituencies and, in order to 
perform this task, they sometimes have to use their influence to intercede on behalf 
of their constituents in government. However, this does not imply that the legislator 
has any power in the decision to use public goods to benefit specific recipients: 
[T]he word ‘clientelism’ is simply not appropriate to describe what TDs 
do in their role as constituency representatives. It is more realistic to see 
TDs as being engaged in ‘brokerage’, a distinct concept. A broker deals 
in access to those who control resources rather than directly in the 
resources themselves; there might be situations in which a person wants 
something but is unable or unwilling to obtain it from the actor who has 
it, in which case the services of a broker may be useful. Once the service 
has been provided, the brokerage relationship ends. The main difference 
between brokerage and clientelism is that clientelism implies a more 
intense, more permanent relationship. It involves ‘clients’, people who 
are in some way tied in to the person who does things for them, whereas 
‘brokerage’ implies a relationship that is not institutionalised (Gallagher 
& Komito, 2009, p. 243). 
With regard to pork-barrel politics, sometimes legislators might manage public 
funds that they can then redistribute in their constituencies (Carey, 1996; Keefer & 
Khemani, 2009). In this case, following the definition above, there is obviously not a 
brokerage relationship, since there is no mediation between the constituents and the 
deputy who controls the resources. It can also happen that during negotiation of the 
annual budget, legislators might try to secure funds for projects for their 
constituencies (Ferejohn, 1974; Lyne, 2008; Stratmann & Baur, 2002). During the 
budget negotiation process legislators can ask the authorities to earmark funds for 
specific projects in their constituencies. Finally, occasionally legislators intermediate 
between the governmental institutions that manage public funds and their 
constituents (Suiter & O’Malley, 2012). These last two situations are examples of 
                                                                                                                                     
medicines, food, school books, and “humanitarian assistance for an unemployed person” (Reyes-
Avelar, 2010).  
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brokerage relationships, but in the realm of pork-barrel politics. Therefore, I make a 
theoretical distinction in this chapter between pork-barrel politics and brokerage. 
Nonetheless, the empirical disentanglement of the brokerage work of legislators from 
pork-barrelling or even clientelism and patronage might be hampered by data 
limitations.16 
Representation of interests groups 
In terms of the representation of interest groups, the literature tends to associate 
legislators’ strategic behaviour with campaign finance (Bawn & Thies, 2003; Chang et 
al., 2011; Denzau & Munger, 1986). Denzau & Munger (1986) summarize that 
relationship in the sense that “interest groups offer contributions to legislators in 
exchange for legislators’ efforts on each interest group’s behalf” (1986, pp. 90-91).  
One could also add, following Strøm (1997), that some parliamentarians have a 
role representing their political parties. According to Strøm, a deputy can have 
several motivations in representing her political party’s interests, e.g. securing 
renomination, gaining a party leadership or party whip position, or in order to join 
steering committees. Whether the representation of parties implies non-targeted 
strategies rather than targeted ones can be contended. One can argue that by 
representing their parties, legislators are representing the parties’ policy positions in 
parliament and, certainly, that means adhering to the party’s point of view regarding 
the distribution of public goods. Furthermore, sometimes legislators specifically 
represent the interests of the party, for example, by commemorating special dates for 
the party or by advocating for the national recognition of their party leaders. This 
could be related to the strategic behaviour of a legislator to seek votes for the party 
that in turn could bring her benefits as well.  
To summarize, Figure 2.1 outlines a classification of the targetable behavioural 
strategies of legislators—what I also label particularism. This can be divided into two 
types of strategy: representation of interest groups and constituency service. In terms 
of the representation of interest groups, the private benefits can be either for the 
interest groups or for the party. When we talk about constituency service, we might 
be referring to pork-barrel politics, brokerage, clientelism, or patronage. 
                                                 
16 I will go back to this empirical issue in the description of the dependent variables used in this work 
in Chapter 4.  
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Legislators’ targetable benefits strategies 
2.2.2 Non-targetable strategies 
While other activities can have direct and indirect consequences on the creation of 
public goods, by formulating broad bills, discussing them and converting them into 
laws, legislators are engaging in different sub-sets of related activities, which ceteris 
paribus can help them pursue their re-election. For example, through participation in 
general legislative committees legislators can seek to influence the distribution of 
targetable public goods. As the American congressional experience exemplifies, the 
importance of committees rests upon the possibility that if they are modelled “as 
having substantial (and exogenous) institutional powers—ex post vetoes and the 
right to bring bills to the floor under closed rules, for example—then they end up 
exerting considerable influence over policy” (Cox & McCubbins, 2007, p. 150). 
Legislators can also use their plenary time to add topics of their interest to the public 
opinion agenda or to delay voting on bills (Cox, 2006).  
Like Cox and McCubbins (2001) and Crisp et al. (2004), in the remainder of 
this dissertation, and especially in chapters 5 and 6, I will make continued reference 
to two types of targetable benefits: private goods delivered to interest groups and 
local public goods, which are constituency services such as those described in Figure 
2.1 above, in particular pork-barrel politics. By contrast, I will refer to general public 
goods as those which are intended to generate benefits across an entire country as 
opposed to goods which are targered at a population within a constituency or at a 
specific group. Is this particular case, I study legislation formulated by legislators as a 
form of general public good. 
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2.3 Explanatory factors of personal vote-seeking strategies 
There are different factors that can help explain the behaviour of legislators. These 
can be classified into institutional and non-institutional explanations. The former can 
be further divided into explanations based on electoral systems and those that take 
into account other formal institutions. Non-institutional explanations are usually 
associated with sociological factors. The present section is divided into three parts. 
Firstly, I discuss the institutional explanations, paying particular attention to the 
aspects of electoral systems associated with personal vote-seeking incentives. In this 
regard, according to Carey & Shugart (1995), ballot structure, the ways in which votes 
are pooled, and the types of vote, along with district magnitude, are the key elements 
in electoral systems that have the potential to impact on legislators’ personal vote-
seeking behaviour. Secondly, I address the expected interaction between ballot type 
and district magnitude. In the third part, I study alternative, non-institutional 
explanations of personal vote-seeking behaviour.  
2.3.1 Ballot structure, vote pooling and types of votes 
In addition to district magnitude, Carey & Shugart (1995) identify three elements of 
electoral systems that can have an effect on the personal vote-seeking behaviour of 
legislators: ballot control, vote pooling, and type of vote. Ballot control is the power 
party leaders have over the nomination of candidates in the party list. In closed-list 
PR systems where there are no primary elections, party leaders exercise total control 
over the candidate nomination process. However, in PR systems that use preferential 
voting—i.e. where voters have the possibility to cast a vote for the candidate instead 
of the party—the power to decide which candidates have a chance to win the 
elections is, all other factors being constant, given to the voter.  
Vote pooling means whether a vote for a candidate also contributes to the total 
number of seats the party wins in a district. This can be done in three ways. First, 
that even when preferential voting exists votes are pooled first at the party level and 
then redistributed to the candidates. Second, that pooling is done at the sub-party 
level, i.e. across factions. And, third, that there is no pooling at all; in other words, 
votes count directly to the candidate’s pool of votes. Finally, types of votes classifies 
electoral systems according to whether they allow voters to cast a single vote for a 
party, multiple votes, or to cast a single vote for a candidate. Systems with the 
possibility to cast multiple votes include those that use primary elections and then 
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general elections, the PR-single transferable vote (PR-STV), and the open-ballot with 
panachage, which allows voting for candidates from multiple party lists (Gallagher & 
Mitchell, 2005a, p. 590).17 
Electoral systems are usually classified into plurality and PR (Cox, 1997; Farrell, 
2011; Sartori, 1997; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). That classification is useful in 
comparative analyses—typically of different countries—where the researcher can 
study the variation in the interparty effects of the formulas used to convert votes into 
seats. Plurality rule, also known as first-past-the-post, uses single-member districts 
(SMD), and the formula employed to convert votes is very simple: the candidate who 
gets 50 per cent plus 1 of the votes wins a seat. By contrast, PR systems use different 
mathematical formulas to allocate seats in multi-member electoral districts in 
proportion with the votes each party obtains (Farrell, 2011; Gallagher & Mitchell, 
2005a). However, in terms of the intraparty effects they produce, the classification of 
electoral rules usually distinguishes between systems where votes are cast for parties 
and systems where votes are given to candidates. The first refers to closed-list 
systems while the second includes a broader variety of electoral rules, from plurality 
to different varieties of list systems under PR (Shugart, 2005). 
The present study focuses primarily on the closed-list PR (CLPR) and the 
open-list PR (OLPR) systems.18 Because of their design, these systems represent 
extreme opposites in terms of the incentives they produce for legislators to adopt 
personal vote-seeking strategies. In CLPR systems, voters “have absolutely no input” 
(Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005a, p. 589); the integration and the order of party lists are 
determined during the candidate selection process before the election takes place. In 
OLPR, voters can indicate their preference for candidates within lists, determining 
candidates’ access to the ballot. In contrast to what happens in CLPR, in OLPR the 
order of candidates in the party list is not ranked, giving to virtually all candidates the 
same probability of being elected. In OLPR contexts, votes for candidates are pooled 
at the party level and seats are allocated depending on the relative number of votes 
that each candidate obtains.  
                                                 
17 As explained by Gallagher and Mitchell (2005a), “[u]nder the PR-STV the voter has, as the name 
suggests, just one vote, but when casting is given the opportunity to rank the candidates in order of 
choice” (p. 593). 
18 One of the main differences of PR systems compared to the plurality rule system is that district 
magnitude is larger than 1; that is, they allow for multi-member constituencies. Polities that use the 
plurality rule imply single-member constituencies. 
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In the literature there seems to exist a consensus that CLPR increases party 
reputations, and that systems where votes are cast for candidates can be correlated 
with higher personal reputation activity among legislators (e.g. Carey, 1996; 2009; 
Carey & Shugart, 1995; Katz, 1980; Shugart, 2005). A large amount of the research is 
based on analyses of the American legislature and its electoral system, the plurality 
rule, where candidates compete in single member constituencies and the winner is 
the one who gets the majority of votes (Bowler, Donovan & van Heerde, 2005). For 
example, the works by Mayhew (1974) and Fenno (1978) have become classics of 
parliamentary and electoral systems studies. Both scholars agree that the incentive of 
re-election combined with the nature of the plurality rule system in the United States 
generates constituency-oriented legislators, with consequences for party strength.19 
OLPR can be considered a system that generates strong incentives to look for 
personal votes instead of party votes. Regarding the Brazilian experience using open-
list PR, in the early 1990s Mainwaring wrote: “the effects of the electoral system 
begin with the campaign but go far beyond it. Once elected, representatives can act 
independently of party programs with almost no chance of sanctions” 
(1991, pp. 27-28). Finland is another country that uses OLPR, exhibiting similar 
consequences to the case of Brazil in terms of the effects of the personal vote-
seeking behaviour of legislators, which can be maintained even to the detriment of 
party reputations (Raunio, 2005).  
Nevertheless, other evidence contradicts the potential of analyses of electoral 
systems to predict the behaviour of legislators. The United Kingdom uses a plurality 
rule system for the election of members of parliament (MPs) of the House of 
Commons similar to the US electoral system. However, British MPs are more 
inclined to follow the party line and are less constituency-oriented than their 
American counterparts (Cain et al., 1987; Cox, 1987). India is another country that 
uses the plurality rule. There is evidence that in this country legislators, even when 
they have the chance to build their personal reputations and compete for personal 
votes, emphasize the reputations of their parties when seeking re-election (Keefer & 
Khemani, 2009). Contradicting evidence is also found in PR systems. Brazil itself in 
                                                 
19 A more fragmented party representation within Congress and lower levels of support for the 
executive’s decisions when these imply costs for their constituencies are among the consequences for 
which the plurality rule system is criticized in the United States (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1987; Cox 
& McCubbins, 2007; McGillivray, 2004). 
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recent years shows that, in spite of the adoption of the OLPR system, legislators 
sometimes choose to attach greater weight to their parties’ reputations than to their 
personal reputations (Hagopian, Gervasoni & Moraes, 2009; Lyne, 2008; Samuels, 
1999). Costa Rica is a country that uses CLPR and its constitution does not allow for 
the immediate re-election of deputies. Theoretically, under these circumstances, 
legislators should find little incentive to build personal reputations, in particular by 
bringing particularistic benefits to their constituencies. However, Carey (1996) has 
found that in fact legislators in Costa Rica seek, through particularistic means, to gain 
votes for their parties. Thus, they use personal-vote seeking attributes to attract votes 
for their parties. 
Despite the contradictory evidence, a number of scholars have put forward 
alternative explanations to the puzzle of the personal/party vote-seeking behaviour 
of legislators. Carey (1996), based on his analysis of Costa Rican deputies, believes 
that legislators have incentives for pork-barrel politics other than simply staying in 
office for another term. For instance, the possibility of attaining a top hierarchical 
position in the public sector, for example as a minister or ambassador, motivates 
legislators to seek votes for their parties. In a similar vein, the internal party 
organization can be determining in creating different career incentives for legislators, 
who weigh up which strategies will provide them with the most revenue, taking into 
consideration their own political and economic resources and those controlled by the 
party leaders (Carey, 1996; Samuels, 1999).  
Similarly, Strøm (1997) argues that there are several types of institutional 
incentives which help to orientate the legislator’s work, be it in a direction that 
privileges her constituency, interest groups she is connected with, or her party. He 
suggests that in addition to access to the ballot and re-election, other institutions 
constrain legislators’ behaviour, especially their parties’ rules and structures and the 
parliament’s rules and structures. From this point of view, studies analysing the 
behaviour of legislators tend to neglect these other variables, which sometimes have 
a stronger explanatory potential than electoral systems in and of themselves. 
Strøm (1997) also questions the assumption that re-election is the most important 
factor influencing legislators’ work in parliament. According to him, parliamentarians 
have career advancement incentives within their own parties, parliaments, and in the 
government’s institutions. 
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Strøm’s (1997) theory departs from the observation highlighted by others (he 
cites the work by Searing, 1994) that deputies assume several roles in their 
parliamentary work, but some specialize in certain areas, e.g. as constituency servers, 
party leaders and parliamentary leaders. This pattern is observable in most political 
systems, in spite of their differing electoral rules. This can be seen in the case of the 
United Kingdom (studied by Searing, 1994) and in Honduras. In this, 
Taylor-Robinson (2010) classifies Honduran parliamentarians according to three 
roles: congress advocates, party deputies, and constituency servers. The congress 
advocate role is “based on a preference to build the Congress as an institution, 
increasing both congressional independence from the executive and backbenchers’ 
independence from party leaders” (p. 132). From her point of view, party deputies 
are those who “construct their role around two elements: their party’s goal to win the 
presidency so it will control the state’s patronage resources, and the Congress’s 
oversight duty” (p. 135). Finally, constituency servers work as parliamentarians 
securing goods for their constituencies and helping individuals.  
Additionally, party and parliamentary institutions other than the electoral 
systems and sometimes in combination with them seem to affect the behaviour of 
legislators. For example, party regulation in Brazil facilitates party switching. 
Desposato (2006) finds evidence that suggests that for Brazilian legislators, the 
characteristics of their constituencies and differences in the incentives provided by 
political parties is a key factor that legislators take into consideration when deciding 
which party they will switch to. Other studies focus on the incentives provided 
within the parliamentary structure; for instance, committee assignments and pork-
resources within parliament (Cox & McCubbins, 2007; Martin, 2012). Furthermore, 
other political institutions, such as the constitutional structure, i.e. parliamentary or 
presidential, and federalism, can also impact the behaviour of legislators (Carey, 2007; 
2009). 
In addition to these institutional incentives, other scholars stress the influence 
of the individual characteristics of legislators. Factors such as experience, education, 
and seniority within parliament can be predictors of the personal vote-seeking 
behaviour of legislators. For example, more influential legislators, such as senior 
politicians with past experience as legislators or party leaders, might have easier 
access to pork-barrel resources (Golden & Picci, 2008). The capability of legislative 
candidates to finance their campaigns is another variable that could explain the 
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personal or party vote-seeking behaviour of legislators. Incumbent legislators who do 
not have enough personal financial resources to pay for their campaigns might feel 
obliged to align their re-election strategies with those of their parties (Samuels, 1999).  
2.3.2 District magnitude 
Much of the discussion regarding the potential intraparty effects electoral systems 
create has focused on the incentives for intraparty competition resulting from the 
interaction between type of ballot and district magnitude (M) as theorized by Carey 
and Shugart (1995). Systems where party leaders do not control candidate selection, 
such as in OLPR, will motivate candidates to differentiate their electoral pledges 
from those of their co-partisans. On this basis, candidates would have greater 
incentive to attract personal votes instead of party votes. The incentives to seek 
personal votes are higher as M increases, because there are more candidates to 
compete against; the effect is the opposite when party leaders control the candidate 
nominations, namely under CLPR. In this case, Carey and Shugart (1995) argue that 
candidates have more chances to be individually identified by voters in small 
constituencies, which means they have more incentives to look for a personal vote. 
Incumbent legislators can use the resources available to them to compete for votes 
under different electoral systems frameworks, for example, through pork-barrel 
strategies. This interaction between M and type of ballot is depicted in Figure 2.2 
below. 
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Figure 2.2. The differential effect of district magnitude on the intraparty dimension 
Source: Shugart (2005, p. 47). 
Empirically, there is some evidence that supports the arguments put forward by 
Carey and Shugart (1995).  Shugart, Valdini and Suominen (2005), doing a cross-
sectional comparison of six European countries, find that electoral systems affect 
Open-list PR 
Closed-list PR 
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voters’ behaviour in their demand for information about candidates’ attributes.20 
According to the authors, where voters’ demand for information cues is high, 
legislators will be more likely to exhibit their local personal attributes. The demand 
for information is related to the type of electoral system in place. Under open-ballot 
systems as district magnitude increases, the voters’ demand for information cues will 
increase and candidates will tend to appeal to their personal attributes, such as their 
community work or birthplace backgrounds. The same is expected to occur when 
district magnitude is low under closed-list systems.  
Similarly, Crisp et al. (2004), doing a cross-national study of six Latin American 
presidential democracies,21 find a statistically significant relationship in the interaction 
effect between the type of ballot and district magnitude and the type of bills 
legislators introduce. Basically, in countries where the electoral system encourages 
legislators to seek personal votes bills with local characteristics are presented more 
often than national-scope bills. Their findings are sensitive to the interaction of types 
of ballot and different district magnitudes.  
Chang and Golden (2007) use cross-sectional data on the perception of 
corruption and sub-national data on infrastructure contracts in Italy (e.g. 
construction of airports and roads) during the period OLPR was used as proxies of 
personal vote-seeking behaviour. They find that countries that use CLPR show lower 
levels of perception of corruption in expert/elite surveys as M decreases. Conversely, 
OLPR is correlated with higher perceptions of corruption as M tends to increase. 
André and Depauw (2012) collected data from parliamentarian surveys across 
15 European democracies. Focusing their attention on members of national and 
regional parliaments, they conducted a cross-sectional analysis using as a dependent 
variable the number of hours MPs spent in their constituencies doing constituency 
service activities. They classified the countries in their sample according to whether 
they used a closed list or some form of preferential list, such as OLPR in Austria and 
PR-STV in Ireland. They found evidence that indicates, as hypothesized by Carey 
and Shugart (1995), that the number of hours MPs dedicate to their constituencies 
can be related to the interaction between the type of ballot and the district 
                                                 
20 Their sample of countries is: Finland, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. 
21 The countries included in their study are: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, and 
Venezuela.  
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magnitude. In other words, their evidence suggests that in CLPR countries, the larger 
the district magnitude the smaller the amount of time MPs give to constituency 
service, and that in countries that use preferential voting systems, as M grows so too 
does the number of hours legislators dedicate to this activity. 
These previous studies represent significant attempts to quantitatively assess the 
empirical implications of Carey and Shugart’s (1995) theory. Nevertheless, they all 
have in common their use of cross-sectional analysis as research design to test that 
theory. This methodology generates divisions within the scholarly community. As 
Grofman and Fraenkel (2008) claim, much of the scepticism comes from the 
potential explanation of different factors that challenge the electoral systems’ 
explanations and the bias introduced in cross-national studies. Positive correlations 
between certain types of electoral systems with different proxies of legislators’ 
behaviour can sometimes be interpreted as a form of “selection bias connected to 
variations in cultural patterns and economic development that cannot be fully 
addressed with only cross-sectional data” (Grofman & Fraenkel, 2008. pp. 75-76).  
Furthermore, Carey and Shugart’s (1995) proposal has been challenged on 
theoretical grounds. Crisp, Jensen and Shomer (2007) contend that in Carey and 
Shugart’s model, M compounds both the competition between candidates from 
different parties for a seat and the intraparty competition. Thus, for Crisp, Jensen 
and Shomer (2007) the incentives to build a personal reputation and look for a 
personal vote are lost when using M as an indicator of intraparty competition. In this 
regard, they argue that challengers and incumbent candidates from the same party do 
not necessarily take into consideration the number of seats available when deciding 
whether they should choose a personal vote or a party vote strategy. Instead, they 
might consider other factors such as the number of seats their party is likely to win 
based on each party’s past electoral experience.  
Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008b) agree with Carey and Shugart (1995) that the 
value of personal reputation in CLPR systems is higher when M is very low. And as 
M increases, the personal attributes of legislators lose importance. However, they 
differ in two regards from Carey and Shugart’s (1995) model. First, they criticize 
Carey and Shugart’s emphasis on the personal vote-seeking incentive, which should 
become higher as the election approaches. In this regard, Siavelis and Morgenstern 
(2008b) try to focus on how legislators behave between electoral terms, which is how 
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they create constituent loyalty. Secondly, they claim that in OLPR systems the value 
of personal vote-seeking behaviour increases as M grows: 
With open-list systems, however, we diverge from Carey and Shugart’s 
logic and argue that as magnitude increases, the value of personal 
reputation in the election may increase as they contend, but the incentive 
to cultivate the loyalty of constituents for the long term actually 
decreases. Parties become almost irrelevant in large magnitude open-list 
systems, because of low thresholds to victory and the decreased 
importance of a party label (p. 13). 
Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006) state that in single-member districts 
legislators are easily identified as the providers of projects for their constituencies. 
However, in multi-member districts each legislator can receive a share of credit for 
the local goods provided in the constituency through the facilitation of projects by 
other co-partisans, “creating an incentive to free-ride” (p. 176). In addition, it has 
been noted in the literature that the variation in M is correlated with population. 
Furthermore, in most PR systems there is an endogenous relationship between 
district magnitude and the level of urbanization. Large M districts tend to have 
denser urban populations. Monroe and Rose (2002) believe that that variation district 
magnitude has an enormous impact on the representation of urban and rural 
interests in congress. According to their theory, given the covariance effect between 
M and urban and rural interests, the effect of M on representation within parliament 
will depend on the extent of the urban-rural differences in a given country, the 
institutional environment and how much these two co-vary. In other words, rural 
populations will tend to be over-represented by what Monroe and Rose (2002) call 
rural parties. This effect has been to a certain extent corroborated by Calvo and 
Murillo (2004) in their analysis of the impact of the electoral system and the 
patronage behaviour of Argentine deputies. 
Carey and Hix (2011) point out in a similar vein that the expected outcomes of 
electoral systems are only substantiated when district magnitude tends to be low 
(around six seats, they claim). This conjecture applies not only to the interparty 
effects of district magnitude that have caught much of the attention of electoral 
systems scholars (for a discussion see Cox, 1997), but also to the so-called intraparty 
effects. Electoral systems are sometimes designed to stress accountability, and other 
times they are tailored to generate more representativeness. Carey and Hix (2011) 
argue that the way in which a system accentuates one aspect or point on that 
continuum to the detriment of another is through district magnitude, provided that it 
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is low. Systems that reach a threshold of around six seats tend to reinforce the 
representativeness of the party as a whole, whereas lower district magnitudes tend to 
enforce the accountability of legislators to voters. 
Drawing from Latin American case studies and a deductive analysis of electoral 
and other formal political rules, Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008b) build a typology of 
different types of legislator behaviour. Once again, district magnitude and the type of 
ballot are placed at the epicentre of the range of potential behaviour of legislators. 
According to their theory, the electoral system type (with other institutional 
variables) can produce four different types of legislators: (1) constituent servant, 
(2) party loyalist, (3) entrepreneur, and (4) group delegate. For them, from a rough 
analysis, constituent servants are more likely to be found in districts that range from one 
to three seats. Party loyalists will be concentrated in constituencies where there are 
four or more legislators, particularly when closed-list ballot structures are being used. 
Entrepreneur legislators are to be found in constituencies where M is equal to or 
greater than seven. Group delegate legislators are those who are accountable mainly to 
interest groups. For Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008b), the influence of M is 
indeterminate in the formation of this type of legislator. 
2.3.3 Alternative explanations of personal vote-seeking behaviour 
There is scepticism about rational choice explanations of legislators’ behaviour, 
particularly in regard to the explanatory extent of electoral systems theories. In 
general, rational choice institutionalism is often criticized for ignoring other aspects 
of social interaction related to human psychology (Smith, 1991), culture, history, and 
geographic differences (Inglehart & Carballo, 1997; Weyland, 2002).  
Moreover, the study of electoral systems is sometimes plagued with 
methodological problems. For example, as discussed in section 2.3.2, in some PR 
systems district magnitude is very likely to be correlated with factors such as the size 
of the population, patterns of socioeconomic development, and urbanization. In the 
electoral studies literature, scholars have long argued about whether electoral systems 
shape societies or instead the former are the result of factors inherent to each society 
(Benoit, 2004; Colomer, 2004). For instance, the PR-STV electoral system used in 
Ireland is often accused of creating parliamentarians inclined toward particularism, 
sometimes to the detriment of national policies. However, some argue that localism 
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is an aspect rooted in Irish political culture, something that is not necessarily related 
to the electoral system (Gallagher, 1980; 2005b). 
For Keefer and Vlaicu (2008), the difference between pork-barrel politics and 
clientelism lies in the amount of work legislators dedicate to pork and other related 
activities, such as casework. They consider that in clientelistic countries, which are 
typically developing countries, legislators tend to devote most of their time to 
activities such as pork. The allegedly clientelistic behaviour of parliamentarians in 
these contexts could be related to personal vote seeking or to an adaptation process 
in which legislators and parties adopt strategies to attract the average voter in their 
respective constituencies. 
2.3.4 Concluding remarks on the literature on personal vote-seeking behaviour 
In this chapter I have reviewed some of the most cited contributions on electoral 
systems and the personal vote-seeking behaviour of legislators. Despite the close 
relationship between these two variables, highlighted by Carey and Shugart’s (1995) 
seminal paper, very often researchers focus on one or the other but do not study that 
relationship. This is probably because some of the most important theories on the 
personal vote have been developed based on the experiences of US Congress 
representatives, who are elected using the first-past-the-post system. For example, 
while there is abundant work on pork-barrel politics in the US, very little is known 
about what happens in other systems, particularly proportional representation 
systems (Denemark, 2000; Golden & Picci, 2008).  
Moreover, many important debates remain open, like the discussion initiated by 
Cox and McCubbins (1986), and furthered by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and 
others (e.g. Dixit & Londregan, 1996; McGillivray, 2004), on who gets pork benefits, 
core supporters or swing voters. In particular, we know very little about the causal 
chain in PR systems between legislators, parties, and particularistic outcomes. On the 
one hand, Cox and McCubbins (2001) argue that in candidate-centred electoral 
systems, particularism will predominate. On the other hand, others expect that, even 
in candidate-centred systems, activities such as pork-barrel politics will decrease in 
importance as district magnitude increases, given the difficulty in claiming credit 
when there are multiple competitors from the same party (Ashworth & Bueno de 
Mesquita, 2006; Lancaster, 1986).   
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Much of the academic discussion about the influence of electoral systems on 
legislators’ behaviour has gravitated around Carey and Shugart’s (1995) theory, in 
particular their predictions about the consequences of the combination of different 
types of ballots and candidate selection procedures with district magnitude.22 Their 
solely theoretical contribution has faced challenges on its empirical testing. As 
previously explained, cross-national studies cannot account for many idiosyncratic 
aspects of individual countries, like political culture, and case studies often hold the 
electoral system constant, leading to incomplete and necessarily biased inferences. In 
addition, case studies often necessarily hold constant key independent variables. 
Carey and Shugart’s (1995) model provides a rather intuitive and parsimonious 
explanation of the personal vote-seeking behaviour of candidates. However, given 
the contended aspects of their theory, highlighted by among others Crisp, Jensen and 
Shomer (2007), Grofman (1999), and Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008a), I believe that 
there is an issue that has received very little attention, namely that the behavioural 
strategies legislators choose vary according to the type of electoral system in use. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I develop an argument on how electoral systems can 
interact with legislators’ personal attributes in an effort to explain the choice of 
strategies to seek personal votes. 
2.4 Main argument 
One of the main goals of the present work is to test Carey and Shugart’s (1995) 
theory, controlling for different aspects that normally are difficult to account for in 
cross-national large-N, small-N analyses and case studies. However, by measuring the 
impact of electoral systems on legislators’ behaviour, what are being measured more 
precisely are the outcomes of the legislators’ work. In the discussion section of their 
article, Carey and Shugart (1995) mention some of the potential proxies for gauging 
legislators’ behaviour, such as roll-calls, amendments to bills, and the internal 
organization of legislatures. In terms of public policy, they expect that “more 
attention by legislators to personal reputation would generally lead to more ‘pork’ in 
a country’s budgets (…). Where, on the other hand, party reputation matters more, 
policymaking should be more ‘efficient’ (…) in the sense that voters vote on the 
                                                 
22 In some countries the ballot structure and candidate selection are combined in a single legal 
framework, for example, the electoral law. This is the case in Honduras. There are other cases where 
the norm for selecting candidates is entirely dependent on the party (e.g. Crisp et al., 2004). 
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basis of broad policy options rather than on the basis of promised particularistic 
benefits” (p. 433). 
I argue that a legislator’s choice of targetable or non-targetable personal vote-
seeking strategies depends on the district magnitude, the type of ballot, the principals, 
and the legislator’s personal attributes. My argument is similar to the one developed 
by other scholars who have studied cross-nationally the effects of electoral systems 
on economic policy outcomes. In this regard, these analyses generally focus on the 
simple dichotomy between plurality and PR. It is usually argued that the PR system is 
associated with allocation of public goods whose benefits reach voters across 
constituency boundaries, while in the plurality system there is a greater tendency 
towards the provision of targetable goods such as pork within the constituency 
boundaries. As a consequence, some expect PR systems to be correlated with 
outcomes such as welfare states, fiscal deficits, and a greater propensity for 
corruption than in plurality systems—given that there is more incentive for 
accountability from legislators to voters in the latter system (Austen‐Smith, 2000; 
Gassner, Ugarte & Verardi, 2006; Iversen & Soskice, 2006; Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & 
Rostagno, 2002; Persson & Tabellini, 2000; Persson & Tabellini, 2003). For example, 
in the monographic work by Chang et al. (2011), the authors expect to find that 
plurality systems create closer legislator-voter bonds that favour voters who demand 
politicians institute policies that help to keep the market prices of goods and services 
low. In contrast, for these scholars, PR generates quite indeterminate connections 
between principals and agents that sometimes favour the business elites as interest 
groups who finance the campaigns of incumbent legislators: 
plurality systems—or those plurality systems in which leading parties 
divide the vote not too unequally—will be systematically more pro-
consumer in their policies and will have significantly lower prices. 
Proportional representation (PR) systems, on the other hand, which by 
design do not greatly distort vote shares when converting them into seat 
shares, will be systematically more pro-producer in their policies and will 
have significantly higher prices (Chang et al., 2011, p. 25). 
Because there is inner variation in terms of district magnitude in countries that 
use PR, which is to say that small-M districts are less proportional than large-M 
districts (Lijphart, 1990, pp. 486−488), one could expect to find that the closer a 
constituency is to single-member seats, the stronger the legislator-voter bond. This 
situation generates more incentives for legislators to provide local public goods. In 
contrast, as M increases, the importance of pork decreases, the strength of interest 
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groups rises and so too does the possibility of legislators adopting non-targetable 
strategies. It has already been noted that pork tends to be more important in small-M 
constituencies in CLPR systems (Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, 2006; Lancaster, 
1986; Lancaster & Patterson, 1990). However, whether the effect is the same in 
OLPR systems is subject to debate (Carey & Shugart, 1995, p. 430). I argue that in 
OLPR systems pork is still most important in small-M constituencies, given the 
stronger legislator-voter connection. Considering that as M gets larger is more 
difficult to claim credit for individual projects, legislators probably need to increase 
their personal reputations by other means. As I will explain in detail in the remainder 
of this section, some legislators provide favours to interest groups in exchange for 
campaign finance. This is of particular importance in situations where there are 
diffused groups of policy-oriented voters. Therefore, interest groups and policy-
oriented voters are two sets of principals to which individual legislators might need 
to be accountable. Under these conditions, the decision of a legislator to favour 
specific sets of principals varies according to their personal attributes. For instance, a 
legislator who has been a local leader in the past will probably use that attribute to 
attract local votes, whereas a legislator whose background is as a widely recognized 
public figure will probably be more inclined towards broad policy-making. 
One could argue that the variation in particularism is not necessarily related to 
the type of institution, but to endogenous factors in constituencies. In other words, 
small-M districts are usually associated with low levels of development, which in turn 
translates into poverty, rural populations, and high illiteracy rates. These populations’ 
demands tend to be focused on pork, clientelism, and patronage (Taylor-Robinson, 
2010). In contrast, higher development is associated with more ideological and party-
oriented electorates, as well as with business elites. However, if electoral systems 
matter as in the ways outlined in the paragraph above, one should be able to observe 
an increase across district magnitudes in different forms of particularism in OLPR 
systems in comparison with CLPR. Moreover, non-targetable strategies should 
decrease in OLPR, particularly in constituencies where these activities are more 
important. 
2.4.1 Electoral systems, principal–agent relations, and legislators’ behavioural 
strategies 
Carey (2007; 2009) and Hix (2002; 2004) suggest that apart from voters, legislators 
must also pay heed to those who nominate them and to those who control key 
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resources. For both scholars, the identification of the main principal varies 
depending on the electoral system and the method of selection of candidates under 
which legislators are elected.23 For example, Carey (2009, p. 17) argues that in 
presidential democracies, when legislators are elected using electoral systems such as 
CLPR, legislators are accountable to party leaders, who control their nomination, but 
because the president controls public resources, they also have incentives to be 
accountable to that actor. Similarly, Hix (2004) notes that whether members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) are accountable to their national parties or to their 
European Parliament group depends on the method of selection of the candidate 
and the district magnitude where she was elected. In either case, independently from 
the form of government and the electoral system, for Carey (2009, p. 16), parties are 
accountable to voters because voters through their vote can reward or punish the 
party for its overall performance. Hence one can argue that, depending on the type 
of voters, party leaders will demand that legislators focus on particularistic goods or 
public goods. Under proportional representation systems if, as expected, voters in 
small-M constituencies are more constituency-oriented and the demands become 
more heterogeneous as district magnitude increases, one could also expect that public 
goods will be more important the larger the district magnitude. 
From a different viewpoint, Denzau and Munger (1986) explain that legislators 
face two competing principals: (1) the interest group that cannot vote but which is 
organized and able to financially contribute to the vote-producing campaigns of 
legislators, and (2) the voters, who are unorganized, assumed not to contribute to the 
campaigns of legislators but, at the same time, can decide the re-election future of 
these agents through their votes. For these scholars, in a single-member district 
(SMD) setting, interest groups have an opportunity to influence the policy choices of 
legislators when voters in a constituency are indifferent to the policy positions of the 
interest group. In consequence, unorganized voters who manifest specific 
preferences about policies will have their interests represented over those of the 
interest groups. 
Bawn and Thies (2003) build on Denzau and Munger’s (1986) argument but 
comparing plurality, CLPR, and mixed-member electoral systems settings. They put 
                                                 
23 In some countries the method of selection of candidates is institutionalized as part of its general 
electoral rules, while in others it is a feature that varies within each political party (Gallagher, 1988b). 
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forward a set of theoretical expectations of how legislators represent the unorganized 
interests of voters compared with those of organized interest groups. Regarding 
plurality (i.e. SMD) and CLPR, they expect that legislators will be more likely to 
favour interest groups in CLPR than in SMD settings. They believe so first because 
the efforts of legislators on behalf of constituents will convert into votes only in 
SMD, and in large constituencies voters tend to be ideologically heterogenous. 
Second, the efforts of a legislator for an unpopular interest—e.g. advocating for the 
tobacco industry—will disadvantage her most if she is elected under plurality because 
the costs of such actions are not shared among co-partisans. Third, parties will 
reward with nominations those legislators who bring more vote shares to the party. 
Because legislators are more committed to voters than to interest groups in the SMD, 
they have an extra incentive to support voters if they believe that by doing so can get 
endorsement for their party leaders. Fourth, “[t]he constraint of matching candidates 
to districts is absent under PR, leaving parties free to respond to the preferences of 
their favoured interest groups as to the ordering of the party list” (p. 15). And, fifth, 
candidates can more easily increase their reputation for how good they are at getting 
resources for their constituents in SMD; thus, they have less incentive to drive their 
strategy based on ideology, for which they would probably need campaign financing. 
Therefore, legislators are concerned not only with institutionalized principals—
e.g. party leaders, voters, and other actors like presidents or prime ministers. Interest 
groups are a potential principal, particularly in places where voters are more 
concerned about policy and ideology than particularism, and under proportional 
representation rather than plurality rule. This means that interest groups are more 
likely to be favoured by legislators in larger magnitude districts. In Bawn and 
Thies’ (2003) theory, it is not clear what can be expected from the relationship 
between legislators and interest groups under OLPR.24 I maintain that under this 
electoral system the importance legislators give to interest groups should increase 
even more with district magnitude, considering that in this case intraparty 
competition increases and that could cause the costs of electoral campaign to rise. 
Thus, legislators might seek funding from interest groups to finance the costs of their 
electoral campaigns. 
                                                 
24 Specifically, they say “[w]e believe that our model could be used to understand the incentives that 
other electoral rules (e.g. open-list PR-STV) generate as well” (Bawn & Thies, 2003, p.25). 
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Figure 2.3 depicts the expected interaction effects between electoral systems 
and the personal vote-seeking strategies chosen by legislators. I expect that, 
independently of the electoral system being used, non-targetable public goods and 
the representation of interest groups will be more important the larger the district 
magnitude. Nevertheless, in OLPR the importance legislators give to interest groups 
increases in comparison to CLPR, while legislators will be less likely to appeal to 
public goods in OLPR than in CLPR. Similarly, regardless of the electoral system, 
constituency service should be more important the smaller the district magnitude. 
Nevertheless, we should observe an increase in the importance attached to 
constituency service in larger district magnitude constituencies under an OLPR 
system. 
 
Figure 2.3. Theorized interactions between type of ballot and district magnitude on 
the choice of personal vote-seeking strategy. The black solid line indicates that under 
CLPR, non-targetable behavioural strategies and the representation of interest groups are 
virtually the same; thus, as district magnitude increases, so too does the likelihood that 
legislators will favour public goods and interest groups. In OLPR, the opposite can be 
expected, in other words, that non-targetable strategies will decrease at the same time that 
strategies for the representation of interest groups will increase. Activities under the label of 
constituency service in CLPR—indicated by the thick solid grey line—will be more 
important as M gets smaller. In OLPR their importance will increase in all constituencies 
regardless of the size of M, but constituency service will still be more important the smaller 
the district magnitude. 
2.4.2 Legislators’ personal attributes 
In Figure 2.3 we observed that public goods should not stop being provided in 
OLPR even when they are reduced (unlike in CLPR systems), and constituency 
service should increase in larger-M constituencies, even though it is difficult for 
several legislators in a constituency to claim credit for the same projects—if pork is 
the strategy chosen. This raises a number of questions. What makes a legislator 
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choose a strategy such as pork when the benefits are potentially only marginal in 
comparison with the alternatives in OLPR? Similarly, which legislators pick public 
goods rather than constituency service or the representation of interest groups in 
both types of system? I believe that the answers to those questions depend ceteris 
paribus on the personal attributes of legislators. 
In a CLPR context, as argued by Bawn and Thies (2003), party leaders will be 
concerned with increasing the vote advantage of the party. In this sense, it is more 
likely that they will privilege legislators with local backgrounds in small magnitude 
constituencies. In medium and large magnitude districts, legislators who want to 
secure a safe seat on the list must prove that they can secure a sufficient share of the 
votes to help the party win as many seats as possible. Some legislators can contribute 
directly by literally “buying” their seat with contributions for the party. Other 
legislators with good connections can seek support from interest groups. Some 
others can contribute by enlisting the participation of functional organizations of 
activists that help the party identifying potential sets of voters in the constituency. 
Finally, a different group of legislators is those whose personal reputations can be 
useful in helping the party get votes, for instance, media celebrities.  
Under OLPR it is expected that the importance of the personal attributes of 
legislators outweighs that of the party and institutional features. In this regard, while 
I expect district magnitude to be correlated with some legislators’ features in closed-
list PR systems—for example, their professional background—I do not expect the 
same in the open-list PR systems, or at least that its influence should be minor. The 
existing theory is relatively limited in terms of describing what kind of personal and 
party attributes legislators use in order to look for votes in candidate-centred systems. 
Ames (1995) considers that when the OLPR is used, the career success of their 
predecessors is an aspect that affects the behaviour of legislators. Legislative 
candidates with a local background, such as former mayors and community leaders, 
will concentrate their efforts on attracting local votes. In the case of non-local 
candidates, his theory predicts that given the scattered distribution of voters for these 
candidates, they will need to look for new voters in concentrated districts. He 
contends that legislators who once occupied high rank positions in the public sector, 
such as ministers or bureaucrats, have incentives to use their personal reputation as 
former pork-barrel providers to attract personal votes. Regarding the professional 
backgrounds of legislators, Ames (1995) also looks at the case of business candidates:  
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The electoral support of business candidates is more fickle than the 
support enjoyed by local politicians. Better offers sway bosses loyal to 
the highest bidder. Thus businessmen face contradictory incentives. 
While opportunities are clearly better for candidates unconstrained by 
local careers, businessmen can lose support as quickly as they gain it 
(Ames, 1995, p. 417). 
In addition to professional background, it is important to also take into 
consideration those personal attributes of legislators that are common among 
candidates in large magnitude constituencies. For example, Honduras has seen an 
increase in the number of public figures such as footballers and people related to the 
media running as candidates since OLPR was adopted.25 Some of these candidates 
are placed on the ballot by party factions while others choose to run on their own 
initiative. However, once in office, these deputies will need to build a reputation 
based on more than their previous careers if they are to seek re-election. I believe 
that because of their public figure status, they have more reasons to be deemed 
accountable to the whole country, and will therefore seek to provide public goods 
rather than targetable local and private goods. 
2.5 Summary of the main argument 
To sum up, I argue that under CLPR incumbent legislators and parties will focus 
more on the provision of local goods as M gets smaller, and on the provision of 
more private and non-targetable goods as M increases. Legislators will be more likely 
focus on pork-barrelling when they are elected through OLPR rather than CLPR; 
however, that does not mean that they stop providing non-targetable public goods. 
As M increases, some deputies will seek to differentiate themselves from their co-
partisans by providing non-targetable public goods. In addition, due to the fact that 
within an OLPR system, legislators need to reach broader publics in larger district 
magnitude constituencies, they will probably appeal to interest groups in order to 
finance their political campaigns. Once in office, they will be more likely to produce 
private goods for the groups that provided contributions during the electoral 
                                                 
25 In Appendix 6.1 to Chapter 6 I show statistics that come from the series of elite surveys conducted 
by the University of Salamanca. There it is observed that during the surveys conducted in 1998 and 
2002—i.e. when legislators were elected under CLPR—only one surveyed legislator reported having a 
profession related to the media. In contrast, in the two rounds of surveys carried out on Honduran 
legislatures elected using OLPR, 12 legislators reported they had a background related to the media, 
entertainment or football. More recently, the Honduran press has covered this new phenomenon, 
especially in advance of the primaries held in November 2009 when factions of both the PLH and the 
PNH tried to ensure the inclusion of recognized journalists, entertainers and footballers among their 
legislative candidates (El Heraldo, 2012a; 2012b; La Prensa, 2012a; La Tribuna, 2012). 
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campaigns. Finally, under OLPR, what determines whether legislators will focus on 
the provision of local public goods or non-targetable public goods in large-M 
constituencies is their own personal attributes. Legislators who are recognizable by 
broad sections of the public will be more likely to provide non-targetable public 
goods; whereas those who have a more local background will focus on their 
constituency service work. 
2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have shown that much of the literature on the relationship between 
electoral systems and legislators’ behaviour has tended to focus on the development 
of concepts for cross-national comparison. In this regard, some scholars have 
produced a number of theories aimed at improving our understanding of how 
countries with plurality rule differ in terms of public policy outcomes from countries 
that use PR. Another group of academics has focused on parliamentarians’ personal 
vote-seeking behaviour, which they see as equivalent to pork-barrel. Moreover, in 
this latter group there are different approaches to the analysis of the role of principals 
on the behaviour of legislators. In this sense, one body of literature has focused on 
how interest groups shape the preferences of legislators, while other contributions 
analyse the role of principals from an institutional and party-oriented perspective, e.g. 
the influence of actors such as presidents, prime ministers, and party factions. 
I believe that the arguments developed by most of these scholars have 
contributed significantly to our understanding of electoral systems on the behaviour 
of politicians. At the same time, the disconnection between the different approaches 
has led to confusion about how we should understand and measure the legislators’ 
behaviour. I argue that one can apply the different logics present in the works of 
comparative political economy scholars, some who have focused on the politics side, 
and others of whom have an economics focus. While most of the contributions have 
concentrated on the variation electoral systems produce in a single outcome, e.g. 
pork-barrel, I focus my attention on how electoral systems can affect legislators’ 
choices of different personal vote-seeking strategies, not only pork but also non-
targetable public goods and private goods for interest groups. 
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Chapter 3 
Research design 
 
 
In Chapter 2, we noted that that there is a lack of understanding in relation to the 
actual effects, if any, of electoral systems on legislators’ behaviour. That vacuum of 
empirical knowledge is due largely to the limitations inherent in the most common 
research designs used in the social sciences, which are based on large-N studies, 
small-N comparisons, and case studies. Because of this, several scholars believe that 
the best way to conduct an analysis of the impact of electoral rules is through the 
study of the consequences of electoral reforms (Giannetti & Grofman, 2011; 
Grofman & Fraenkel, 2008; Norris, 2004; Shugart, 2005). For example, Shugart 
(2005) argues that: 
In the case of electoral reform, the crucial experiment is that we can see 
in one country how electoral politics responds to changes in the electoral 
system. Thus we can hold constant numerous other factors that might 
confound the relationship being tested for when we are using 
observations from separate countries with distinct political histories, 
cultures, and so on. Of course, it is not a perfect control, as other 
factors—for example, demographic changes, or the rise or decline of 
issue cleavages—may have been the cause of the change in the electoral 
system in the first place. Nonetheless, electoral reform offers a more 
controlled environment than we normally confront (p. 34). 
Studies such as the one I develop in the present work are often labelled as 
natural experiments or quasi-experiments, mostly because the source of variation in the 
explanatory variable occurs in the real world, outside of the control of the researcher. 
Nonetheless, as the number of peer-reviewed publications using so-called natural 
experiments increases, so too does the criticism of the sometimes significant 
shortcomings of this approach (Dunning, 2008; Robinson, McNulty & Krasno, 2009; 
Sekhon & Titiunik, 2012). The popularity of these research design approaches comes 
from the possibility for drawing causal inferences with more or less the same 
confidence that randomized experiments provide. However, there are different 
aspects that clearly differentiate these approaches from randomized experiments. 
Overall, as suggested by Shugart (2005) above, studying institutional changes in more 
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or less controlled environments is sometimes the best means by which social 
scientists can find the necessary counterfactuals to test their theories.  
As with other researchers who have studied the impact of electoral reforms, I 
follow the quasi-experiments approach. In the following section, I will discuss why I 
have chosen this methodology. I will also explain why I believe the case of Honduras 
offers many advantages over other case studies and competing large-N 
methodologies to conduct a test of the theory presented in Chapter 2. However, I 
acknowledge that it also has its disadvantages, and I will suggest alternative solutions 
for addressing them.  
This chapter includes the following parts. In the first section I discuss the the 
research design in general. In section two, I describe the explanatory factors 
considered in the present study. In section three, I address possible endogeneity 
issues concerning the relationship between electoral systems and legislators’ 
behaviour. In the next part, I suggest possible ways of dealing with the endogeneity 
problem. Section five discusses potential rival explanations for the legislators’ 
behaviour. I conclude this chapter with a note regarding the methods that I employ 
in the empirical analysis part of this study. 
3.1 Methodological strategy 
For Przeworski and Teune (1970, pp. 20-23), causality is a key criterion in evaluating 
theories. For King, Keohane and Verba (1994, pp. 7-8), descriptive inference and 
causal inference are the goals of any scientific endeavour. The importance assigned to 
causality lies in the belief that the social sciences can and should follow the example 
of the natural sciences: “[s]ince the law of causality has been verified in other 
domains of nature and has progressively extended its authority from the physical and 
chemical world to the biological world, and from the latter to the psychological 
world, one may justifiably grant that it is likewise true for the social world.” 
(Durkheim [1982], quoted in della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 24).  
Nevertheless, in contrast to the work of scientists in other fields, political 
scientists are often not in a position to conduct experiments, which are the most 
powerful tool that can be used to establish causal relationships. Considering these 
limitations, scholars rely on observational data, employing large-N, small-N, and in-
depth case study methods (Lijphart, 1971). Each of these methods has its advantages 
and disadvantages. The large-N, or statistical method, is oriented towards the 
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derivation of generalizable inferences that transcend individual cases, especially when 
the datasets consist of observations for very large numbers of countries in different 
periods of time. The inconvenience of this approach is that by aiming for generality 
there is a substantial sacrifice in terms of the understanding of the complexities of 
each of the cases considered in the dataset (della Porta, 2008, p. 210).  
In the case of small-N research designs, by comparing two or more cases 
researchers increase their capacity to make inferences, provided that they compare 
similar cases that differ in the key factors that are relevant for their theories 
(Przeworski & Teune, 1970). However, as Brady, Collier and Seawright (2004, 
pp. 245-247) point out, small-N comparisons can be placed somewhere in between 
large-N analyses and case studies. In this regard, they restrict the researcher’s ability 
to make robust inferences in comparison with large-N statistical analyses. Moreover, 
researchers have to make methodological decisions in terms of how deep their 
analyses of the cases considered in their sample will be. The limitations inherent to 
conducting experimental designs in the social sciences, where results should have 
external validity—meaning that they can be observed outside laboratory conditions 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1966)—make necessary the adoption of observational research 
designs. However, the most common observational approaches—large-N and small-
N comparisons and case studies—also have considerable limitations. Norris (2004) 
exemplifies those shortcomings. She studies, using a large-N methodological 
approach, the impact of electoral rules on political behaviour. In the conclusion to 
her book, she states:  
It should be recognized that in considering the evidence surrounding 
these issues the research design used in this book, and the comparative 
framework, remain limited in many important ways. In the best of all 
possible worlds, one would be able to examine time-series case studies to 
understand how the process of electoral engineering works in more 
depth, especially more before and after natural experiments with rule 
reform (2004, p. 261). 
A natural experiment can be defined as a type of study where factors exogenous 
to the control of the researcher can potentially affect some phenomenon of interest. 
That process generates at the same time a “natural”, possibly random selection of 
observations classifiable, using experiment terminology, into “control” and 
“treatment” groups or, in terms of longitudinal analyses, “pre-test” and “post-test” 
groups (Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Dunning, 2008; Robinson et al., 2009; Sekhon & 
Titiunik, 2012). In experimental designs, the researcher randomly selects a group that 
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will receive a “treatment” (i.e. a change in the key independent variable) and a control 
group that will not receive it, ruling out the potential for rival explanations. The 
researcher then compares how the group that received the treatment behaves in 
comparison with the group that did not. In contrast, natural experiments are actually 
observational studies because “analysts observe the values that the independent 
variables acquire through the unfolding of political and social processes” (Brady, 
Collier and Seawright, 2004, p. 230). In other words, researchers do not have control 
over the ceteris paribus conditions; all they can do is collect data as it is generated in the 
outside world. Given the restrictions imposed on researchers in non-controlled 
experiments, researchers should approach the process of conducting inferences with 
care because it is not possible to completely exclude the existence of rival 
hypotheses. 
Defining what constitutes a natural experiment might be controversial. Several 
scholars share the view that policy changes and, in general, institutional reforms 
produce natural experiments (Ansolabehere, Gerber & Snyder, 2002; Giannetti & 
Grofman, 2011; Meyer, 1995). However, as I will later explain, these kinds of 
approaches often face problems of endogeneity―a situation in which the explanatory 
variable is affected by the dependent variable (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, p. 185). 
Not all studies in which the source of variation in the independent variable is 
exogenous can be classified as natural experiments. A very similar research design is 
the quasi-experiment approach. Cook and Campbell (1979) define quasi-experiments as 
“experiments that have treatments, outcome measures [dependent variables], and 
experimental units [observations], but do not use random assignment to create the 
comparisons from which treatment-caused change is inferred” (p. 6). For 
Dunning (2012) the fact that quasi-experiments do not use randomization of control 
and treatment groups clearly differentiates them from natural experiments. In this 
regard, as he explains, the hallmark of natural experiment is that they generate 
random or as-if random assignments of subjects into control and treatment groups—
e.g. by flipping a coin. Nevertheless, as he himself admits, in some circumstances, 
distinguishing what constitutes as-if random assignment is not a straightforward task: 
Without true randomization, however, asserting that assignment is as 
good as random may be much less plausible—in the absence of 
compelling quantitative and qualitative evidence to the contrary. Since 
as-if random assignment is the definitional feature of natural 
experiments, the onus is therefore on the researcher to make a very 
compelling case for this assertion… Ultimately, the assertion of as-if 
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random is only partially verifiable, and this is the bane of some natural 
experiments relative, for instance, to true experiments (Dunning, 2012, 
p. 28). 
Although I argue that the case study of Honduras fits into the categorisation of 
a quasi-experimental study, it greatly resembles a natural experiment for two distinct 
reasons. First, the source of variation in the independent variable—the ballot type 
change—is motivated to a great extent by the impact of a hurricane that hit the 
country six years before the electoral reform. Second, because the mechanism of 
elections limits the possibilities of politicians self-selecting to benefit from the 
institutional reform. Nevertheless, as with other studies of its nature, the present 
study faces research design challenges. In the following two sections, I will explain 
what the change in the independent variable is, how the present study fits into the 
natural experiment research design category and the challenges imposed to this 
research design.  
3.2 Explanatory variables 
In this study I analyse the interaction between district magnitude and type of ballot as 
key explanatory factors of legislators’ behaviour. As we observed in Figure 2.3 in 
Chapter 2, in order to asses the effect of that interaction, district magnitude must 
ideally be held constant while the type of ballot should be let vary. The case of 
Honduras meets those criteria. In terms of district magnitude, during the 1980s there 
were two changes. The first took place in 1985 when a legal reform increased the 
number of parliamentary seats from 82 to 134. In 1989, another reform decreased it 
from 134 to 128 seats. Since then the district magnitude has not been modified (see 
Table 3.1). Therefore, I picked the year 1990 as the starting point of the timeframe 
for this study, because in January of that year the first legislature elected under the 
district magnitude distribution of 1989 was inaugurated. 
Table 3.1. District magnitude variation in Honduras in time and 
across departments 
Department Year of reform/number of seats 
1981 1985 1989 
Islas de la Bahía 1 1 1 
Gracias a Dios 1 1 1 
Ocotepeque 2 2 2 
La Paz 2 3 3 
Intibucá 2 4 3 
(continued on following page) 
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Table 3.1 
(continued from previous page) 
Department Year of reform/number of seats 
1981 1985 1989 
Colón 2 4 4 
Valle 3 4 4 
Olancho 4 7 7 
Copán 4 7 7 
Comayagua 4 7 7 
Atlántida 4 8 8 
Santa Bárbara 5 9 9 
Lempira 5 5 5 
El Paraíso 5 7 6 
Yoro 6 9 9 
Choluteca 7 9 9 
Cortés 11 22 20 
Francisco 
Morazán 14 25 23 
Total 82 134 128 
Note: The numbers in bold represent constituencies within which the number of seats was 
modified. 
3.2.1 The closed-list PR system (elections 1989–2001) 
Since Honduras started its transition to democracy in 1977 and until the elections of 
2001, the method used to convert votes into legislative seats was closed-list 
proportional representation. During this period, political parties had to present a list 
of candidates for deputy positions. As a result, the candidate selection process within 
the political parties was very vertical and controlled by the party leadership, which 
was usually ruled by the strongest faction within the political party. The presidential 
candidate and the leaders of the political party chose the legislative candidates 
(Taylor, 1996, p. 331). Sometimes, when the leaders were not sure which members to 
include on the list to fill some of the positions in some constituencies, they would 
carry out polls in those constituencies to assess the popularity of the potential 
legislative candidates. The result could become a factor in the ordering of the party 
list of candidates to compete in the general elections. However, deputies understood 
that they were included on the list because it was a decision of the leadership, 
regardless of the popularity of a legislative candidate within a constituency (Taylor-
Robinson, 2009a, p. 334). 
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The Electoral Law required political parties with factions to conduct 
primaries.26 In order to neutralize the potential for factionalism, the dominant faction 
would call a party convention to designate the list of presidential and legislative 
candidates that would compete in general elections. Losing factions certainly had the 
opportunity to contest the nomination process as irregular. However, they probably 
had more to lose than gain by doing so. According to Taylor-Robinson (2009a):  
An affected faction could protest or threaten to leave the party. 
However, this type of threat lacked credibility because it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for the new party to register to participate in 
the election, especially because the members of the electoral tribunal 
belonged to parties that were already registered” (p. 334, own 
translation).    
Until the election of 1997, the country’s electoral system could be labelled fused 
closed-list PR. Under this system voters had to cast a single vote for one person in a 
closed list which included not only the candidates to the legislature, but also the 
presidential candidate and, until the elections of 1989, candidates to the municipal 
authorities of the electoral circumscription where the voter was registered. In 1992, 
the municipal ballot was partially separated from the presidential and legislative 
ballots, which remained fused (see Figure 3.1). In 1996, the parties agreed to 
completely separate the presidential ballot from the one used for legislative, what 
resulted in a simple closed-list PR system for legislative elections (Figure 3.2).  
During the time frame covered in this study, when the CLPR was used 
(elections from 1989 to 2001), the mathematical formula employed to convert votes 
into seats in the multi-member constituencies was the Hare method with largest 
remainders. Under this method, the total number of votes per constituency obtained 
in an election is divided by the number of seats available in order to obtain a quota. 
Every time a party reaches the quota a seat is assigned to that party and those votes 
are subtracted from the party’s total. The candidate who tops the list wins the seat. 
When no party can reach the quota and if there are still seats available, these are 
distributed via the largest remainders method, which gives the remaining seats to the 
parties with “most votes left over” (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005a, p. 586). In the two 
                                                 
26 An amendment to this law introduced in 1986 established the requirement for primary elections 
(art. 19, Ley Electoral y de Organizaciones Políticas de 1981). The law did not establish restrictions on 
participation in these elections. 
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Honduran single-member constituencies a simple plurality of votes (fifty per cent 
plus one) was employed to assign the seats. 
 
Figure 3.1. Ballot used in the elections of 1993. This was the ballot used in the elections 
of November 1993. It shows the photographs of the presidential candidate from each 
political party competing in the elections. Below the photographs each party section is 
divided by a vertical line. To the left of the line it reads, in Spanish, “Ballot for President and 
deputies.” On the right-hand side of the line it reads, “Municipal ballot.” Voters had to cast 
two votes, one for the presidential and deputies list and another for the municipal list. 
Source: La Tribuna (1993, p. 1). 
 
Figure 3.2. Legislative ballot used in the elections of 1997. This was the ballot used to 
vote for legislative candidates in the 1997 elections. The same format was applied in the 
elections of 2001. On top of the ballot it reads in Spanish, “Deputies to the National 
Congress and the Central American Parliament Ballot.” Voters had to mark only once the 
box of the party of their preference. 
Source: La Tribuna (1997, p. 1). 
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3.2.2 The open-list PR system (elections 2005–2009)  
The open-list PR method (OLPR) was introduced in April 2004 when a new 
Electoral Law was passed in the National Congress. The method was used for the 
first time in the 2005 elections and most recently in the general elections of 
December 2009. The first difference worth noting is that under the new Electoral 
Law, every party is required to hold primary elections where factions compete to 
represent the party in national elections.27 Unlike in the old model, parties cannot 
                                                 
27 Factions present a list of candidates for president and vice-president, legislative seats, and mayor 
and vice-mayor seats. In the case where there is no more than one faction competing for elections, 
parties can avoid the primary election requisite. To date under OLPR, the large ruling parties have 
held primary elections but the smaller parties have not. 
Figure 3.3. Legislative ballot used in the elections of 2009. This ballot was used in the 
department of Atlántida in the November 2009 elections. The ballot shows not only the 
names of the legislative candidates but also their photographs. This constituency has a district 
magnitude of eight seats and the panachage mechanism implies that voters can mark up to eight 
candidates of their choice from across different parties. 
Source: National Electoral Tribunal of Honduras (2009). 
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alter the resulting list of candidates to the legislature.28 Both primary and general 
elections use the open ballot with panachage which, as noted in Chapter 2, allows the 
voter to cast her vote across different party lists. Additionally, the ballot includes the 
photograph of each legislative candidate. In contrast with Brazil, a famous case that 
utilises an OLPR system where voters are given the option to vote for a party block 
or for each individual candidate (Mainwaring, 1991), in the OLPR system used in 
Honduras, voters are not given the party block option. The formula used to convert 
votes into seats is still the Hare method with largest remainders and votes for 
candidates are pooled at the party level. The main difference in comparison with the 
old electoral system is that because the ranking of candidates is not previously 
decided by party leaders, when a party wins a seat that seat is given to the candidate 
who has secured the most votes (see  above).  
The Electoral Law of 2004 making it necessary for the larger parties to hold 
primary elections, combined with the use of open ballots with panachage, has 
generated changes to the ways in which candidates are selected within political 
parties. The most obvious change is that the party leader has much less control over 
the allocation of candidates to electable polistions within the party list. That power 
has been transferred to the voter. Moreover, as previously explained, open-lists with 
panachage are now used in primary elections, which further weakens the control of 
party leaders over the selection of candidates. However, according to interview 
information, factions usually have coordinators in each constituency. The 
coordinators recommend to the presidential candidate of the faction which legislative 
candidates can fill the positions in the faction’s list.29 Under the 2004 regulations 
there are no restrictions regarding which voters can vote in primaries (art. 48, Ley 
Electoral y de las Organizaciones Políticas, decree 44-2004). 
3.3 The endogeneity problem in the electoral system change 
Major electoral changes are rare events; once a reform takes place the electoral 
system usually becomes quite fixed (Benoit, 2004; Boix, 1999; Colomer, 2004; 
Gallagher, 2005a). This is partially explained by the fact that “party systems and 
                                                 
28 This implies that the final list of candidates for the general election is formed by candidates from 
different factions. 
29 Secretary of the Central Committee of the Liberal Party of Honduras, personal interview, 19th 
January 2010, and deputy of the National Party of Honduras, personal interview, 15th February 2012. 
52 
electoral systems are tied to one another through the self-interest of politicians” 
(Katz, 1980, p. 123).  
While the present work does not aim to explain inferentially the electoral 
system change in Honduras, it is important to understand how it came about. The 
nature of the variation in the electoral system has implications for the research 
design. As noted by Benoit, “if electoral systems are shaped by the party systems they 
supposedly determine… then this casts serious doubt on conclusions about the 
independent causal effect that electoral systems exert on party systems” 
(2007, p. 367). Thus, studies that use electoral systems as an explanatory variable of 
party systems (in their interparty and intraparty dimensions) usually face the 
methodological dilemma of determining whether electoral systems cause party 
systems or vice versa. This endogeneity problem makes it difficult to treat major 
electoral reforms as natural experiments.  
There is not a full theoretical consensus in the literature about the causes of 
electoral systems change. However, different scholars suggest that the underlying 
motivation to change is brought about by the rational expectations of the actors who 
have a real power to modify the institutions (Benoit, 2004; Boix, 1999; Gallagher, 
2005a). For example, Colomer (2004, p. 7) argues that electoral systems can be 
deemed stable if political actors can expect that the potential benefits from a change 
of system would not surpass the gain provided to them by the current institutions. 
On the other hand, losers and deputies in a weakened position will perceive the 
institutional change as a good strategy if they believe that the new institutions will 
bring them increased advantages. Shvetsova (2003) argues that the assumption that 
institutions are endogenous can be problematic because it implies that politicians 
know the expected outcomes of the proposed institutions:  
Relevant players at the institutional stage are usually politicians, but even 
they may lack information about such characteristics of the game as the 
number of other players, what actions will be feasible to them and to the 
others in the future, and what their payoffs would be from different 
outcomes―about the things which are determined by a variety of societal 
characteristics themselves yet unknown. This is the source of the ex ante 
uncertainty for such players with regard to how much they value specific 
institutional options. The consequence of such uncertainty is that the 
realized effect of her ex ante preferred institutions is generally sub-
optimal and that the actual institutional choice is not correlated with the 
designer’s ex post institutional preferences (Shvetsova, 2003, p. 194). 
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In the particular case of Honduras there are two points that support the 
assumption that the major electoral system reform of 2004 took place relatively 
independently from the party system. As Robinson, McNulty and Krasno (2009) put 
forward, “natural experiments as opposed to random experiments imply acts of nature, or 
more generally, exogenous interventions demarcating observations in theoretically 
important ways” (p. 346, italics are from the original). In this regard, the intervention 
of nature limits the possibility that political actors can interfere in the institutional 
change. The evidence suggests that this was precisely the case in Honduras. A major 
natural event, Hurricane Mitch, which struck the country in October 1998, is 
identified as the driving force behind the change in the electoral rule from CLPR to 
OLPR. 
3.3.1 Background 
Since the early 1990s, parallel to the transformation of the Honduran economy, a 
state reform process has been implemented. According to Barahona (2005), the state 
modernization process was stimulated by multilateral financial institutions, such as 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in line with recently adopted 
market liberalization policies. Throughout that decade reforms to the judiciary 
system, the accountability rules, and the institutions were adopted. Two important 
changes also took place in the electoral system. In 1992, the municipal ballot was 
separated from the presidential and deputies ballot. This reform was achieved as part 
of a decentralization process that gained momentum after the approval of the 
Municipalities Law in 1990. The original proposal was to completely separate the 
municipal elections from the presidential and legislative elections. However, the 
electoral reform passed in Congress instructed that a vertical line would separate the 
presidential and legislative ballot from the municipal ballot (see Figure 3.1 above).  
Under the administration of President Carlos Roberto Reina (1994–1998), the 
National Convergence Commission (CONACON) was created. This was a multi-
sector committee consisting of representatives from the political parties and 
Honduran civil society organizations. Through this body, the government aimed to 
discuss state reform and the governability of the country. In 1996, a year before the 
general elections, the political parties within this forum agreed the separation of the 
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deputies’ ballot from the presidential ballot. This ballot was used in the general 
elections of November 1997 and, four years later, in 2001.30 
3.3.2 The change to OLPR 
On the 26th of October 1998, what had started as a tropical storm reached its highest 
intensity and was upgraded to hurricane status just as it reached the Honduran 
Caribbean Coast. Hurricane Mitch first made landfall in Honduras at the Islas de la 
Bahía on the 28th of October. It lost intensity over the following days, weakening to a 
tropical depression by the time it left Honduran territory on the 1st of November. 
Nevertheless, Mitch caused great damage across most of Honduras, particularly in 
the territories of the North Coast, Choluteca, and Tegucigalpa (ECLAC, 1999, p. 8). 
It was one of the most devastating natural disasters ever to occur in Honduran 
history (National Hurricane Center, 1999). As a consequence of the destruction, the 
country was forced to request reconstruction aid and debt relief from the 
international community. The imposition of conditions by donors regarding political 
reform, which would make the aid allocation process more transparent, in addition to 
pressure from civil society groups, accelerated the institutional reform process. The 
electoral reform of 2004 is a consequence of these changes. In the opinion of one 
scholar of Honduran politics: 
The persistence even in a democratic regime of election and nomination 
rules developed by party caudillos in an authoritarian milieu prompts the 
question of how it was possible to adopt open-list nominations and 
elections in the 2004 election law. The answer is behind-the-scenes 
pressure from the international aid organizations that gained much 
influence in Honduras after Hurricane Mitch in 1998, plus recognition 
by party leaders that the small parties were increasing their vote share 
and more voters were becoming disaffected with the traditional parties 
(Taylor-Robinson, 2010, p. 109). 
Five Central American countries received reconstruction aid in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Mitch.31 In May 1999, their presidents attended a meeting with the foreign 
aid donors in Stockholm. They signed a declaration in which they committed, among 
other things, to “[c]onsolidate democracy and good governance, reinforcing the 
process of decentralization of governmental functions and powers, with the active 
participation of civil society” (IADB, 1999, para. 6). The same year, Foro Ciudadano, 
                                                 
30 In Appendix 3.1 I describe other reforms that were carried out during the period CLPR was used. 
31 The Central American countries in question are Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua. 
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a group composed of different civil society organizations, launched an electoral 
reform proposal. Two of the changes they suggested were the constitution of single-
member electoral constituencies and the adoption of nominal voting ballots 
(Comisión Política de los Partidos Políticos, 2005, p. 64). The philosophy behind the 
adoption of nominal ballots was to increase legislative accountability and to enforce 
the connection between voters and deputies, which had been eroded by increasing 
perceptions of corruption and distrust of political parties and politicians (Comisión 
Política de los Partidos Políticos, 2005, pp. 59-61).  
In the context of the primary elections in 2000, the Liberal Party of Honduras’ 
(PLH) leadership asked the National Electoral Tribunal (TNE) to disqualify the 
National Party of Honduras (PNH) presidential candidate, Ricardo Maduro Joest, 
who had been born in Panama to a Honduran mother. The PLH claimed that he 
should not be allowed to participate in the elections since he was not Honduran by 
birth. The claim was unsuccessful and finally solved via a constitutional interpretation 
by the National Congress. This case revealed some of the weaknesses of the electoral 
regulatory framework as well as the inefficacy of the TNE to solve electoral 
conflicts.32 After that experience, Maduro Joest, who was leading the opinion polls to 
win the presidential elections of November 2001, made the comprehensive reform of 
the Electoral Law one of his central campaign issues. In this context, the political 
parties and civil society organizations requested the help of the Honduran Office of 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in facilitating the electoral 
reform process.  
The UNDP facilitated the formation of a political commission in which each of 
the five legally constituted political parties had two representatives. This commission 
formulated a declaration of commitment, which was signed by each of the five 
presidential candidates on the 4th of September 2001. During the negotiations, the 
parties could not reach to an agreement regarding the method of electing legislators. 
However, the presidential candidates committed themselves to ensuring that the 
                                                 
32 Furthermore, the presidential candidate of the PLH had been investigated for being, at the same 
time, the President of Congress, a position that he could have used to his own advantage by 
distributing the resources he had available to him for pork-barrelling purposes.  
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electoral reform proposals would be put before the National Congress the following 
year, regardless of which candidate gained office.33 
The introduction of the open ballot with panachage and the inclusion of 
photographs to identify the candidates was an initiative of a group called Movimiento 
Cívico por la Democracia (MCD, which literally translates as Civic Movement for 
Democracy). MDC was a association of civil society organizations and the 
governmental National Institute for Women (INAM). Amongst the civil society 
organizations that formed part of this group were: the Honduran branch of the 
international NGO CARITAS; a major Honduran business guild, the Honduran 
Council for the Private Enterprise (COHEP); and several women’s movement 
organizations such the “Visitación Padilla” Pro-Peace Women’s Movement and the 
Centre for Women’s Studies (Dole-Duron, 2004, p. 14; MDC, 2003, p. 18). As 
previously mentioned, the single-member district (SMD) system was also considered; 
however, this option was rejected by the small parties and women’s movements, who 
believed that the introduction of an SMD system would lead to a reduction in the 
chances of election for women and candidates from smaller parties. But it was also 
argued that women would benefit from the inclusion of their photographs since 
some voters would be inclined to vote along gender lines (Lanza, 2004, p. 10). 
In early September 2003 the PNH adopted the MDC proposal and promoted it 
in Congress through one of its deputies. Shortly thereafter, the PNH Central 
Committee approved the conduction of its primary elections using OLPR. In one 
sense the PNH was claiming the initiative for a wider adoption of the OLPR system, 
but at the same time it was challenging the PLH to do the same, perhaps taking into 
consideration that the latter party was more fragmented (El Heraldo, 2003a; La 
Tribuna, 2003b).34 In general, the leadership of the PLH was reluctant to adopt 
separate ballots and the use of photographs for legislative candidates. When asked 
about its potential consequences for his party, the then leader of the Liberales in 
Congress, Roberto Micheletti, declared that the true intention of the reforms was to 
                                                 
33 In addition to the ballot modality to vote for legislative candidates, the introduction of the plebiscite 
and referendum institutions, the creation of the Electoral Superior Tribunal (TSE), and the separation 
of the National Registry of People from the TSE were the main dividing issues that made it difficult 
for the parties to reach agreement in the National Congress (Comisión Política de los Partidos 
Políticos, 2005; El Heraldo, 2003b). 
34 By the time the reforms were being discussed in Congress, in early 2004, there were 14 registered 
factions within the PLH, compared to the four contending factions within the PNH (La Tribuna, 
2004b, p.8). 
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create “a reason to seek out confrontation” (La Tribuna, 2004a, p. 18). That did not 
prevent the new electoral law being approved by the Honduran National Congress 
on the 1st of April 2004.  
To sum up, pressure from the media and civil society organizations that were 
constantly appealing to propaganda mechanisms through mass media 
communications for the adoption of the separate ballot with the candidates’ 
photographs was influential in the reform process. There were also demands for 
internal democracy from disadvantaged groups within the parties that saw the change 
as potentially beneficial for them. As previously mentioned, there was a declining 
public perception of the main political parties, reflected in increasing voter 
absenteeism and growing support for the smaller parties. These factors taken 
together contribute to explaining Congress’ final decision to pass a new electoral law 
in April 2004, which among other things incorporated the OLPR mechanism with 
panachage and introduced candidates’ photographs to the ballot. 
3.3.3 Discussion 
In the previous section, we observed that the decision to replace CLPR with OLPR 
was to a great extent a consequence of the impact of Hurricane Mitch. In this regard, 
after this natural catastrophe, the main political parties felt obliged to improve their 
accountability mechanisms towards voters. This was part of an agreement made 
between the Honduran government and the civil society under the auspices of the 
international donor community, who made it a condition of their aid that the 
Honduran government make a commitment to undertaking state reforms. I also 
showed that the choice Honduras legislators made in the National Congress to 
change to the OLPR electoral system became a campaign issue for one of the 
political parties. However, the adoption of the new system came about largely 
because social organizations, with the technical support of the UNDP, kept it in the 
public eye for several years. Therefore, it can be surmised that legislators, probably 
party leaders, carried out the reform as a means of avoiding social and political unrest 
rather than to ensure outcomes that would bring them benefits such as those 
theorized in the political science literature (see Chapter 2). As a matter of fact, part of 
the rationale of adopting OLPR was to improve the representativeness of 
disadvantaged groups, such as women. Moreover, when the PNH decided to move 
to OLPR in the second half of 2003, they did so in order to maximize votes for the 
party and not for their benefit as individual legislators. It is possible that 
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backbenchers perceived the reform as beneficial; however, an intended or 
unintended consequence is that they could have been deprived of pork-barrel 
spending if re-elected. Hence, like Shvetsova (2003), we can conclude that in this 
particular case the Honduran institutional designers lacked of perfect information 
about the effects the OLPR could have on legislators’ behaviour, particularly in terms 
of district magnitude, which is a concept more common in the academic jargon 
rather than in the political spheres. Moreover, the possible consequences resulting 
between ballot type and district magnitude remain quite unknown, so it is very 
unlikely that politicians could have foreseen the effect of adopting the OLPR system 
across different district magnitudes. 
Finally, independently of the electoral system type, turnover rates have tended 
to be very high in Honduras. The legislative elections of November 2005—20 
months after the electoral reform—unintentionally became a randomization 
mechanism to generate a “post-treatment” population of legislators. In the elections 
of 2005, in most of the constituencies less than half of the legislators were re-elected 
for the following term. For example, legislators in Francisco Morazán, the largest 
constituency with a district magnitude of 23 seats, experienced a sharp decline in 
their re-election rate―17.4 per cent when historically it was around 35 per cent. In 
constituencies where district magnitude is smaller than three seats the turnover rates 
are even higher (see Figure 3.4).35 These figures support the idea that the OLPR 
system itself becomes a randomization device in which, ceteris paribus, every legislator 
has the same probability of being re-elected. It can be argued that some legislators 
have information on what the ceteris paribus conditions consists of. However, judging 
by the high turnover rates in the Honduran Congress after the election following the 
reform of 2004, there are strong reasons to believe that they had not clear idea of the 
consequences of OLPR for their re-election probability.    
                                                 
35 This behaviour is probably explained by high fragmentation in the main political parties.  
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Figure 3.4. Turnover patterns in the Honduran Congress by district magnitude and 
year of election, in percentages (1989–2009)  
Source: own, based on data from the National Electoral Tribunal of Honduras.  
Sekhon and Titiunik (2012, p. 36) argue that when the random assignment has 
been assumed the researcher should ask herself: first, whether the proposed 
treatment–control comparison can be guaranteed to be valid by the assumed 
randomization, and second, if it is not valid how the resulting control-treatment 
assignment relates to the comparison the researcher wishes to make. Because one of 
the aspects I am interested in studying is pork-barrel politics, it is important to 
acknowledge the fact that Hurricane Mitch caused lots of damage in terms of both 
personal losses and destruction of infrastructure, which poses a competing 
explanation for pork-barrelling. The sceptic can counter argue that this natural 
disaster pushed legislators to behave in a more particularistic way, and it was this 
behaviour that gradually made the electoral system change possible. This is 
equivalent to admitting that there is endogeneity between the variation in the 
electoral system and the variation in the legislators’ behaviour. As already stated, this 
is problematic but is one of the most common dilemmas scholars of electoral 
reforms have to face.  
I argue that there are reasons to treat the impact of Mitch and the change to 
OLPR as independent events. From a longitudinal point of view, I expect that after 
Mitch there will be a disturbance in legislators’ targetable goods delivery behaviour, 
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but while the influence of this shock as might persist over time, it could also dissipate 
and the legislators’ behaviour could return to the historical trend. My expectation is 
that OLPR will produce a new trend, because after its adoption the OLPR institution 
remains constant, as do the incentives to seek personal votes (see Figure 3.5). In 
chapters 5 and 7, which deal with time-series cross-sectional data, I control for 
autocorrelation in order to have more confidence in the results.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Time frame, major events covered in the present study and legislators’ 
expected pork-barrel behaviour.  
Certainly, the period is not long enough to be fully confident that the OLPR 
has produced a completely new cycle, which is a major concern in disciplines such as 
economics, in which case the variables are usually integrated, that is, they follow 
similar time trends. As Beck and Katz (2011, p. 344) demonstrate, in political 
economy studies the variables are less likely to be integrated, especially when they 
vary between zero and one, and they are usually affected by predictable events, such 
as changes in governments in presidential systems. Therefore, according to these 
scholars, it is recommended to control for autocorrelation, for example, by including 
lagged dependent variables in panel datasets when the time series are not very long. 
From a cross-sectional point of view, even though it is calculated that around 
80 per cent of the Honduran territory was affected by Hurricane Mitch, its greatest 
impact was on the North Coast—which was the first area of Honduran territory hit 
by the hurricane—, Choluteca, and Tegucigalpa (ECLAC, 1999, p. 8). Additionally, it 
should be recognized that Mitch impacted most on the poorest populations, and the 
subsequent relief efforts were targeted especially at that population, which is spread 
all over the country (Government of Honduras, 2001). Because district magnitude 
holds constant during this period, and the patterns of distribution of the poorest 
populations remain relatively constant as well (Flores et al., 2009), if legislators 
increased the allocation of targetable goods after Mitch the geographical distribution 
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Figure 3.6 Maps of district magnitude distribution, the path of Hurricane Mitch in 
1998 and poverty distribution in Honduras in 2001. In (a), the path of Hurricane Mitch 
has been reproduced on the basis of data from ECLAC (1999, p. 10). Between points 1 and 2 
the wind speed ranged between 285 and 95 km/h, and was classified as hurricane. Between 3 
and 4 the speed of the winds ranged between 70 and 85 km/h and Mitch was downgraded to 
a tropical storm. Note that M and the percentage of poor are relatively evenly spread 
throughout the country; however, where M ranges between one and six seats the percentage 
of population with two or more unsatisfied basic needs tends to be higher. By comparison 
larger M constituencies tend to have lower rates of poverty.  
Sources: (a) own and ECLAC (1999), (b) National Institute of Statistics of Honduras (2002). 
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hould remain the same, or should be higher in small-M constituencies than in 
medium or large ones. This is because smaller-M constituencies tend to have higher 
percentages of poor population measured according to the Unsatisfied Basic Needs 
Method (the Pearson factor of correlation between the two variables is -.5279). 
Figure 3.6 demonstrates graphically that the spatial distribution of the poorest 
municipalities tends to be found towards the western border, the centre and the 
eastern border of the country. The smallest district magnitude constituencies are 
located along the western and eastern borders of Honduras.36   
An alternative approach to control for the influence of Hurricane Mitch, as I 
will explain in chapters 5 and 7, is by focusing only in the municipalities that were 
not affected by this Hurricane. In this regard, one can compare those municipalities 
before and after the electoral reform. If Mitch caused no effect or its influence was 
minimal we can have more confidence that a change in pork-barrel behaviour is due 
to the electoral system change and not caused by the natural disaster.       
3.4 Controlling for rival explanations 
As noted earlier in this chapter, one of the advantages that the present research 
design has over other investigative approaches is that different factors can be 
expected to remain relatively constant during the period of study. Other factors that 
vary can be parameterized through statistical methods, i.e. holding them fixed to 
study the partial effect of the key variables in multiple variable regression analyses. In 
Chapter 2, it was explained that formal institutions, such as the form of government 
and type of state (unitary or federal), and informal institutions, such as clientelism, 
can partly explain legislators’ personal vote-seeking behaviour. Additionally, we 
discussed that whether spending goes to core, swing or opposition supporters could 
be another factor in explaining pork-barrel behaviour. Other aspects are particular to 
the Honduran context. In this section I focus on four potential rival explanations of 
legislators’ personal-vote seeking behaviour: (1) institutional factors, (2) party 
ideology, (3) political culture, and (4) level of socioeconomic development. In 
Appendix 3.1, I provide additional information in relation to the Honduran context. 
                                                 
36 The definition of the Unsatisfied Basic Needs Method to measure poverty, utilized in the Census of 
2001 by the Honduran National Institute of Statistics, was the lack of basic needs in the areas of 
drinking water, sewerage, school attendance for children between seven and twelve years of age, 
having more than three dependents per household, and the co-habitation of three or more people per 
room (National Institute of Statistics of Honduras, 2009, p. 66).  
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3.4.1 Institutional factors  
The form of government and whether the administrative organization is federal or 
unitary are factors which can explain the ways legislators behave (Ashworth & Bueno 
de Mesquita, 2006; Carey, 2009); it goes without saying that both are kept constant in 
this study.37 The decentralization of fiscal and administrative powers from the central 
administration towards the municipalities, which has been taking place gradually in 
Honduras since the early 1990s, could affect the geographical allocation of spending. 
But in terms of differences between municipalities, the Honduran regulations 
indicate that municipalities with lower levels of development should be focalized. 
Therefore, because poor municipalities are more dependent on the government, the 
impact the decentralization processes could have is reduced. In Chapter 7, I deal 
specifically with pork-barrelling, focusing on spending from the central government, 
which is allocated with discretionary power. 
3.4.2 Party ideology 
Party ideology could contribute to explaining the distribution of welfare benefits in 
the form of pork-barrelling. Social democrat parties are believed to favour the 
redistribution of wealth in an economy, particularly across the less disadvantaged 
groups, whereas conservative parties are associated with macroeconomic policies that 
restrict the welfare state and leave the redistribution role to the markets (Boix, 1998). 
In Honduras, party politics has been dominated by two major political parties: the 
Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH) and the National Party of Honduras (PNH). The 
origins of these political parties date back to the formation of the Honduran state 
between 1890 and the first decade of the 1900s (see Appendix 3.1). 
The PNH has been traditionally identified with conservatism in terms of its 
closer ties to the institutions of the clergy and the military. Internally, it tends to be 
more ideologically coherent and unified than the PLH. This phenomenon has been 
observed in relation to the fact that until the mid-1990s, the PNH primaries saw 
fewer factions competing for the presidency than in the PLH. Since its origins, the 
PLH has tended to be separated from the clergy, and throughout its history has 
detached itself from the military. It was also characterized by internal fragmentation, 
a characteristic that has become more noticeable since the 1970s, when conservative 
                                                 
37 In the appendix to this chapter I describe these formal institutions in more detail.  
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and social democrat factions emerged and remained relatively stable throughout 
different electoral processes (Ajenjo, 2001; Bulmer-Thomas, 1990; Taylor-Robinson, 
2010).  
One could argue that legislators’ behaviour, particularly regarding pork-barrel 
politics, is a result of party ideology, especially for party deputies in government. This 
intervening factor can be controlled for, especially taking into consideration that 
during the period of study both parties have alternated in government―one can use 
variation to track the differences in terms of the geographical spending allocations of 
each party at an aggregate level. Furthermore, I can also control for each legislator’s 
party, as I will show in chapters 5 and 6. 
3.4.3 Party strongholds 
There is discussion about whether pork-barrel spending is directed towards 
government strongholds or swing voters. Cox and McCubbins (1986) put forward a 
model of electoral competition aimed at explaining the distribution of funds allocated 
to constituency projects. They posit the existence of three types of groups to which a 
legislator who is seeking re-election must address herself: (1) supporters—the re-
election constituency in Fenno’s (1978) terms, (2) the opposition—those who have 
consistently opposed her, and (3) swing groups—those who have not consistently 
supported her or who have been hostile. In this context, it is not clear at which group 
politicians will target pork-barrel spending. From Cox and McCubbins’ perspective, 
rational politicians will promise “benefits to those groups in their constituencies with 
the highest rates of return, and promise no or even negative benefits (i.e. costs) to 
those with the lowest rates of return” (1986, pp. 375–376). They conclude that 
candidates take into consideration the risk of losing their electoral constituency if 
they do not provide benefits to their voters. Therefore, their prediction is that risk-
averse politicians will tend to over-invest in their closest supporters. 
On the other side of the debate, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) argue that 
candidates have good reason to appeal to swing voters. They assume that it is 
reasonable for politicians to aim to obtain as much support as possible so they can 
secure the minimum number of votes necessary to gain a seat. It may be possible that 
their core supporters are not enough to secure that minimum threshold.  
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3.4.4 Political culture 
It is believed that there is a strong connection between political culture and 
socioeconomic development (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006; 2005). Populations with low 
levels of socioeconomic development tend to favour particularism over national 
politics, whereas increasing levels of socioeconomic development are associated with 
broader policy identification.38 Overall, Honduran politics is categorized by different 
observers as very clientelistic (Ajenjo, 2001; Norsworthy & Barry, 1994; 
Taylor-Robinson, 2006; 2010).  
For Taylor-Robinson (2010), there is an intrinsic connection between poverty 
and clientelistic politics in Honduras. Given the poor living standards of most of the 
Honduran population, good connections in government seem to be necessary to 
have access to even the most basic public services. Evidence of clientelism relies 
most of the time on observation and interviews. Yet, an analysis of survey data 
concludes that party activism increases in inverse proportion to the standards of 
living conditions (Booth & Aubone 2007, cited in Taylor-Robinson 2010, p. 117), 
which also suggests the existence of clientelistic relationships. In this regard, 
clientelism is a factor that varies little over time during the period of study. 
Moreover, according to Taylor-Robinson (2010), while poorer populations remain 
mainly in rural areas, urban areas also have important segments of poor populations, 
which makes them prone to clientelistic practices.  
3.4.5 Socioeconomic levels of development 
As I explained in the previous section, a hypothesis links increasing levels of 
economic and social development to policy-oriented electorates and legislators. In 
Honduras, during 2000s, there were some improvements in the economy and some 
social indicators. However, the changes were not dramatic. Honduras is still 
considered one of the poorest countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(alongside Bolivia, Haiti, and Nicaragua) (ECLAC, 2005; 2009). According to the 
Honduran Office of the United Nations Development Programme, in terms of 
income, in 1992 it was estimated that 47.4 per cent of Honduran families lived in 
                                                 
38 In this regard, the analysis of the formation of national parties in England by Cox (1987) provides a 
good example of how technological, social, and economic improvements during the 1800s can explain 
in part the change from particularistic to party-oriented electorates and MPs. 
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extreme poverty; by 2004 that figure had decreased slightly to 44.6 per cent (UNDP, 
2006, p. 56).  
It must be noted that in the years after Hurricane Mitch struck Honduran 
territory, the government, together with the international aid agencies and civil 
society organizations, instituted a reconstruction programme targeted in particular at 
the poorest populations, who were the most affected by the hurricane. In 2001, the 
government launched the Poverty Reduction Strategy (or ERP to use its acronym in 
Spanish), which was the result of a broad consensus between civil society 
organizations and political parties with the support of international donors 
(Government of Honduras, 2001). Yearly home surveys have showed that during the 
2000s decade several indicators related to poverty improved slightly. According to 
UNDP (2009, p. 299), the probability of not surviving until the age of 40 was 
reduced from 11 per cent in 2001 to 9.4 per cent in 2006. The illiteracy rate in people 
aged 15 years or older was 20 per cent in 2001, while in 2006 it was 17.6 per cent. 
While the percentage of population with no access to sources of drinking water was 
19.2 in 2001, this figure had been reduced to 12.8 per cent in 2006. 
The small improvements in the living conditions of Hondurans could be also 
related to an economic growth rate that averaged 4.1 per cent between 2000 and 
2010 (Central Bank of Honduras, 2012). This has come with an increase in the 
employment rate, specifically in tourism, the food and clothes manufacturing 
industries (maquilas), and services. However, there has also been an increase in the 
influx of remittances that Honduran nationals living abroad, especially in the United 
States, send to relatives in Honduras (UNDP, 2009, pp. 278-281). The improvements 
in the economy and their translation into benefits for Honduran society are especially 
felt in urban areas, particularly in the capital, Tegucigalpa (department of Francisco 
Morazán), the department of Cortés, which is known as the industrial centre of the 
country, and the Islas de la Bahía, which is the constituency that attracts the highest 
percentage of foreign tourists (UNDP, 2009, p. 281). In this regard, patterns of 
development across departments have not changed significantly over time―the 
poorest departments are still located in the western part of the country, and the most 
developed ones are to be found on the north coast and in the capital.  
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3.5 Methods 
In the present work I combine quantitative and qualitative research methods; in the 
latter case, I rely in particular on interviews but, in Chapter 7, I also include evidence 
from official documents and other secondary sources to trace the pork-barrel 
mechanism in Honduras. Interviews not only allow me to trace the causal 
mechanism connecting electoral systems to legislators’ behaviour, but this method 
can also be used to support the evidence of my statistical analyses.39 
As I will explain in more detail in Chapter 4, I use three proxies of legislators’ 
behaviour: (1) initiated bills per legislator, (2) geographically distributed grants, and 
(3) surveys of parliamentarian elites. The datasets from (1) and (2) form panel data 
structures; in other words, they consist of repeated observations over time of the 
same cross section units (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 6), in the first case legislators and in 
the second case constituencies. Because the units of observation are fixed in time, the 
assumption of random sampling used in most common econometric methods, 
typically the ordinary least squares, has to be relaxed. However, panel data 
methods—also know as time-series cross-section methods (TSCS)—compensate for 
the need to account for the inner variation of each unit, which is often wrongly 
attributed to the error term, therefore leading to biased inferences—known as the 
omitted variable bias—in most popular linear and non-linear statistical models and 
even experiments (Beck & Katz, 1995; see Chapter 10 in Wooldridge, 2002). 
The idiosyncratic disturbances found in TSCS models could be correlated with 
the key independent variables, a situation known as fixed effects, or could be 
associated with the error term, i.e. random effects. Each situation requires different 
statistical methods and interpretations of the results. Deciding which method to use 
depends on a number of factors such as model specification and data availability. 
Furthermore, there are post-estimation statistical tools that help to identify whether 
random effects methods generate better estimators than fixed effects, or vice versa. 
But for the present work, the decision is more straightforward: “[i]n cases where the 
key variables in xt do not vary much over time, fixed effects and first-differencing 
methods can lead to imprecise estimates. We may be forced to use random effects 
estimation in order to learn anything about the population parameters” (Wooldridge, 
                                                 
39 To test the theory posed in Chapter 2, I have had recourse to some common statistical tools, using 
the statistical package Stata 12. 
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2002, p. 286, emphasis in original). Because one of the key variables of this study, 
district magnitude, holds constant over time the use of random effects models 
becomes imperative when using TSCS methods. 
In terms of the parliamentarian elite survey data analysis, survey data by 
definition implies randomization of the units of observation. In this regard, if what is 
being studied is each legislator included in the samples, TSCS cannot be applied in 
conjunction with survey analysis methods. Needless to say, for ethical reasons, each 
surveyed parliamentarian has been made anonymous, which makes it impossible to 
keep record of them at different points in time. Therefore, for the analysis of survey 
data I do not use TSCS methods. 
Each of the three dependent variables imposes the use of different analytical 
approaches. I will discuss the statistical models that I will use in more detail in the 
part of this thesis dedicated to the empirical analysis (chapters 5 to 7). 
3.5.1 Interactive effects analyses 
To conclude this chapter I point to two aspects that are treated as standards in the 
empirical analysis chapters. One is the indicator of district magnitude (M) used to 
calculate the effect of this variable on legislators’ behaviour. In the electoral systems 
literature, it has become common practice to employ the logarithmic form of M 
which helps to observe the marginal impact of M on different relationships of 
interest, such as the effective number of parties, legislators’ behaviour or the 
allocation of spending (Cox, 1997; Hallerberg & Marier, 2004; Monroe & Rose, 2002; 
Shugart et al., 2005; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). I use the same transformation, that 
is, the decimal logarithm of district magnitude, which I abbreviate as logM. It makes 
sense to use this indicator in the Honduran case since the density in the distribution 
of seats tends to be skewed towards medium and small constituencies. Furthermore, 
the long gap between small and medium-sized constituencies (where M is smaller 
than 10) and large constituencies (where M is equal to or larger than 20) must be 
taken into consideration. Hence, logM helps to make more linear relationship 
analyses. 
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The interactive effects between ballot type and logM on proxies of legislators’ 
personal-vote seeking behaviour are more easily observable by plotting the predicted 
probabilities of regression outcomes.40  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Illustration of predicted probabilities at different values of x and z  
 
In Figure 3.7 above, the estimated coefficients of y are substituted with its 
predicted probabilities ŷ at relevant values of x for the researcher. Moreover, one can 
keep constant x and analyse the effects of the intervening variable z. Holding other 
factors constant within this hypothetical example, it is observed that when z equals 
zero, the predicted probability of y when x equals two is the coefficient 2
∧
β ; whereas 
when z equals one ŷ is equivalent to 2
∧
β . Conversely, when x equals three and z equals 
zero ŷ will be 1
∧
β  and 4
∧
β if z equals one. 
                                                 
40 In chapter 3 of Kam and Franzese (2007) an explanation is provided on how predicted probabilities 
are computed (see also Brambor, Clark & Golder, 2006). 
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Appendix 3.1 Context 
Honduras is a republic located in Central America. With an area of 112,432 square 
kilometres (National Institute of Statistics of Honduras, 2009, p. 5), it borders the 
Caribbean Sea to the north east, Nicaragua to the south east, El Salvador and the 
Pacific Ocean to the south west, and Guatemala to the north west (see Figure 3A.1). 
The country is characterized as having the most mountainous area of the Central 
American isthmus. The mainland territory is complemented by islands in the 
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, of which the Islas de la Bahía, a 
system of islands off the north coast, is the largest. 
 
Figure 3A.1. Map of Honduras 
Source: World Bank (2005). 
The Honduran population is made up of approximately 90 per cent Mestizos, 7 
per cent indigenous groups, 2 per cent Afro-descendants, and 1 per cent Caucasians 
(Central American Parliament, 2011). The religion is predominantly Catholic with an 
increasing number of Protestants in recent years. The total population, according to 
the last census carried out in 2001, is 6,535,344, of which 49.4 per cent are male and 
50.6 per cent female.  
Within the country there is internal variation in terms of the ways its population 
is distributed and in the degrees of social and economic development. The most 
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populous and wealthiest regions of the country are located in certain areas of a region 
known as the North Coast (on the Caribbean coast) and in the central department of 
Francisco Morazán, where the capital of the country, Tegucigalpa, is located. Very 
high levels of poverty exist in most of the country (see Figure 3.6 above and Bulmer-
Thomas, 1990).  
History 
The colonization of Honduras by the Spaniards began in 1524, with settlers focusing 
on trade of indigenous slaves as the main economic activity. Puerto Trujillo in the 
North Coast region was the first settlement and an important port for trade with 
other Spanish colonies. By 1550, motivated by the search for gold and silver as well 
as for finding a way to connect the Caribbean Sea with the Pacific Ocean, Spanish 
conquistadores began to explore the rest of the territory (Payne-Iglesias, 2009; 
Vargas-Aguilar, 2006). In the second half of the 1500s, the Spaniards had some 
control over the North Coast and centre of the country. Mining of gold and silver as 
well as the need to develop routes to take these products to the main ports located 
on the North Coast are factors that explain the population distribution in Honduras. 
However, climatic and topographic variables as well as the social organization of the 
indigenous population in those areas made the colonization of those territories so 
difficult that by the end of the 18th century, the largest part of what nowadays 
constitutes the territory of Honduras had not been colonized.  
The Spanish colony’s economy was strongly based around the encomienda.41 
However, by the time the encomienda was introduced in Honduras the indigenous 
population was already diminishing. Slaves from Africa were introduced in order to 
complement the indigenous labour. In the first half or the 1600s two ships carrying 
black slaves sank close to the Caribbean coasts of Honduras and Nicaragua. The 
slaves mixed with the natives giving origin to two other ethnic groups, the Miskito 
and the Garifuna people, who have since dominated in the department of Gracias a 
Dios and in different parts of the North Coast (Vargas-Aguilar, 2006). Throughout 
the 17th century, English privateers established different alliances with the Miskito. 
The English later colonized what used to be known as Bay Islands, now the 
department of Islas de la Bahía. They brought with them black slaves from other 
                                                 
41 Under this regime a Spaniard would receive a set of property rights over ‘Indian’ labour, most of the 
time forced. In exchange, the encomendero provided the Indians with protection and Catholic faith 
instruction and paid the Indians’ taxes to the Crown (Yeager, 1995, p.843). 
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colonies in the Antilles Islands, known as the Creole. Some of the Spaniards mixed 
with the indigenous peoples, giving birth to the Mestizo group. By the time of 
independence in the early 1800s, the Mestizo had become predominant in Honduras; 
some indigenous villages were spread throughout the country, while smaller 
populations of Afro-descendants, Miskito, and Garifuna peoples were located 
predominantly on the Caribbean coast. 
In the early 1800s, Honduras was part of the Kingdom of Guatemala (a 
territory that extended from the south of Mexico up to the south of Costa Rica). On 
15 September 1821, the Declaration of Independence of Central America was signed. 
Immediately after independence, divisions and conflicts sparked among the 
Honduran elite. Discussions about whether to join a federation of Central American 
states or the Mexican Empire, headed by Agustín de Iturbide, were the first points of 
conflict that led to the subsequent civil wars. Moreover, divisions between supporters 
of liberal reforms and sympathizers of the Spanish Crown and the clergy gave origin 
to the first liberal and conservative parties respectively. Honduras formed part of the 
Federal Republic of Central America between 1921 and 1938, when this was 
dissolved.  
The government of Marco Aurelio Soto (1876–1883) is considered the starting 
point in the consolidation of a liberal state (Barahona, 2005). His government 
envisaged a development of the Honduran economy around mining and the export 
of minerals. Because the main gold and silver mines were located in the centre of the 
country, projects to develop a railway system to connect these areas to the main 
ports on the Caribbean coast were granted to American and British companies, who 
in exchange received large concessions of land in the territories close to the 
Caribbean coast. The foreign firms exploited those lands for the production of 
bananas to be sold in international markets, mainly the United States. These firms 
became quite influential, not only in the Honduran economy and society, but also in 
politics, leading Honduras, in the early 1900s, to be given the name Banana Republic 
(Bulmer-Thomas, 1990, p. 285).  
In this context, the two main parties that currently dominate Honduran politics 
emerged: the PLH and the PNH. The PLH was founded in 1891 by Policarpo 
Bonilla. Bonilla became President of Honduras for the period 1895–1899. During his 
tenure in office, a new constitution was promulgated, as well as a set of laws 
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reflecting the largely liberal ideology of his party. These included the abolition of the 
death penalty, the instauration of civil unions and divorce, prohibition of the Church 
to participate in state affairs, as well as the elimination of the tithe and the 
establishment of religious freedom (Ajenjo, 2001, p. 196). 
The period following the establishment of the PLH is characterized by the 
influence of caudillos in party politics and struggles between factions that in some 
cases descended into intermittent periods of civil war. One of the factions that arose 
from within the Liberal Party was the National Party (PNH). This party was created 
in 1902. Originally, its ideology was quite similar to that of the PLH but it became 
increasingly conservative over the years, developing closer ties with institutions such 
as the military and with the clergy (Ajenjo, 2001, p. 236). During this period foreign 
banana companies participated in domestic politics by providing financial help to the 
competing presidential candidates in exchange for favours (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990, 
p. 285). For Ajenjo (2001, p. 236), the origins of Honduran clientelism can be found 
in the birth of the PLH and the PNH and their relationships with the banana 
companies. Due to the high instability that characterized the period in which both 
parties originated, they only managed to become relatively stable organizations by 
attracting social and economic groups that provided human and financial resources. 
In 1932, candidates for the PNH, Tiburcio Carías-Andino, and for the PLH, 
José Ángel Zúñiga-Huete, ran for presidential election. The elections were won by 
Carías by a very small margin and Zúñiga-Huete did not accept the electoral results. 
Both sides went on to engage in armed conflict, the outcome of which supported 
Carías-Andino, who was sworn in as constitutional president for a term of four years 
in February 1933. Just before the elections of October 1936, the Congress reformed 
the constitution, extending the presidential term from four to six years 
(Bulmer-Thomas 1990, p. 290). In 1941, the Congress reformed the constitution 
again to extend Carías’ term until 1948, the year in which he finally retired after 
contesting peaceful elections. For Bulmer-Thomas (1990), the Cariato, as his term of 
16 years in office is known, not only had the effect of diminishing any nascent 
democracy in Honduras in the 1930s, but by the end of the dictatorship it “also 
proved impossible to reverse the country’s economic decline” (p. 291). He further 
states that the “weak fiscal position and the subordinate role of the government 
undermined the scope for economic diversification and left the economy dependent 
on an industry which appeared to be in structural decline. For most of the Cariato 
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the fruit companies remained the lender of last resort” (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990, 
p. 295). 
Carías was succeeded in government by Juan Manuel Gálvez after the 
presidential elections held in 1948. In October 1954, new presidential elections were 
organized. The former dictator, Tiburcio Carías, stood for election as the National 
Party candidate. He competed against Ramón Villeda-Morales of the Liberal Party, 
who won the plurality of votes but could not get the absolute majority necessary to 
become president. The constitution dictated that in such cases the president must be 
appointed by Congress. However, the deputies could not agree to form a quorum 
and proclaim the new president. Julio Lozano-Díaz, who had become vice president 
following the recent resignation of Gálvez, proclaimed himself interim president. 
However, he did not relinquish power through elections, causing a period of turmoil 
in 1956 which ended with the intervention of the Honduran Army. A military junta 
ruled the country for the next year.  
The Liberal representative, Villeda-Morales, was appointed president in the 
elections of 1957. During his six-year term in office he expanded a reformist 
programme already initiated by the Gálvez administration. The first income tax law 
in the country was promulgated in 1950; women’s voting rights were recognized in 
1957; and a labour code, granting workers rights such as a minimum wage and 
collective bargaining was introduced in 1955. Villeda-Morales went even further, 
introducing an agrarian reform to transform productive land tenure. By 1963, the 
next election year, many of these reforms had become unpopular among the 
Honduran elite. However, it was the possibility of having another term of Liberal 
Party rule, under the presidency of Modesto Rodas-Alvarado, a known anti-militarist 
who was the favourite to win the elections, that sparked a military coup only ten days 
before the elections were due to be held (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990, pp. 301–302). 
An alliance between the de facto government and the PNH allowed the 
introduction of a new constitution, confirming the autonomy of the Honduran army, 
and facilitating the appointment of General López-Arellano as President of 
Honduras for the next six years. Constant conflict between the PLH and the PNH 
helped to prolong the military rule until 1981, with only a very brief period of civilian 
government in 1972. In 1975, General Juan Alberto Melgar-Castro was appointed 
head of state. During his term, discussions about a return to civilian rule began. In 
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1977, a new electoral law was passed, replacing the law of 1966. This event is 
considered by different observers as the beginning of the transition to democracy 
(Bulmer-Thomas, 1990; Posas, 1992; Sieder, 1996).42 Constituent assembly elections 
were held in April 1980 (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990, p. 310).  
In the 1970s, Honduras’ external debt grew rapidly due to unfavourable 
international economic conditions. During the last military government in the late 
seventies, the level of debt became unbearable. Throughout the 1980s, Honduras 
managed to resolve some of the constraint on its economy thanks to the economic 
support of the US government, offered in exchange for Honduran cooperation in 
the armed conflict in Central America. Once the conflict showed signs of coming to 
an end in the late 1980s, US assistance started to wane and the real and untenable 
state of the Honduran economy became evident (Barahona, 2005; Bulmer-Thomas, 
1990). 
The economic policies of the three governments that assumed the 
administration of the country during the 1990s were characterized by the 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), with the assistance of 
the International Monetary Fund (Barahona, 2005, p. 279).43 Different actions taken 
to increase the country’s competitiveness in the international markets were adopted. 
For example, the introduction of a wider variety of agricultural and livestock 
products for export (such as melon, water melon and seafood products). 
Manufacturing became the largest sector of the economy. 
Previous electoral reforms during the CLPR period 
The introduction of the PR system with closed lists dates back to an electoral reform 
in 1957. Previously, deputies were elected in multi-member districts that used local 
ballots and majority rules to assign seats. After 1971, congressional and presidential 
elections were fused (Taylor-Robinson, 2010, pp. 106-107). In 1976, the military 
government appointed an Advisory Council responsible for enacting a new electoral 
                                                 
42 As Sieder (1996) explains, the electoral legislation of 1977 laid down unprecedented rules in terms 
of internal party organization, including a requirement for all internal factions and movements to be 
permitted to participate in internal selection processes using the proportional representation system. 
That law “also favoured the inscription of new parties by reducing the number of signatories 
necessary for registration from 15,000 to 10,000” in addition this regulation created the National 
Electoral Tribunal (Sieder, 1996, p.22). 
43 The first SAP was approved in 1990 and was followed by a second in 1994. The last SAP was 
approved in 1998. 
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law (Paz-Aguilar, 2008; Sieder, 1996). This law, meant to elect the deputies who 
formed a Constitutional Assembly in 1980, incorporated the institution of primary 
elections using a PR mechanism. The Constitutional Assembly was also responsible 
for the creation of the 1981 Electoral Law. In the law of 1981, the deputies opted to 
eliminate the requirement to hold primary elections within the political parties. For 
Taylor-Robinson (2010), although backbenchers in the Constituent Assembly could 
have defended internal democracy, the presidential control over state resources and 
the informal institutional structure of Honduran clientelism was an incentive for 
incumbent deputies to give up any form of democratic nomination for the legislative 
seats:  
When de facto presidents legitimized their rule through formal 
appointment by a Constituent Assembly, it was important for the leader 
to control backbenchers to ensure his “legitimate” election. Deputies 
continued to support or acquiesce to party leaders, instead of demanding 
internal party democracy for nominations, because they needed state 
resources for clientelism; in addition, they relied on presidential coattails 
to get elected, which cost less than running their own campaign 
(Taylor-Robinson, p. 107).  
In 1985, after a failed attempt to extend his term in office, President Roberto 
Suazo Córdova (1982–1986) of the Liberal Party wanted to appoint the presidential 
candidate within his party.44 This situation caused an institutional crisis involving the 
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary branches. At the heart of the conflict was 
the power the National Electoral Tribunal (TNE) had to interpret the Electoral Law 
and intervene in the political parties’ internal disputes. The TNE was composed of 
one representative of each of the registered political parties and one representative of 
the Supreme Court. However, in reality, the representatives of the PLH and the 
Supreme Court belonged to Suazo-Córdova’s faction, and the representative of the 
National Party was his ally. The President of Congress, Efraín Bú Girón, another of 
the PLH’s potential presidential candidates, attempted to block Suazo-Córdova’s 
efforts to dictate the nomination of his successor by replacing the Supreme Court 
representative at the TNE, and formed a legislative commission who found the 
members of the Supreme Court guilty of corruption. Congress ordered the removal 
                                                 
44 Previously, in 1984, Suazo-Córdova argued that he had been elected in November 1981, some 
months before the new constitution was enacted in January 1982. The new constitution fixed a four-
year presidential term prohibiting re-election. In an attempt to extend his term in office, Suazo 
Córdova claimed that he had come to power under the 1957 constitution, which established a six-year 
presidential term. This situation led to a conflict between the executive and the Congress, also 
dominated by the Liberal Party. 
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of the judges; in response, Suazo Córdova accused the new members of the Supreme 
Court of high treason. The conflict lasted for two months and was resolved only 
when the three branches reached the Acta de Compromiso agreement, mediated by the 
US Embassy and the military. The main outcomes of this agreement were an increase 
in the number of seats in the Honduran Congress from 82 to 134 and a reform of 
the Electoral Law to allow party factions to present their own presidential candidates 
in primary elections that would be held on the same day as the general elections 
(Sieder, 1996, pp. 27-28). 
In 1986, the Electoral Law was changed again, this time to introduce primary 
elections for the process of selecting party authorities and candidates for electable 
positions, including deputies. The reform to the Electoral Law of 1981 established 
that primaries should be carried out in each political party (Art. 19). However, this 
law did not include binding mechanisms to oblige parties to comply with the results 
of the primaries, which in practice allowed the political parties to alter the final 
composition of the party list of legislative candidates. The PLH and the smaller 
parties, the Social Democrat Innovation and Unity Party (PINU-SD) and the 
Christian Democrat Party of Honduras (PDCH), hold primary elections for the first 
time in 1993. 
In the PNH, there was more resistance to this type of internal democratization 
process. Traditionally, the formation of the party list and the nomination of the 
party’s presidential candidate were agreed among its elite, who had used the 
technicalities of its internal regulations and the Honduran legislation to avoid 
conducting primary elections. However, after holding the presidential office for the 
first time in Honduran democratic history between 1990 and 1994, the PNH lost the 
presidential elections. In an attempt to give an impression of inner democratization, 
and amid recriminations and accusations from different party factions, in May 1996, 
the PNH party assembly approved holding primary elections in November that year 
(El Heraldo, 1996; Envío, 1996). Since then, primaries have been held in the PNH. 
The political crisis of 2009 
In January of 2006, Manuel Zelaya-Rosales of the PLH became President of 
Honduras after winning the elections of November 2005. During his second year of 
government he changed his cabinet, incorporating in it a number of well-known 
leftist politicians. A change in the leaning of his government to the left became 
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clearer when Honduras joined the Petro-Caribe initiative of the Venezuelan 
government of Hugo Chávez. This programme allowed Honduras to receive oil 
imports from Venezuela at very low prices and offered the facility of a payment plan. 
A subsequent integration of Honduras into the Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas (ALBA) programme in July 2008, driven by President Hugo Chávez, also 
brought international financial assistance from Venezuela (Ruhl, 2010; 
Taylor-Robinson, 2009b).45 
The alignment of the Honduran government with the Venezuelan leftist regime 
caused distress among different groups, including conservative factions and some 
deputies in the president’s party. Some of his decisions, such as a 60 per cent increase 
in the minimum wage, also upset the business and political elites (Ruhl, 2010). But it 
was Zelaya-Rosales’ intention to call for the establishment of a constituent assembly, 
announced in November of 2008, that was the main cause of the political unrest at 
the time. His justification for calling a constituent assembly was to change the legal 
order to facilitate the establishment of fairer relations among Hondurans (La Prensa, 
2008b; Rodríguez, 2011). However, different sectors believed that the president’s 
true intention was to reform the constitution to make possible his own re-election, 
following the example of constitutional reforms carried out in other South American 
countries.  
                                                 
45 Conflicts between the Executive and Legislative branches of government were commonplace 
during the Zelaya-Rosales administration (2006–2009), even before the events leading up to the coup. 
Interestingly, this discord seemed to reach its height during the primary election process that took 
place in November 2008. In an interview conducted in July 2007, the President was asked whether he 
was concerned by the lack of support among public servants from his own party—including 
legislators—as a result of the contentious primaries within the party. He replied: “that is exactly what I 
don’t want, that when they wear ‘two hats’, dedicating themselves part-time to being deputies and 
candidates… and part-time to working for the country.” (La Tribuna, 2007a, para. 3, own translation). 
In October 2008, the National Congress approved the adhesion of Honduras to the Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA)45 after days of discussion in Congress and the mass media.45 
According to news reports, Zelaya-Rosales managed to get that polemical bill passed after he 
publically supported Roberto Micheletti, who was serving as president of Congress, as presidential 
candidate for the Liberal Party in the primary elections.45 It was also claimed that during their 
negotiations the President had agreed to allocate pork-barrel resources to deputies in Micheletti’s 
faction to the detriment of the other strong faction within the Liberal Party, which was headed by the 
then Vice-President of Honduras, Elvin Santos (El Heraldo, 2008b; La Prensa, 2008a; La Prensa, 2012b). 
It is worth mentioning that in the first year of his government in 2006, Zelaya-Rosales created the 
Fondo Social Departamental, a budget managed by the Ministry of Finance with the aim of financing 
small projects across Honduras. The moneys from this fund would be distributed by the Honduran 
deputies, who would prioritize projects in their constituencies (La Tribuna, 2006). Elvin Santos and his 
followers accused Zelaya-Rosales of a biased and unfair allocation of those funds to help the 
campaign of Micheletti and the deputies in his faction (El Heraldo, 2008a; La Prensa, 2008a). 
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The government’s plan was to include what they called the Cuarta Urna (Fourth 
Ballot) in the general elections of 29th of November 2009. The Cuarta Urna was a 
non-binding plebiscite to ask voters whether or not they agreed to a constituent 
assembly. The National Congress, the National Electoral Tribunal, the Supreme 
Court, and the Attorney General concluded that the proposal for the Cuarta Urna 
was illegal because it intended to change unamendable provisions of the Honduran 
Constitution, such as those that prohibit presidential re-election (Rodríguez, 2011; 
Ruhl, 2010).46  
Despite this declaration of the Cuarta Urna as illegal, Zelaya-Rosales continued 
with his plan based on the Citizens’ Participation Law, which allows non-binding 
citizen consultations. In the early morning of Sunday, 28 June 2009, a group of 
soldiers from the Honduran Army raided Zelaya-Rosales’ house after the president’s 
detention was ordered by the Supreme Court of Honduras. That same morning he 
was put on a plane to Costa Rica. In the afternoon, the President of the National 
Congress, the Liberal and Zelaya-Rosales’ former campaign manager, Roberto 
Micheletti, was sworn in as interim President of Honduras after the deputies present 
voted unanimously for the removal of Zelaya-Rosales from office.  
Internationally, many states, including the United States, did not recognize the 
interim government and Honduras was ousted from the Organization of American 
States. Domestically, the coup generated social upheaval and led to constant clashes 
between Zelaya’s sympathizers and the army and national police. Zelaya’s supporters 
and different governments around the world claimed that they would not recognize 
any electoral process unless Zelaya was allowed to return to the presidential office 
before the elections on the 29th of November. The US government decided that they 
would support the elections as the only possible solution to the conflict. Finally, on 
the 30th of October, Zelaya’s team of negotiators and Micheletti’s government signed 
an agreement that allowed the general elections to be held as planned. 
One could argue that it was Zelaya-Rosales’ ideological about-face due to the 
ALBA alignment in the second half of his government that generated the conflicts 
between the Executive and Legislative branches (Rodríguez, 2011; Ruhl, 2010; 
                                                 
46 The Honduran Constitution of 1982 has a set of three articles that cannot be amended according to 
the same Constitution. They are related to the form of government (art. 4), the Honduran territory 
(art. 9), and the presidential term with no re-election (art. 239).  
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Taylor-Robinson & Ura, 2013), which in turn led to him being overthrown. 
However, even before this ideological shift by the president and members of his 
cabinet there was friction between the two branches of government. This was 
exemplified by the presidential veto of the Electoral Law bill promoted by a faction 
of the Liberal Party in Congress and the President steadfastness in allocating time for 
the discussion of bills sponsored by legislators from his own party when the agenda 
setting in Congress was controlled by the Executive (La Tribuna, 2007b; La Tribuna, 
2007c; La Tribuna, 2008). It is worth noting that conflicts between legislative 
candidates from different factions during primary elections can also be observed in 
the 2010–2014 National Party of Honduras (PNH) government of Porfirio Lobo-
Sosa, something that it does not seem to be as common as when the electoral system 
was CLPR. 
Governing structures 
The current Honduran Constitution dates back to 1982. Honduras has a presidential 
form of government, i.e. the president of the republic is the head of state and chief 
of the executive branch, which in theory is counterbalanced by independent 
legislative and judiciary powers. The president is elected for a period of four years 
with no possibility of re-election, using a majority rule (50 per cent of the total valid 
votes plus one). The executive body is complemented by a number of ministries 
(secretarías de Estado) and autonomous institutions. Ministers and officials of the 
autonomous institutions are appointed by the president. There are three presidential 
appointees (designados presidenciales), who are the equivalent of vice-presidents of the 
republic. They are elected simultaneously with the president.  
The National Congress is the legislative body of government, and is a single-
chamber assembly comprised of 128 permanent legislators and their substitutes, 
representing 18 constituencies. These legislators are elected for a period of four years 
in simultaneous elections with the president, and they have the possibility to run for 
election an indefinite number of times. The role of the substitute deputy is to replace 
his respective permanent legislator in her absence.  
The Judiciary branch in Honduras is comprised of the Supreme Court of Justice 
(CSJ), the tribunals, and the appeals courts. The candidates for judges in this body 
are nominated by an Appointments Board made up of representatives from different 
organizations, such as the CSJ itself, the Honduran Entrepreneurial Council, and the 
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National Autonomous University of Honduras. The CSJ has among its functions the 
duty to carry out the constitutional requirements.  
The constitution provides for an independent institution in charge of 
organizing elections and the administration of electoral justice—the Supreme 
Electoral Court (TSE, to use its acronym in Spanish). There are four layers to the 
structure of the TSE. The first is the TSE itself, composed of three magistrates that 
serve for a period of five years. They are elected by the Congress and are permitted 
to seek re-election once their term is over. The second layer is made up of the 
Departmental Electoral Courts. The third and the fourth layers consist of the 
Municipal Electoral Courts and the polling stations boards.  
Honduras is divided into administrative areas called departments; each 
department has a governor who is appointed by the Executive. The Municipal Law 
states that the departmental governor is a liaison between the institutions of the 
central government and the municipalities. Each department is divided into 
municipalities; there are 298 municipalities in total (see Figure 3A.2). Municipalities 
are governed by a municipality council composed of one mayor, one vice-mayor, and 
at least four aldermen. All council members are elected in simultaneous elections to 
president and deputies to the National Congress and the Central American 
Parliament, and serve for a period of four years. Re-election is allowed for all 
municipal positions. 
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              Figure 3A.2. Political division of Honduras in departments and municipalities 
              Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2001). 
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Political parties 
Since the transition to democracy in the early 1980s, the PLH and the PNH have 
coexisted with three smaller parties: the Social-Democrat Innovation and Unit Party 
(PINU-SD), the Christian-Democrat Party of Honduras (PDCH), and the 
Democratic Unification Party (UD).  
Table 3A.1 shows the electoral results for the elections that have taken place in 
the country between 1981 and 2009. The ENP Index column shows the index of the 
effective number of parties, a measure that shows which parties have tended to 
dominate the party system (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979). Using the number of seats 
per party, with values ranging between 2.17 and 2.42, the ENP Index indicates that 
the PLH and PNH have dominated the Honduran Congress over the last three 
decades. The table also shows how these two parties have alternated in power during 
that period, the PLH being the party that has held the presidency most times (five 
times, compared to the PNH’s three times). 
Table 3A.1 Presidential election results and parliament 
composition in Honduras, 1981–2009, in thousands 
Election 
year 
PL PN PINU PDCH UD1/ Total 
valid 
votes 
Voters 
turnout 
(%) 
ENP 
Index2/ 
1981 
 
636* 
(44) 
491 
(34) 
29 
(3) 
19 
(1) 
- 1,178 22.0 2.17 
1985 
 
787* 
(67) 
701 
(63) 
23 
(2) 
30 
(2) 
- 1,543 16.0 2.12 
1989 
 
777 
(55) 
917* 
(71) 
34 
(2) 
25 
(0) 
- 1,755 23.4 2.03 
1993 
 
907* 
(71) 
735 
(55) 
48 
(2) 
20 
(0) 
- 1,712 64.97 
 
2.03 
1997 1,040* 
(67) 
846 
(54) 
 
41 
(5) 
 
25 
(1) 
 
24 
(1) 
 
1,977 27.65 2.20 
2001 
 
965 
(55) 
1,138* 
(61) 
32 
(4) 
21 
(3) 
24 
(5) 
2,179 33.73 2.42 
2005 
 
919* 
(62) 
850 
(54) 
19 
(3) 
26 
(4) 
27 
(5) 
1,841 55.08 
 
2.41 
 
2009 
 
817 
(45) 
1,214* 
(71) 
40 
(3) 
38 
(5) 
36 
(4) 
2,146 NA 2.30 
Notes: The seats per political party are in parentheses. 1/This party formed in 1992 and 
participated in elections for the first time in 1997. 2/There are two versions of this index: one 
is calculated using each party’s vote share and the other using each party’s number of seats in 
congress. The results presented here have been calculated based on the number of seats.  
* Signifies the party that won the presidency. 
Sources: Taylor (1996, p. 329), updated with information from the National Electoral 
Tribunal of Honduras.  
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Chapter 4 
Measuring legislators’ personal vote-seeking 
behaviour 
 
 
Three of the most popular proxies political researchers use to investigate the 
different facets of the behaviour of legislators are records of bill initiation, elite 
surveys, and the geographical distribution of public spending. Each of these has its 
advantages and disadvantages. If taken together, the advantages of one compensate 
for the disadvantages of the other, increasing the reliability of causal inferences. As 
King, Keohane and Verba (1994) recommend, case studies can enhance a 
researcher’s leverage of analysis to test a theory by increasing the number of 
dependent variables:  “[a]dditional instances for the test of a theory or hypothesis can 
be generated by retaining the same unit of observation but changing the dependent 
variable. This approach involves looking for many effects of the same cause—a 
powerful technique for testing a hypothesis” (p. 223). 
I have constructed an original dataset on bills initiated by each Honduran 
legislator between 1990 and 2009. I also employ data from four rounds of 
parliamentarian surveys conducted by the Ibero-American Institute of the University 
of Salamanca in the years 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010. Finally, to study pork-barrel 
outcomes, I use an original dataset on projects executed in each municipality by the 
Honduran Social Investment Fund (FHIS) from 1990 to 2009. In this chapter I 
explain how these sources of data are good proxies of legislators’ behaviour. To this 
end, I study the variation of the data to observe patterns of interest that could be 
associated with the change to an OLPR electoral system. Additionally, this chapter 
aims to describe the data collection process. I start with the bill initiation dataset in 
section one. Section two considers the parliamentarian survey data. The last part of 
this chapter is dedicated to the discussion and description of the geographically 
distributed spending dataset.  
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4.1 Initiation of bills data 
The introduction of bills is an activity through which legislators leave traces of their 
behaviour. Political scientists are aware that this indicator provides valuable 
information which can be used to test relevant hypotheses. For example, Crisp et al. 
(2004) use the presentation of bills to test different hypotheses on the effects of 
political institutions on the ways in which legislators represent their parties and their 
constituencies in congress. They employ a dataset on patterns of bill presentation in 
six Latin American presidential democracies over several years. Similarly, Gam and 
Kousser (2010) test their hypothesis on a dataset of 165,000 bills presented by 
members of the lower houses of 13 state legislatures in the United States over a 
period of 120 years. 
I have constructed a dataset of bills initiated by each of the permanent 
legislators of the Honduran Congress.47 The dataset includes bills initiated between 
January 1990 and December 2010, allowing me to study the patterns of legislative 
behaviour in the Honduran Congress.48 The data was collected from the annual bill 
indexes created by the Secretary of the Honduran Congress. Each entry for these 
indexes contains a code, a summary of the bill, and the name of the legislator who 
presented it (see Appendix 4.1). From these sources, information can be inferred 
about who introduced the bill, when it was introduced, the type of bill, and the 
targeted population. I coded every bill into one of the five following categories: 
district, national, sector, individual, and others. 
4.1.1 District bills 
To be coded as district a bill must mention a specific place or suggest that the benefits 
it is meant to create will be directed to a particular place.49 In this regard, mention of 
a town, a municipality, or department was the main criterion for identifying this type 
                                                 
47 Or the substitute legislators, in cases where these replaced permanent deputies.  
48 Previous to the coding of the bills, I had to construct a database of legislators. I collected the 
information on individual legislators from the official announcements (declaratorias de elección), which are 
published by the National Electoral Tribunal in the Honduran statute books (Diario Oficial La Gaceta) 
after the official counting of the votes in each election, as well as from the registration of candidates 
each party had to publish in La Gaceta previous to the elections.  
49 In 27 out of 1,794 cases that were coded as district bills it was not possible to identify the places the 
bills were supposed to benefit. This was due to the fact that the geographical information was not 
included in the summary of the bills. For example, bill 382-99 is a proposal from 1999 requesting 
authorization for the transfer of 6.75 acres of lands from the ownership of the Ministry for Natural 
Resources to the Ministry for Health. In this case, the name of the place was not included in the 
summary of the bill, even though its existence can be inferred.  
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of bill. When a bill affected more than one department (i.e. constituency) it was also 
classified as a district bill. The rationale behind this decision was that on some 
occasions several legislators from different departments presented a bill together, 
creating a shared benefit for their constituencies. There were also cases where, for 
example, a project to build a road connecting municipalities in different departments 
was presented by a single legislator. While the project would affect different 
departments, it would most directly benefit that legislator’s constituency. 
A vast range of district bills are pork-barrel legislative proposals seeking 
funding to finance projects in the legislators’ constituencies. For example, bill 365-
2002, which seeks “[t]o instruct the Secretary for Finance to add to the budget of the 
Secretary for Public Works and Transports a special budget to build a bridge over the 
river Cuyamapa, cities of Victoria and Morazan, department of Yoro” (own 
translation). But district bills can cover a variety of other interests, for instance, if a 
municipality is granted an exemption from import tax for the import of a vehicle into 
the country for use by the local government. Another example might be the creation 
of new community college degrees. Municipality and town declarations are another 
kind of bills that Honduran legislators usually present, as well as authorizations for 
public institutions to donate or buy lands. 
4.1.2 National bills  
Legislative proposals were coded as national bills when they had the potential to affect 
the whole country or have an impact on large diffuse publics. For example, 
constitutional reforms, the creation of and amendments to laws such as the Labour 
Code, the Electoral Law, and other similar regulations. The creation of new laws 
such as the Access to Information Law, Municipalities Law, and the Citizens’ 
Participation Law were also coded as national bills, because they attempt to regulate 
the social, political, and economic aspects of Honduran society. 
Other bills had the potential to impact rather diffuse publics across the country. 
For example, bill 118-2010 instructs the Secretary for Finance to “cancel the 
collection of fines and sub-charges imposed on road users for the late payment of the 
vehicle circulation permit” (own translation). That bill benefits car owners. While not 
all Hondurans own cars, the car-owner population is not a well-defined sector (and 
certainly not organized) like public workers, teachers, and coffee producers. 
Therefore, any norm that can potentially affect voters who share similar 
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characteristics and who are spread across the country, like car owners, house owners 
and tax payers, is classified as a national bill.  
4.1.3 Sector bills  
The main criterion to be included in the sector category was that the proposed norm 
had to affect a defined sub-group of the Honduran population or an organization 
whose location was not well specified. Examples of this type of bill are norms to 
officialize and/or regulate professional guild associations (e.g. civil engineers, 
dentists, and lawyers); bills regulating the pension plans of the national association of 
public school teachers; or a bill to commemorate Indigenous People’s Day or Afro-
Descendant People’s Day. These groups are usually spread throughout the country 
or in small areas that transcend the boundaries of a constituency.  
Some bills generate benefits for particular sub-groups of the Honduran 
population but these are identified with a specific area of the country. I coded those 
bills as district rather than sector since they are likely to affect a discernible group of the 
population in a given constituency rather than diffuse groups spread out across the 
national territory. This is the case of well-defined ethnic groups, such as the Miskito, 
who are mainly based in the department of Gracias a Dios. Additionally, on some 
occasions the bills were aimed at generating benefits for a particular sector. For 
example, some legislators presented bills to exempt evangelical churches in specific 
cities from paying taxes, or requested funding from the government to repair a 
church building. As in the case of district bills, these proposals specified the location 
of the beneficiary group. As the legislator’s objective was to bring benefits to a 
particular group within her constituency these bills were classified under the district 
label.  
An exception was made when the proposed norm dealt with women’s issues. 
Considering that women constitute more or less half of the population, I coded such 
bills as national. The same rationale was applied when bills were meant for children 
and the elderly, given that these are often non-organized groups and are often 
dependents in their families.  
Most bills seeking awards to organizations were coded under the category of 
sector bills. However, an exception was made in a few cases involving sports and 
cultural figures, particularly in football. I reasoned that these had to be coded as 
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national bills, considering that these awards were conceded to figures representing 
Honduras in international competitions or at cultural events. Furthermore, the 
legislator’s intention in presenting the bill could have been to evoke national 
sentiment.  
4.1.4 Individual bills 
I coded bills as individual in those cases were the proposals were aimed at benefiting 
individuals and private organizations. Examples of these bills are grants, honorary 
titles, and awards. In the case of individuals, even if the bill identified a place it was 
still coded as individual, because most of the time it was not clear whether a benefit 
for an individual could be extended to the whole constituency or a more or less 
diffuse group of voters. In the case of organizations, when the territory where the 
organization carries out its activities was not specified in the bill, I coded that bill as 
individual.  
4.1.5 Others 
In this category I included those bills for which I did not have sufficient information 
to judge the impact of the bill in terms of national, local, or private interests. The 
journals from which the data was collected only included summaries of the bills and 
did not show the justification for or details of what exactly was being proposed. In 
this category I also included bills related to the institutional work of the Congress. 
For example, it is usually the Secretary or the President of the Honduran Congress 
who calls for breaks or extraordinary sessions. In this regard, they do not necessarily 
reflect the behaviour of legislators since presenting such a bill is not part of their 
ordinary work. A similar criterion is used for the bills related to the appointments 
Honduran legislators have to make, for example, to the positions of the National 
General Attorney or the Judges for the Supreme Court of Justice. These 
appointments are strategic decisions made by the party, and not necessarily by 
individual legislators.  
Table 4.1 displays a random sample of the bills that were coded into the 
different categories. The table includes a column for the category or type of bill 
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(district, national, sector, private, and others), its consecutively-numbered bill code 
and a summary of the bill.50 
Table 4.1. Examples of bills presented by legislators in the 
Honduran Congress 
Type Code Bill summary 
District 
365-2003 To instruct the Secretary of State for Finance to include, in the 
fiscal year 2003–2004, one million lempiras, to be used in the 
remodelling and construction of the Plaza Cívica, city of 
Siguatepeque, department of Comayagua. 
94-2001 To authorize the National Electrical Energy Board (ENEE) to 
forgive all debts held by costumers who live on the banks of the 
river Choluteca, city of Choluteca. 
331-2000 From the first half of 2000 to change the award for the current 
baccalaureate in computing at the Official Institute Paraíso 
Occidental, Department of Copán, to a baccalaureate in arts and 
computing. 
National 
58-1990 To form a special committee to analyse in detail the transactions 
made by Bank Banadesa. 
156-2005 To reform by addition article 87 of the Education Law, in the 
sense that the evaluation will take into consideration the 
students’ performance, their aspects of their personalities, and 
the completion of projects,  in accordance with the educational 
objectives. 
144-1993 To reform article 120 of the Labour Code (regarding the 
payment of workers’ benefits). 
Sector 
5-1991 To create a postage stamp to commemorate the first centenary 
of the Liberal Party. 
387-1998 To add to the executive decree 28-97, in its article 5, that the 
members of the sports federations will serve for an honorary 
period of no longer than four years, and they will not be re-
elected. 
48-2002 Organic Law of the Professional Association of Graduates in 
Communication. 
Individual 
189-1995 To give citizen Rafael Murillo-Selva authorization to accept an 
award conferred by the Government of Colombia. 
510-2006 To include in the National Budget a monthly budget of 100,000 
lempiras for the economic strengthening of the Asociación 
Koinomia. 
207-1990 To grant citizen, Juan Fernando López, a lifelong pension of 
3,000 lempiras.  
(continued on following page) 
                                                 
50 To select random sub-samples within the database a variable containing pseudo-random numbers 
was generated. Then sub-samples for each of the sub-categories were created by shuffling the pseudo 
random numbers and the variables for each of the sub-categories. 
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Table 4.1 
(continued from previous page) 
Others 
280-1993 To extend the current session by an additional 50 days, starting 
on the 1st of November 1993. 
538-2010 To include a budget item in the National Budget, fiscal year 
2011, for the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, for the creation and 
operation of a consular office on Grand Cayman Island. 
45-1991 To instruct the Secretary of State for Finance to increase the 
current fiscal year budgets of the National Electoral Institutes by 
7,221,758 lempiras.  
  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
The unit of analysis in this study consists of every bill introduced by each of the 
permanent Honduran legislators or their substitutes between January 1990 and 
December 2010. As shown in Table 4.2, bills coded as district and national represent 
over 60 per cent of the observations included during the period of study. When non-
presentations are excluded that figure increases to 78.5 per cent, meaning that between 
1990 and 2010 more than three quarters of the bills initiated fell into the categories 
of district and national. The variable non-presentations can provide information on what 
type of legislators decide to present bills or not, given that depending on the electoral 
system some deputies will have greater incentives to introduce bills or not. 
Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics of bill introduction by the deputies 
of the Honduran Congress, 1990–2010  
Type of bill Observations Per cent 
National 2,162 33.20 
District 1,794 27.54 
Non-presentations 1,479 22.71 
Sector 595 9.14 
Individual 367 5.63 
Others 116 1.78 
Total 6,513 100 
 
In Table 4.3 I present the percentages for bill initiation in the National 
Congress of Honduras between 1990 and 2010. The figures are broken down by 
legislature.51 An additional column indicates the number of seats the party held 
during that legislature. Non-presentations refers to the percentage of legislators who did 
not introduce bills in the four years of each legislature. During the CLPR period, as 
one might expect, it can be noticed that the main opposition party had the most non-
                                                 
51 It must be borne in mind that in Honduras deputies serve for terms of four years starting on the 
21st of January after their election, which takes place in November of the previous year. Therefore, the 
change from one legislature to the next happens in January of the same year. 
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presentations per legislature. In contrast, few legislators from the party in 
government fell into this category. The figures for this variable are also relatively 
minor for the smaller parties. During this period, all parties tended to introduce a 
majority of national bills, followed by district bills in second place, then sector and 
individual bills. Note that district bills tend to increase in importance between each 
legislature. For instance, by the end of the 1990–1994 period, the percentage of 
district bills was 11 per cent. At the end of the following legislature that figure 
increased to 18.1 per cent. By January 2006, the last month of the last legislature of 
the CLPR system, the percentage of district bills was 27.2. That does not mean that 
the presentation of other types of bills decreased. In fact, the increase in district bills 
seems to be correlated with a gradual reduction in the number of legislators who did 
not present bills. 
During the OLPR period the percentage of national bills increases, particularly 
among the smaller parties. Nevertheless, we can notice that in the 2006–2010 
legislature, 50 per cent of the bills introduced by legislators from the party in 
government were district bills. It is difficult to say whether that pattern will be 
repeated in the 2010–2014 legislature, because at the time this thesis was written only 
two years of the legislature had been completed, and data was available only for the 
first year. However, as I will show later, it seems that during the first year of that 
legislature there was a tendency among all the political parties to introduce mainly 
national bills and then district bills, a tendency that was higher still if it is compared 
to the CLPR period.   
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Table 4.3. Introduction of bills by political parties in the Honduran Congress, in percentages, 1990–2010 legislatures 
Electoral 
system 
Legislature Party Seats Percentage of bills by type Percentage of 
non-
presentations 
District National Sector Private Others 
CLPR 
1990–1994 
PLH 55 7.6 29.4 4.4 3.8 1.6 53.2 
PNH* 70 13.8 29.7 13.0 4.7 3.1 35.7 
PINU-SD 3 0.0 69.2 3.8 0.0 3.8 23.1 
Total 128 11.0 30.8 9.4 4.2 2.5 42.0 
1994–1998 
PLH* 70 24.4 35.0 10.9 4.4 2.4 23.0 
PNH 56 7.0 24.7 4.0 2.3 1.7 60.3 
PINU-SD 2 0.0 80.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 
Total 128 18.1 32.6 8.6 3.7 2.1 34.9 
1998–2002 
PLH* 67 29.7 36.4 10.0 6.2 2.5 15.3 
PNH 55 11.5 34.2 7.0 2.2 0.6 44.5 
PINU-SD 3 0.0 53.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 46.7 
PUD 1 0.0 77.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.2 
PDCH 2 6.1 54.5 21.2 6.1 6.1 6.1 
Total 128 23.5 36.7 9.3 5.0 2.0 23.5 
2002–2006 
PLH 55 23.8 28.5 6.9 6.9 0.5 33.3 
PNH* 61 29.4 29.7 8.6 10.4 1.9 20.0 
PINU-SD 3 4.5 59.1 9.1 18.2 0.0 9.1 
PUD 5 17.5 47.5 10.0 2.5 0.0 22.5 
PDCH 4 36.3 37.2 13.3 8.8 2.7 1.8 
Total 128 27.2 31.1 8.5 8.9 1.4 22.9 
OLPR 2006–2010 
PLH* 63 50.2 26.3 8.2 5.1 2.1 8.1 
PNH 54 28.7 35.4 10.2 7.3 0.6 17.8 
PINU-SD 2 35.5 45.2 16.1 3.2 0.0 0.0 
PUD 5 9.1 61.8 10.9 7.3 1.8 9.1 
PDCH 4 34.4 31.1 23.0 6.6 0.0 4.9 
Total 128 41.6 30.7 9.6 5.8 1.5 10.8 
          
(continued on following page) 
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Table 4.3 
(continued from previous page) 
Electoral 
system 
Legislature Party Seats Percentage of bills by type Percentage of 
non-
presentations 
District National Sector Private Others 
OLPR 2010–20141/ 
PLH 45 31.9 44.5 4.9 9.3 0.0 9.3 
PNH* 71 35.7 40.7 5.3 8.7 1.5 8.0 
PINU-SD 3 5.6 83.3 5.6 0.0 5.6 0 
PUD 4 8.3 58.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 
PDCH 5 43.8 37.5 0.0 15.6 3.1 0.0 
Total 128 33.1 43.8 9.1 4.9 1.4 7.7 
Total   768 7.6 29.4 4.4 3.8 1.6 53.2 
Notes: The mark * indicates the party in government. 1/ Data for this legislature considers only the year 2010. 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates that when the totals for each type of bill per year are 
compared, national and district bills are those introduced most frequently by 
Honduran legislators. After 1992, the year of the first ballot reform, some degree of 
disturbance in the trends can be observed, specifically a slight increase in the number 
of national and district bills. Between 1997 and 1998, three significant events occur. 
In 1997, the legislative ballot was completely separated from the presidential ballot. 
In January 1998, a new legislature with deputies elected under the non-fused CLPR 
system came into effect. At this point, the graph shows that the number of national 
bills introduced increases considerably in comparison to previous years. However, in 
October of the same year Hurricane Mitch hit the country. In the year after this 
natural disaster, national bills actually increased in number. By 2000, a significant 
decrease in these bills can be seen. This seems to be correlated with a rise in the 
number district bills introduced. In the period between Hurricane Mitch and 2004, in 
2003, there is another important peak in the number of district bills. Also worth 
noting is that the number of legislators who do not introduce bills has been declining 
slowly since 1990. 
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ballot. General
elections the
following year
1997: end of
fused ballot.
General elections
the following year
1998: inauguration of
new legislature in
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Figure 4.1. Introduction of bills by type, and non-introductions, by Honduran 
deputies in the period January 1990–December 2010 
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Despite the gradual changes observed in the 1990s, and in spite of the 
disruption to previous trends that occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, the 
most important changes are observed after the OLPR reform. For instance, in 2006 
the number of district bills grew in an unprecedented manner. Then around 2007 the 
number of bills introduced started to decline rapidly. Two hypotheses could provide 
an explanation for this decline. The first is that bill introduction behaviour is seasonal 
and that political cycles determine that seasonality. As can be noticed in Figure 4.1 
above, in 2004 and 2008 there are significant declines in bill introduction, particularly 
of district bills. During those years primary elections were held under the new 
system. By contrast, 2006 and 2010 are years in which governments were 
inaugurated. While there is no evidence in this specific case to understand how 
political cycles work in Honduras, it is not irrational to suppose that legislators will 
tend to spend more time campaigning in their constituencies during primary election 
years. By contrast, during non-electoral years there are probably fewer incentives to 
campaign in their constituencies.52 The second hypothesis is that OLPR makes it 
more difficult to get legislation passed—see Figure 4.2 below—and that this in turn 
potentially discourages legislators from introducing bills.53  
As well as an increase in the number of district bills, 2006 also saw very high 
levels of national and sector bills. In the case of national bills, the peak is similar in 
magnitude to that of 1999. However, it was in 2010 that the introduction of these 
types of bill reached its zenith. In terms of sector bills, the increase of 2006 is the 
highest registered during the time frame considered in this study. Moreover, the 
number of legislators not introducing bills dropped considerably in the 2006–2007 
period, a reduction that seems to be correlated with the rise in the number of 
national but especially district bills. 
There are no formal impediments to the presentation of bills by deputies. And 
the incentives to present them can go beyond the mere fact of whether the bill is 
                                                 
52 Electoral cycles probably also affect the ordinary functioning of the Honduran Congress. The 
absence of deputies from parliament is probably more common the closer to an election, both 
primaries and general as are recesess requests to dedicate time to campaigning.   
53 One could argue that the decline in bills introduction after 2007 occured because deputies had 
initially thought that increasing the number of such bills was a rational response to the new electoral 
system but then concluded otherwise. However, judging by the increase in the introduction of national 
and district bills in 2010—an inauguration year—there is more support for the hypothesis that the bill 
introduction behaviour is seasonal rather than a finite outcome in response to the electoral system 
change of 2004.  
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passed or not. According to one of the interviewees, “most bills are draft budget 
proposals that come through the deputies to record their interest in the needs of 
their communities. Most are rejected directly by Finance, but the rest are dealt with at 
the time of negotiating the budget.”54 Another of the legislators interviewed 
suggested that there are internal negotiations within the political parties and between 
parties, as well as with the Congress Directorate, to decide who present bills, in what 
areas and on behalf of which constituencies: 55  
Some legislators present bills with national scope, but in order for them to 
do so there must exist a consensus within the party and among the 
deputies represented in Congress, and the deputies of each constituency, 
to present, for example a bill seeking funding to build roads, municipality 
markets, or for the conversion of schools into community colleges. This 
is a complex process, and there has to exist a consensus among the 
deputies of the departments and the Congress Directorate.56  
Taylor-Robinson & Díaz (1999) argue that the internal structure of the 
Honduran Congress provides incentives for legislators to negotiate power and perks. 
In this regard, the presentation and approval of bills is often the result of previous 
arrangements to decide strategic positions such as committee assignments and the 
appointment of the President of Congress, a position with a fixed term of four years. 
Figure 4.2 shows the percentage of bills presented by Honduran legislators in relation 
to the total number of bills presented in the Honduran Congress. Notice that after 
the electoral reforms of 1992 and 1997 the percentage of bills presented by legislators 
increased. After the reform of the electoral system to OLPR in 2004 there was a 
sharp decrease. However, following the inauguration of the new legislature elected 
under that system the percentage of bills presented by legislators increased 
substantially in comparison to the previous period. The graph also presents the 
percentage of bills passed as part of the total for bills presented by legislators. In this 
case, note how the percentage of bills passed increased after 1993, but started to 
decrease after the legislative and the presidential ballots were unfused in 1997. There 
is a sharp decrease in the percentage of approved bills after the system changed from 
                                                 
54 Deputy of the National Party of Honduras, personal interview, 7th February 2012. 
55 In a recent article, Grimmer, Messing and Westwood (2012) suggest that constituents may be more 
responsive to the number of a legislator’s credit-claiming messages than the actual amount of money 
secured for the community by that legislator. It may therefore be further argued that, as the legislator 
quoted in this paragraph intimates, merely initiating a bill serves to send a message to constituents 
about the work of the legislator.   
56 Deputy of the National Party of Honduras, personal interview, 15th February 2012. 
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CLPR to OLPR in 2004, which could be an indication that negotiations have become 
more difficult in the Honduran Congress with institutional changes that decentralize 
power from the Executive to the Legislative branch. 
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Figure 4.2. Percentage of bills introduced by legislators in the Honduran Congress by 
year  1/Percentage in relation of the total number of bills presented by year. In addition to 
legislators, the Executive, the Judiciary and the National Electoral Tribunal can present bills. 
2/This is the percentage of bills passed as a share of the total of bills presented only by 
legislators. It was not possible to get a proper statistic for bills passed in 1992; as a result, it 
cannot be confidently stated whether the irregular pattern of bill approval observed that year 
is because of the legislators’ behaviour or whether it is because of the form in which passed 
bills were recorded in the Honduran Congress.  
To conclude this section, the preliminary evidence from the analysis of the 
dataset of introduction of bills per legislator in the Honduran Congress presented in 
this chapter seems to suggest that, in a longitudinal form, there is an association 
between the change in electoral system and the type of bill introduced by legislators. 
While there seem to exist some signs of endogeneity between those two variables, 
particularly after Hurricane Mitch, the most dramatic changes are observed after the 
institutional change of 2004. The variation is consistent with the theory, in other 
words, that greater importance is given to district bills under open-list PR (pork or 
local goods) than to national bills (non-targetable goods).  
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4.3 Parliamentarian survey data 
Since 1994, the Ibero-American Institute of the University of Salamanca in Spain has 
conducted a series of surveys using as populations of study parliamentarians in all the 
Latin American countries. The project is called “Latin American Parliamentarian 
Elites Project” (PELA). The Honduran Congress inaugurated in January 1994 was 
included in the first round of interviews. Since then, every time a new Congress has 
been inaugurated, the University of Salamanca has sent a team of researchers to 
conduct interviews with a representative sample of the Honduran legislators. A total 
of five studies have been carried out, one for each of the following legislatures: 
1994–1998, 1998–2002, 2002–2006, 2006–2010, and 2010–2014. 
Since its beginnings, the reputation of PELA has increased and a considerable 
number of academics in the social sciences have used the survey data to conduct 
analyses on issues related to Latin American parliamentarians. The results of some of 
these investigations have been published by reputable publishing houses and in high-
ranked peer-reviewed journals. For instance, Kitschelt et al.’s (2010) analysis of Latin 
American party systems is founded on the information gathered by PELA for its 
databases in the 1997 round of surveys. Saiegh (2009) uses the information on the 
parliamentarians’ ideological self-positioning to comparatively analyse ideological 
variation among Latin American legislators. Carey (2009) and Carey and Reynolds 
(2007) utilize these databases to obtain information on the accountability of 
legislators towards their party leaders.  
The PELA survey of 1994 did not include some of the questions that are 
relevant for constructing the dependent variables for the present analysis. However, 
the analyses that took place between 1998 and 2010 share many similarities. It was 
therefore decided to focus the analysis on this period, which provides samples of 
deputies from two legislatures elected using the CLPR system and two legislatures 
elected under OLPR. Similar surveys conducted by the same team of researchers in 
other Latin American countries yielded very low rates of response (e.g. Kitschelt et 
al., 2010, p. 348). In the case of Honduras, the proportion of legislators surveyed 
exceeded 50 per cent of the population of parliamentarians in each round of 
interviews. In order to create a sample with a fixation directly proportional to the 
population, each political party represented in Congress was taken as a stratum in the 
survey design. Random sampling was applied to each stratum of legislators.  
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Table 4.4. PELA surveys design by legislatures included in the analysis and electoral system type 
Electoral 
system 
Legislatu-
re 
Dates 
of inter-
views 
Sample size 
n (%) 
Sampling Weight Confiden-
ce 
intervals1/ 
Strata Distribution 
of legislators 
in Congress 
% Distribu-
tion of 
designed 
surveys 
% Comple-
ted 
surveys 
% 
CLPR 
1998–2002 
6th July–
15th 
August 
1998 
71 (55.5) PLH 67 52.34 37 52.11 37 52.11 1.00 ± 11.1 
PNH 55 42.97 30 42.25 30 42.25 1.02 ±12.4 
Other 
parties 
6 4.69 4 5.63 4 5.63 0.83  
Total 128 100.00 71 100.00 71 100.00  ±8.0 
2002–2006 
1st–24th 
October 
2002 
102 (79.7) PNH 61 47.66 49 47.57 48 47.06 1.01 ±6.73 
PLH 55 42.97 44 42.72 42 41.18 1.04 ±7.59 
PUD 5 3.91 4 3.88 5 4.90 0.80 ±0.00 
Other 
parties 
7 5.47 6 5.83 7 6.86 0.80 ±0.00 
Total 128 100.00 103 100.00 102 100.00  ±4.58 
OLPR 
2006–2010 
2nd–31  
July 
2006 
91 (71.1) PLH 62 49.44 44 48.35 44 48.35 1.02 ±8.22 
PNH 55 42.97 39 42.86 39 42.86 1.00 ±8.75 
PUD 5 3.91 4 4.40 4 4.40 0.89 ±25.82 
Other 
parties 
6 4.69 4 4.40 4 4.40 1.07 ±33.33 
Total 128 100.00 91 100.00 91 100.00  ±5.78 
2010–2014 
1st 
March–
5th April 
2010 
91 (71.1) PNH 71 55.47 50 54.95 50 54.95 1.01 ±7.77 
PLH 45 35.16 32 35.16 32 35.16 1.00 ±9.65 
PDC 5 3.91 4 4.40 4 4.40 0.89 ±25.82 
PUD 4 3.13 3 3.30 3 3.30 0.95 ±35.34 
PINU-
SD 
3 2.34 
2 
2.20 
2 
2.20 1.06 ±57.74 
Total 128 100.00 91 100.00 91 100.00  ±5.84 
Notes: 1/ 95.5 per cent two-tailed confidence intervals. 
Source: PELA (2011). 
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Table 4.4 above describes the design of each of the survey rounds included in 
the present analysis. The interviews were conducted personally over periods of two 
to five weeks. In the fourth column is the survey sample: data for the actual 
responses received is presented both in absolute numbers and in percentages, which 
are calculated in relation to the total number of responses per round. The columns 
under the heading Sampling detail the criteria used for the sampling procedure, 
specifically the strata, the total number of seats and their distribution by party in 
Congress, the designed survey, and the actual number of responses per legislature 
and per party. The remaining two columns present the weight that should be 
employed for the normalization of the data before conducting analyses, and the 
estimated sampling errors for a two-tailed confidence interval of 95.5 per cent. 
4.4 Dependent variables 
Building on the theory developed in Chapter 2, there are three dimensions of their 
work that can provide information on legislators’ personal vote-seeking behaviour: 
(1) constituency service, (2) representation of interest groups, and (3) the provision 
of public goods. As I will explain in the following sections, I have selected three 
questions from the PELA surveys to use as dependent variables. These are related to 
pork-barrel politics, the representation of interest groups, and the formulation of 
laws as common activities of parliamentarians.57  
4.4.1 Pork-barrel politics 
To analyse the constituency service behaviour of legislators, I used the question 
“[w]hat degree of importance do you attach, during the course of your parliamentary 
activities, to providing resources for your constituency?” For ease of reference, I will 
label this variable simply as pork. I chose this question for two reasons: first, of all 
similar questions in the PELA surveys, it was the one that best approximates the 
pork-barrel behaviour of Honduran deputies. The second reason to conduct the 
analysis based on this question was that it had not changed in its phrasing over time 
or in the scale of its answers, facilitating comparison across the different surveys 
analysed in this chapter. To answer this question, legislators were given a list of 
options, ordered on a scale in the following manner: (1) none at all, (2) little, (3) a 
good deal, and (4) a great deal. 
                                                 
57 See Appendix 4.2 for a detailed description of the questions used in this chapter. 
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Figure 4.3 shows the variation of the responses for the variable pork. Overall, 
most surveyed legislators showed a very positive opinion towards pork-barrel 
politics. In 1998, more of the responses fell into the a great deal category than in other 
years. However, it must be taken into consideration that during that year the sample 
was smaller than in the subsequent rounds. Only one legislator picked none at all as an 
answer. Between 2002 and 2010, a gradual decrease in the percentage of legislators 
who chose a great deal as their answer can be observed, paired with a slight increase in 
the responses that fell into the a good deal category. In 2010, the percentage of 
legislators who selected little is very low compared to the previous years. 
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Figure 4.3. Distribution of the importance of pork for Honduran legislators, in 
percentages. PELA surveys 1998–2010. The question used to construct this graph asked 
legislators: “[w]hat degree of importance do you attach, during the course of your 
parliamentary activities, to providing resources for your constituency?” 
4.4.2 Representation of interest groups  
In each survey conducted between 1998 and 2006 deputies were asked to what extent 
they take into consideration the opinions of different groups, individuals, and 
institutions when making policy decisions. They were presented with a list of 
categories, one of which was ‘interest groups.’ Legislators had to rank their answers 
for each category according to the following scale: (1) not at all, (2) to little extent, (3) 
to some extent, and (4) to a great extent. In the survey of 2010 the question changed, 
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asking legislators to choose from the same list of groups and institutions given in the 
previous years and rank them first and second in order of the importance of their 
opinions on the legislator’s policy decisions. Given this change of measurement, it 
was necessary to find a way compare the different rounds of surveys. One possibility 
was to standardize the scale. However, when applying this procedure the researcher 
has to make sure that the resulting scale reflects unidimensionality, which means that 
“each item measures the same underlying concepts” (de Vaus, 1991, p. 255).     
I tried to create a single scale that could make the scales used in the 
questionnaires of 1998–2006 comparable with the one employed in 2010. 
Nevertheless, while in the case of the 1998–2006 surveys I found a more uniform 
distribution across items, in the 2010 survey virtually all observations fell into one 
item. Therefore, it could not be assumed that the scales were unidimensional. 
Fortunately, the period 1998–2006 covers variation in the type of ballot, which is our 
major concern, even though fewer observations subtracts degrees of freedom to 
make inferences. 
Figure 4.4 displays the variation of the responses for the representation of interest 
groups variable in percentages. It can be noticed that in 2002 and 2006, the percentage 
of legislators who chose the answers not at all and to little extent increased in 
comparison with 1998. In 2002, there was a significant decrease in the percentage of 
legislators who chose to a great extent. In 2006, however, the number of responses that 
fell into that same item increased in comparison to the previous survey. Overall, 
visual inspection of the data does not reveal patterns that could be related to the 
electoral system change of 2004. 
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of the variable representation of interest groups, in 
percentages. PELA surveys 1998–2006. The question used to construct this graph asked: 
“[t]o what extent do you take into consideration the opinion of each of the following groups, 
individuals, or institutions when making policy decisions?” This graph shows the results for 
questions relating to interest groups.  
4.4.3 Non-targetable goods: formulation of laws 
In order to measure the provision of non-targetable goods by Honduran legislators, I 
chose an item related to the formulation of laws. As I have previously explained, the 
formulation of laws by deputies is one of the principal ways in which they can deliver 
general public goods (Cox & McCubbins, 2001; Crisp et al., 2004). Apart from the 
theoretical importance of this parliamentarian activity, by studying this variable 
through survey data, I can compare it with the observed behaviour of bill 
introduction in the Honduran Congress.  
The question regarding law formulation has changed across the different survey 
rounds. In the survey of 1998, deputies were asked how important is during the 
course of their parliamentary work to making laws. They had to choose one of the 
following answers: (1) none, (2) a little, (3) some, and (4) a lot. In the 2002 and 2006 
surveys, the question asked them to select from a list the three aspects of their work 
as deputies to which they attach most importance, one option being making laws. To 
answer this question they had to rank those aspects first, second, and third in 
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descending order of importance. The same question was used in the 2010 survey; 
however, this time legislators were asked to name only the first and second most 
important aspects of their work.  
I rescaled the surveys held between 1998 and 2010 to make them as comparable 
as possible, without sacrificing data. Because in 1998 the highest value is 4, and is 
then reduced in the following surveys, to facilitate the comparison it was assumed 
that for that year the values 1 and 2 could be combined into a single category, ‘low’. I 
then subtracted one from each of the values 3 and 4, making 2 the value for medium 
and 3 the value for high. Again, because in 2010, at the time the data was being 
coded, each category was included in different columns in the matrix, when I created 
the variables for that particular year I coded the resulting missing values as 1s (i.e. as 
having a value of 1) and assumed that these were the lowest responses for that item. 
To summarize, the resulting scale ranged between 1 and 3, where 1 reflects low levels 
of importance attached by legislators to making laws, 2 refers to medium levels, and 
3 to high levels of importance for the same item. As can be observed in Figure 4.5, 
between 2002 and 2010 there is a trend which seems quite uniform in the sense that 
it shows an increase in responses falling into the high category, which is correlated 
with a decrease in the responses included in the low category. The same behaviour is 
not observed in the 1998 survey. However, notice that the percentage of responses in 
the medium category is very similar across all survey rounds. This would seem to 
imply that there is unidimensionality in the rescaled items. Nevertheless, in order to 
provide additional certainty, I will conduct robustness tests in Chapter 6, the 
parliamentarian survey analysis. 
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Figure 4.5 Distribution of the variable making laws for the Honduran legislators, in 
percentages. PELA rounds of surveys 1998-2010. There have been three versions of the 
questions asking legislators the importance they attach to formulating laws. The first in 1998, 
the second used in the surveys of 2002 and 2006, and the last one used in 2010. The items 
were rescaled in a range from low importance to high importance.  
To conclude this section, I have shown that the Parliamentarian Elite Survey 
databases of the University of Salamanca contain valuable information that enables 
us to test the personal vote-seeking behaviour of legislators in Honduras. Because 
there is a high rate of response among Honduran parliamentarians across the four 
survey rounds that I will use in the analysis, we can have more confidence in the 
inferences. Moreover, the PELA surveys include information about the legislators’ 
individual characteristics that I can use to test hypotheses regarding the impact their 
personal attributes have on pork-barrelling, the representation of interest groups, and 
law formation. 
4.5 Geographical distribution of grants 
In the present work I also use a dataset on social investment projects executed 
between 1990 and 2009 by the Honduran Social Investment Fund (FHIS). This 
dataset enables us to evaluate the impact of electoral systems on pork-barrel 
spending using actual data. There is an extant literature that proves the political 
influence of legislators on governments’ decisions relating to the geographical 
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allocation of their spending (e.g. Ferejohn, 1974; Golden & Picci, 2008; Hallerberg & 
Marier, 2004; Lizzeri & Persico, 2001). As I will show in this section, the case of 
FHIS provides an excellent source of data to test how the type of electoral system in 
use also influences the final allocation of spending.  
There are several reasons why I chose to conduct an analysis on the data 
relating to this particular institution. One important criterion was the availability and 
quality of the data. Since its foundation, FHIS has kept a systematized electronic 
record of the projects it has executed, including information on the sources of the 
budget, the amount of funding spent in the course of each project, and the place 
where the project was carried out. The level of disaggregation of the data was 
another criterion on which I based my analysis of the FHIS dataset. The data is 
disaggregated even at the sub-municipal level, which allowed me to control for 
different factors that pertain specifically to municipalities and could interfere with the 
statistical analysis. Finally, as I will later detail, the qualitative evidence suggests that 
this institution is prone to pork-barrel politics.  
4.5.1 Evolution of FHIS 
FHIS was created in February 1990 as a means of mitigating the effects of the 
structural adjustment programmes that had been recently introduced (Banegas-Lazo, 
2009; FHIS, 2005). According to its constitutive law, the main objective of this 
institution is to promote improvement in the living conditions of marginalized social 
groups in both rural and urban areas by providing funding for programmes and 
projects of social or economic development, in order to increase productivity, 
employment levels and income, and contribute to meeting these populations’ basic 
needs (Congreso Nacional, 1990). Since its creation, this institution’s main source of 
finance has been international aid, provided in the form of donations or loans with 
very low interest rates and special conditions meant to promote development. 
Institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB), KfW Bankengruppe, and the European Commission are among its principal 
partners, which also include other countries. Besides international funding, FHIS also 
receives national budget transfers and help executing projects from other ministries 
in Honduras. 
The historical development of FHIS since its creation is closely tied to the 
credits it has received from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
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Bank. The institution received five credits between 1990 and 2005. The first, for a 
programme known as FHIS I, was approved in 1990 and its execution started in 
March that year. This credit ran until the 31st of March 1994. The objectives of this 
programme were: (1) to mitigate the social costs of adjustment, (2) to establish the 
basis for a decentralized programme of direct support for the poor and 
malnourished, and (3) support improvements in service delivery in the social 
ministries (Education and Health) (World Bank, 1994).  
In July 1992, FHIS II was approved, beginning that month and running until 
October 1995. The objectives of this programme were:  
to help GOH (the Government of Honduras) to sustain its poverty 
alleviation efforts and maintain social cohesion during the period of 
economic adjustment, while the line ministries strengthened their 
institutional capacities and completed policy reform programs, building 
upon the achievements of SIF (the Social Investment Fund) I. As a 
follow-on to SIF I, the project was to provide additional funding to 
FHIS to continue to finance subprojects in social and economic 
infrastructure, social services, and informal sector credit. An ancillary 
component was to provide institutional strengthening through technical 
assistance to the National NGO Liaison Office (NLO) (World Bank, 
1996, p. i). 
The distribution of spending in FHIS I and II was meant to be neutral; in this 
regard, there was not a strict geographical targeting of the poorest populations. 
Instead, the resources were allocated across most municipalities with no 
consideration of the differences of their levels of socioeconomic development 
(World Bank, 2006, p. 13). 
As agreed in the terms and conditions of the credits, FHIS was created as a 
short-term initiative. Towards the end of FHIS II, the execution of projects slowed 
down as a consequence of the electoral campaign and uncertainty among the staff 
regarding the continuity of the programme under a new government. FHIS was 
created under a PNH presidency; nonetheless, the new government inaugurated in 
January 1994 and headed by a PLH president secured its continuity and negotiated a 
third credit with the World Bank and other creditors. The objectives of the third 
credit were similar to those of the second, but the lenders considered that the 
country was now ready to start moving into a different phase, where only the poorest 
municipalities were eligible to receive spending from this institution.  
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FHIS IV, approved in early 1998, carried on the logic of focusing on the 
poorest municipalities. It incorporated the execution of participatory budgeting pilots 
with the intention of cementing the decentralization process initiated in the previous 
phase. More importantly, participatory budgeting was intended to ensure 
transparency and that the funds would reach the poorest populations to address their 
“actual” needs through prioritization of the projects (World Bank, 2006).  
After Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras in October 1998, the international donors 
decided to relax the normal project procedures in order to allow the re-allocation of 
resources to emergency relief efforts. In addition, in December 1999, the World 
Bank assigned a further instalment of funding in the amount of US$ 22 million to 
help the areas most affected by the hurricane. It was also decided to suspend the 
participatory budgeting programme and focus efforts on reconstruction. According 
to an evaluation report for FHIS IV, because normal transparency procedures were 
suspended, this situation gave rise to irregularities in the allocation of the available 
resources (World Bank, 2006, p. 8).  
The donors wanted to resume the normal execution of FHIS IV as agreed in 
the terms of reference of the contract, but there was lack of will among the national 
authorities, and as a consequence the term of the programme had to be extended. 
Those delays meant that FHIS V was not approved in 2002 as planned, but in 2005. 
A condition of the credits for FHIS V was that spending should be decentralized and 
targeted using a map of poverty which would identify the poorest villages in the 
country (World Bank, 2006).  
4.5.2 Types of projects 
Projects at FHIS are divided into different programmatic areas: (1) the Local 
Development and Decentralization Programme, which manages what is called within the 
institution “minor-infrastructure projects.” These are small projects aimed at 
providing basic social services in the areas of education, health, sanitation, road 
engineering, and drinking water supply systems. Some examples include classroom 
buildings and participatory budgeting training courses. (2) Major Infrastructure Projects. 
This programme manages larger size projects in the following areas: water supply, 
sewerage, wastewater treatment, storm water drainage, landfills, municipal markets 
and slaughterhouses, and also has a component on road and bridge repair. (3) Social 
Assistance. This is targeted at providing assistance to populations other than the poor, 
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but who are still vulnerable, such as older people, children, teenage mothers, the 
homeless, and ethnic minorities. (4) “Our Roots” (Nuestras Raíces) aims to develop 
projects specifically tailored to indigenous and Afro-descendent groups that help 
them to cover basic social needs such as those included in other programmes. (5) 
Health and Education is a special scheme dedicated to the construction of 
infrastructure exclusively for health and education purposes. (6) Combat Chagas 
Disease. Its main objective is to improve the household conditions in rural areas 
vulnerable to the Chagas disease (FHIS, 2005). 
4.5.3 Pork-barrel mechanisms 
There are different avenues through which legislators might facilitate the allocation 
of internationally-funded projects to strategic territories in their constituencies. A 
programme evaluation report conducted by the World Bank criticized the tendency 
of some international cooperation agencies to use FHIS as “patchwork of donor-
financed programs” which do not necessarily conform to the core activities of the 
institution (World Bank, 2006, p. 26), essentially facilitating the use of some 
international moneys for pork-barrel activities.58 Nonetheless, it is difficult to control 
for the origin of the funds in the present work, especially when these are combined 
with national public funds. 
The same evaluation report has pointed to a further deviation from FHIS’ 
original objectives in that their efforts are not necessarily directed at the poorest 
municipalities: 
In recent years, there has been some pressure on FHIS, for example in 
the context of the Consultative Council that oversees the 
implementation of the Honduran PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper), to allocate resources only to the poorest municipalities. But this 
proved politically impossible. As the FHIS minister stated during the 
mission in 2005, FHIS is a ministry and is expected to serve the whole 
country. Even leaving out large and rich municipalities such as 
Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula is politically impossible, according to 
another respondent (World Bank, 2006, p. 13).59  
                                                 
58 Former Programme Manager at FHIS, personal interview, 13th February 2012. 
59 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the municipality of Tegucigalpa, located in Francisco Morazán, is the 
capital city of Honduras. San Pedro Sula is the most economically prosperous municipality of 
Honduras and is the capital of the department of Cortés. These municipalities have the highest 
population densities in Honduras (see Chapter 3). 
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These restrictions, especially to its execution of internationally-funded projects, 
have resulted in a perceived reduction in the political influence of FHIS in 
comparison with other public institutions. At the same time, however, most 
international aid agencies have gradually begun imposing restrictions to ensure 
transparency and efficacy in the allocation of funds, making pork-barrel politics more 
difficult. For this reason, in the present study I will focus on the allocation of 
projects with national sources of funding from FHIS itself and from other 
institutions of the Honduran government that execute projects through FHIS. 
FHIS is an autonomous institution but its Executive Director has the rank of 
minister in the Executive’s cabinet. Above the Board of Directors in the FHIS 
hierarchy is a Superior Council of Administration, which oversees the internal 
regulations of the institution. The Council is composed of different representatives, 
including one of the vice-presidents of Honduras, the President of the Congress, and 
the Minister for Education. The Executive Director and the Superior Council of 
Administration have discretionary power in decisions concerning which projects are 
to be paid for with resources assigned to FHIS in the annual budget approved at the 
Honduran Congress. As stated in the internal regulations of the institution: 
both the Superior Council and the Board of Directors, in response to 
their institutional mandate, can authorize the use of Honduran state 
resources from the Public Treasury for projects considered of strategic 
interest. The cost of these projects is not charged to the pre-allocated 
municipal budget, and they are not subject to a participatory planning 
process (FHIS, 2005, p. 41, own translation). 
Funds from other national institutions for projects that are executed by FHIS 
come essentially from national sources, but they also include moneys from 
international donors. In order to restrict political influence on the final geographical 
allocation of the project, it is not unknown for donors to divide their funds among 
different institutions.60 As can be observed in Table 4.5, around 26 per cent of the 
nationally-funded projects executed between 1990 and 2009 were paid for from 
FHIS’ own budget. However, most projects were executed on behalf of the Ministry 
of Education. 
 
                                                 
60 Former Programme Manager at FHIS, personal interview, 13th February 2012. 
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Table 4.5. Sources of funding at FHIS and their respective financial 
contributions in percentages, 1990–2009 
Institution/donor Contribution in percentages 
Ministry for Education 34.68 
FHIS 25.94 
Office of the President 15.38 
Ministry for Finance 12.12 
Honduran Council of Science and Technology 8.61 
Mixed funds (national funds only) 1.66 
Honduran Institute of Childhood and Family (IHNFA) 0.95 
Ministry for Agriculture 0.30 
Ministry for Arts and Culture 0.18 
Family Allowance Programme 0.13 
Honduran Government 0.02 
National Food Marketing Agency (BANASUPRO) 0.01 
Source: FHIS (2009). 
During its first years, FHIS operated with a centralized structure which 
international donors and lenders identified as a source of pork-barrel and clientelistic 
activities. As reported by a private consultancy firm, during FHIS I and FHIS II 
(1990–1998), some pork-barrel practices were common. First, the government pre-
selected a range of projects for which communities could apply, rather than allowing 
communities to request funding for projects on the basis of their perceived needs. 
Second, while targeting the poorest communities has always been part of the 
philosophy of the institution, in practice moneys did not necessarily reach the 
poorest families. The consultants also found evidence of legislators acting as brokers: 
The presence of intermediaries in all of the negotiation and execution 
phases can be observed in every type of project, regardless of the socio-
economic conditions of the beneficiary communities. This pattern seems 
to be related to a lack of initiative in some communities (which can itself 
be associated with authoritarian municipality mayors), or to the 
negotiation tactics employed by these communities, namely the use of 
intermediaries (the more politically influential, the better) to facilitate 
their demands (ESA Consultores, 1999, p. 27, own translation). 
The political influence of legislators in the geographical allocation of projects 
through FHIS has also been the subject of public scrutiny (La Tribuna, 2003a). 
Moreover, one of the cables recently released by the organization Wikileaks revealed 
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that ministerial reshuffles under the presidency of Ricardo Maduro (2002–2006) were 
probably the result of unsatisfied pork-barrel demands within this institution.61  
There are at least three ways in which legislators can seek projects for their 
constituencies through FHIS: (1) by sponsoring a bill in the National Congress, (2) 
through participation in the national budget negotiations in Congress, and (3) by 
brokering directly at FHIS or through the President on behalf of their constituents. 
Sponsoring a bill in the National Congress 
Very often Honduran legislators introduce bills in Congress requesting the Secretary 
for Finance the inclusion of a budget to finance an infrastructure project to be 
executed by one of the ministries, such as FHIS (see Chapter 5). An interview 
conducted in 2004 with Deputy Marco Antonio Andino, of the PLH, gives some 
clues as to how that mechanism works:  
We created 50 schools here in the capital. Well, we built them with the 
government, but if we hadn’t taken the initiative, nothing would have 
been done. We introduced the bill in Congress, then we located the 
money in Finance, found the sites, the people, and made the 
arrangements with FHIS or other institutions for the plans and 
construction (quoted in Salomon, Meza & Flores, 2004, p. 180, own 
translation). 
Further, within the introduction of bills dataset, which I described in section 4.1 
of this chapter, FHIS was explicitly mentioned in eight bills as the institution that 
should execute the proposed projects. In addition, several other bills also included in 
the dataset requested budgets from the government to execute projects in the 
legislators’ constituencies, but these do not mention which institution should be in 
charge of executing the projects. This means that if the projects were approved, the 
government could have decided to execute them through FHIS or a similar 
institution. 
                                                 
61 The Wikileaks’ cable is read: “[a]s President Ricardo Maduro staggers to his first anniversary in 
office, there are emerging signs that he will make some changes in his Cabinet in an effort to recapture 
the political initiative in the country... FHIS Minister, Leony Yu-way, is viewed as not directing FHIS 
projects to Nationalist party interests in the departments. (According to political sources, this reticence 
is not a resistance to corruption as much as it is his unwillingness to treat FHIS projects as a political 
and legislative pork barrel)” (Wikileaks, 2011, para. 6). 
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Negotiation of the institutional budget in Congress  
Another possibility is that legislators seek to amend the annual budget project 
presented by the Executive branch in order to ensure that there are sufficient and 
reliable funds for the allocation of projects in their constituencies.62 Opinions on this 
particular topic are divided. One of the legislators interviewed for this work stated 
that this is very unlikely, especially for members of Congress who do not form part 
of the Budget Committee.63 In contrast, other legislators said that securing funds for 
projects for a constituency during the institutional budget negotiations in Congress is 
common practice.64  
Brokering work 
Most legislators interviewed for the present research admitted that intermediating 
between specific communities, particularly those who have a potential to reward their 
work with a good share of votes, and executive institutions such as FHIS demands a 
large part of their time. Since legislators must divide their time between their 
constituencies and the capital, they have relatively easy access to ministers and even 
to the president. They sometimes also facilitate audiences between mayors and 
ministries.65 
For some legislators being part of the opposition is a disadvantage if they want 
to get pork-barrel resources for their constituencies. For example, a representative 
for the department of Lempira and a PLH deputy in the 2010–2014 legislature, 
declared: “In these two years of the current government, for us the deputies of the 
opposition, it has become almost standard for most ministers to answer our requests 
for resources for our communities by saying that certain projects are not possible 
because Honduras is not recognized by the international community (since the coup 
of 28th June 2009).”66 
                                                 
62 Staff member of the Planning Unit at FHIS, personal interview, 26th January 2010. 
63 Deputy of the PNH for the department of Atlántida, personal interview, 11th February 2010. 
64 Deputy of the PNH for the department of Cortés, personal interview, 7th February 2012, and 
deputy of the PNH for the department of Intibucá, personal interview, 15th February 2012. 
65 Deputy of the PNH for the department of Santa Bárbara, personal interview, 31st January 2012, 
own translation. 
66 Deputy of the PLH for the department of Lempira, personal interview, 1st February 2012. 
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A private programme-evaluation consultant in a randomly selected sample of 
15 projects executed by FHIS between 1998 and 2002 recalls the intervention of a 
legislator in the facilitation of one of the projects they evaluated: 
The school teacher and her husband, who was a board member of the 
patronato,67 said that they were the organizers of the project (to repair the 
community’s school). On one occasion, they took advantage of the visit 
to the community of the then deputy, Victoria Contreras, to show her 
how dilapidated the school was. The deputy promised her help and 
shortly afterwards an engineer showed up to start the work (ESA 
Consultores, 2005, p. 24, own translation).   
4.5.4 Descriptive statistics 
A total of 22,765 projects were approved at FHIS between January 1990 and 
December 2009, the majority in the areas of education, municipal development, and 
energy. The present analysis is based on these projects. That a project is approved 
means that it is going to be executed. Of the total number of projects approved 
during that period, 4,957 were executed at FHIS using national funds. Because the 
focus of this study is on projects financed from national sources, Table 4.6 presents 
the descriptive statistics for the total amounts of these funds approved between 1990 
and 2009 in the different categories into which projects have been classified by FHIS, 
in constant lempiras.68 It can be observed that the majority of projects fall into the 
area of education, followed by employment generation and municipal projects. 
Table 4.6. Descriptive statistics of projects approved at FHIS by 
project area, in thousands of constant lempiras 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total 4,957 208 1,168 0 77,700 
Education 3,531 190 399 0 12,200 
Employment 465 32 22 3 121 
Municipal 429 324 505 0 6566 
Social assistance 128 122 313 0 2689 
Health 104 265 245 4 1250 
Water 82 485 436 0 2235 
Procurment 41 2,313 12,100 11 77,700 
Environment 21 297 169 1 750 
Informal economy 2 462 467 132 792 
(continued on following page) 
                                                 
67 In Honduras patronatos are community-based organizations, legally recognized by their municipal 
governments as representatives of the villages that comprise the municipality. 
68 The Lempira (Lps) is the Honduran currency. In recent years, exchange rates have remained 
relatively constant at around US$1 = 18 Lps. Real prices are calculated using the formula RS = 
spending / (CPI/100), where RS stands for real spending at FHIS. CPI is the consumer price index, 
divided by 100, which is used as a deflator (Abel, Bernanke & Croushore, 2008, p.48). 
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Table 4.6 
(continued from previous page) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Social infrastructure 2 230 30 208 251 
Energy 1 43 0 43 43 
Others 67 298 349 5 2,305 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the averages for national and international spending at FHIS 
between 1990 and 2009, in constant lempiras. It can be observed that when FHIS 
started in 1990 there was an almost immediate increase in spending that reached an 
average of 2,000,000 lempiras, remaining more or less constant until 1994. Since its 
foundation, one of the conditions attached by international donors to their funding 
of FHIS is that the Honduran government must also commit funding to the 
institution; this contribution does not need to be equal and is, in fact, normally 
smaller than that supplied by the international donors. As can be observed in the 
graph, moneys from the national budget were minimal until the period immediately 
after Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras. Also noticeable is the sharp reduction in 
Figure 4.6. National and international spending at FHIS, in thousands of 
constant lempiras, 1990–2009 
Source: own, based on FHIS (2009) and World Bank (1996; 2006). 
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international funding towards 2000, due in part to the delays in the normal execution 
of FHIS IV. Some donor agencies decided to suspend donations until the execution 
of the programme was resumed according to the established objectives.  
In this section I have provided qualitative evidence from different sources that 
suggests a link between the geographical allocation of funds at FHIS and the 
influence of Honduran parliamentarians. I showed that this connection adopts 
different forms, from negotiations within parliament to the brokering work of 
legislators. The connection of pork-barrel spending data with legislators is not as 
direct as it is in the cases of the introduction of bills or the parliamentarians’ survey 
responses. However, the pork-barrel spending data has the advantage that it allows 
for the observation of actual policy outcomes. Similarities between the results of the 
analysis of this dependent variable and the outcomes obtained in the introduction of 
bills and survey analysis datasets would lend greater confidence in the empirical 
strength of the theory.  
In a different vein, because the data is disaggregated at the municipal level, I 
can control for some factors whose influence in the analysis would otherwise to be 
too difficult to rule out. Specifically, I can hold constant the influence of 
demographic variables that usually are correlated with district magnitude, such as 
percentage of population and the patterns of urban and rural population distribution. 
I will conduct the statistical analysis of the FHIS dataset in Chapter 7. 
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Appendix 4.1  Example of how bills are recorded in the Honduran 
Congress 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4A.1. Example of how initiated bills are recorded in the Honduran Congress. 
The indexes to bills are recorded in printed format. For the purposes of this research, a 
digital copy was taken using a digital camera. The number to the left is the code under which 
the bills are recorded. The name of the legislator appears in brackets immediately after the 
name of the bill. 
Source: Secretaría, Congreso Nacional de Honduras.  
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Appendix 4.2  Questions used to construct the pork, representation 
of interest groups, and making laws variables 
In Table 4A.1, I provide the translated versions of the questions used to construct 
the variables pork, representation of interest groups, and making laws. The second column 
from the left gives the scales that were used to conduct the analyses, after the scales 
were modified to match the PELA surveys. The original questions in Spanish are 
presented in Table 4A.2. The complete survey questionnaires can be retrieved in 
portable document format (.pdf) from the following website: 
http://americo.usal.es/oir/Elites/honduras1.htm 
Table 4A.1. Questions used to construct the pork, representation of 
interest groups, and law variables  
Variable Measures after 
rescaling 
process 
Year 
(question 
code) 
Question* 
Pork 4. A great deal 
3. A good deal 
2. Little 
1. None at all 
0. NA 
1998 (P28) What degree of importance—a great deal, a 
good deal, little, none at all—do you attach, 
during the course of your parliamentary 
duties, to providing resources for your 
department? 
A great deal (1) 
A good deal (2) 
Little (3) 
None at all (4) 
NA (9) 
2002 (P23) 
2006 (P23) 
2010 (REP1) 
Representation 
of Interest 
groups 
4. To a great 
extent 
3. To some 
extent 
2. To little 
extent 
1. Not at all 
0. NA 
1998 (P59) To what extent you do you take into 
consideration the opinion of each of the 
following groups, individuals, or institutions 
when making policy decisions? 
 To a  To  To  Not      NA  
 great some little at   
 extent extent extent all  
- The voters  1 2 3 4  9 
in your       
constituency      
- Your party  1 2 3 4  9 
leaders      
- Public  1 2 3 4  9 
opinion      
- Your party’s  1 2 3 4  9 
members      
- The mass  1 2 3 4  9 
media      
- Other  1 2 3 4  9 
deputies      
from your party      
- Interest  1 2 3 4  9 
groups      
- Your party’s 1 2 3 4  9 
voters      
   - The  1 2 3 4  9 
government      
2002 (P52) 
2006 (P56) 
(continued on following page) 
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Table 4A.1 
(continued from previous page) 
Variable Measures 
after 
rescaling 
process 
Year 
(question 
code) 
Question* 
  2010 (REP6) Of the following groups, people, and 
institutions, who you take most into account 
when you make political decisions? (PAUSE), 
and in second place? 
                                                  First place     Second   
                                                                          place 
- The voters in your constituency 1 2 
- Your party leaders 1 2 
- Public opinion 1 2 
- Your party’s members 1 2 
- The mass media 1 2 
- Other deputies from your party 1 2 
- Interest groups 1 2 
- Your party’s voters 1 2 
   - The government 1 2 
Making laws 3. High 
2. Medium 
1. Low 
0. NA 
1998 (P56) 
 
Thinking about your work as a deputy, what 
degree of importance do you attach during 
your parliamentary activity to the following?  
 A Some A None NA 
 lot  little    
- Representing  1 2 3 4   9 9
the nation       
- Making laws 1 2 3 4   9 9
- Solving  1 2 3 4   9 9
the problems       
of Honduras       
- Overseeing 1 2 3 4   9 9
the  government      
- Defending  1 2 3 4   9 9
your  party’s interests     
- Formulating  1 2 3 4   9 9
the general national budgets     
- Representing  1 2 3 4   9 9
your  department   
2002 (P49) Thinking about your work as a deputy, please 
tell me, of the following issues, to which three 
do you attach most importance during your 
parliamentary activity? 
                                First place   Second place   Third  
                                                                           place 
- Representing 1 1 1 
the nation    
   - Making laws 2 2 2 
   - Solving  3 3 3 
the problems of Honduras    
   - Overseeing  4 4 4 
the  government    
   - Defending  5 5 5 
your  party’s interests    
   - Formulating  6 6 6 
the general national budgets    
    - Representing  7 7 7 
your  department    
NA 9 9 9 
2006 (P53) 
(continued on following page) 
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Table 4A.1 
(continued from previous page) 
Variable Measures 
after 
rescaling 
process 
Year 
(question 
code) 
Question* 
  2010 (REP3) Thinking about your work as a deputy, please 
tell me, of the following issues, to which two 
do you attach most importance during your 
parliamentary activity? 
 First Second 
 place place 
- Representing  1 1 
  the nation   
- Making laws 2 2 
- Solving  3 3 
   the problems of Honduras   
- Overseeing 4 4 
   the  government   
- Defending  5 5 
   your  party’s interests  
- Formulating  6 6 
   the general national budgets   
- Representing  7 7 
   your  department   
   NA 9 9 
Note: * The scales of the answers for some of questions are reversed in the original version 
in Spanish. Before creating the variables for this study the order of the scales was changed so 
1 could be assigned to the lowest values and 3 or 4—depending on how many categories of 
answer were available—were the highest values. In cases where the legislators refrained from 
answering (NA), these were assigned the lowest value, i.e. 1. 
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Table 4A.2. Original versions of the questions used to construct the 
pork, representation of interest groups and making laws variables 
 
Variable Year 
(question 
code) 
Original version in Spanish 
Pork 1998 
(P28) 
¿Qué grado de importancia, mucha, bastante, poca o ninguna, concede 
Ud., durante el desarrollo de su labor parlamentaria, a conseguir 
recursos para su departamento?  
Mucha importancia (1)  
Bastante importancia (2)  
Poca importancia (3) 
Ninguna importancia (4) 
NC (9) 
2002 
(P23) 
2006 
(P23) 
2010 
(REP1) 
Representation 
of Interest 
groups 
1998 
(P59) 
¿Hasta qué punto: mucho, bastante, poco o nada, tiene Ud. en cuenta 
la opinión de cada uno de los siguientes grupos, personas o 
instituciones cuando toma decisiones políticas?  
 Mucho Bastan- Poco Nada  NS/ 
  te   NC 
- Los electores de  1  2  3 4 9  
su circunscripción      
- Los líderes de  1  2  3  4  9  
su partido      
- La opinión  1  2  3  4 9  
pública      
en general      
- Los afiliados a  1  2  3  4  9  
su partido      
- Los medios  1  2  3  4  9  
de comunicación      
- Otros diputados  1  2  3  4  9  
de su partido      
- Los grupos de  1  2  3  4  9  
interés      
- Los votantes  1  2  3  4  9  
de su partido      
- El Gobierno  1  2  3  4  9 
2002 
(P52) 
2006 
(P56) 
2010 
(REP6) 
De los siguientes grupos, personas o instituciones que le nombro a 
continuación ¿A quién toma más en consideración cuando toma 
decisiones políticas? (PAUSA) y ¿en segundo lugar? 
 Primer lugar Segundo lugar 
- Los electores de su circunscripción  1  2  
- Los líderes de su partido  1  2  
- La opinión pública en general  1  2  
- Los afiliados a su partido  1  2  
- Los medios de comunicación  1  2  
- Otros Diputados de su partido  1  2  
- Los grupos de interés  1  2  
- Los votantes de su partido  1  2  
   - El Gobierno  1  2  
(continued on following page)
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Table 4A.2 
(continued from previous page) 
Variable Year 
(question 
code) 
Original version in Spanish 
Making laws 1998 
(P56) 
Pensando en el trabajo que desempeña como Diputado, ¿cuál es el 
grado de importancia: mucha, bastante, poca o ninguna, que otorga 
Ud. durante su actividad parlamentaria a los siguientes aspectos? 
  Mucha   Bastante   Poca   Ninguna   NS/ 
                                                                                                      NC  
- Representar  1 2 3 4 9  
a la nación       
- Elaborar las leyes  1 2  3  4  9 
- Resolver los problemas  1  2  3  4  9 
de Honduras        
- Controlar la actuación  1  2  3  4  9 
del Gobierno        
- Defender los intereses  1  2  3  4  9 
de su partido        
- Elaborar los Presupuestos  1  2  3  4  9  
Generales del Estado        
- Representar los intereses  1 2  3  4  9  
de su departamento        
2002 
(P49) 
Pensando en el trabajo que desempeña como Diputado, durante su 
actividad parlamentaria, dígame por favor, a que tres de los siguientes 
aspectos le da Ud. más importancia? 
 Primer Segundo Tercer 
 lugar lugar lugar 
- Representar  1 1 1 
a la nación    
- Elaborar las leyes  2 2 2 
- Resolver los problemas  3 3 3 
de Honduras     
- Controlar la actuación  4 4 4 
del Gobierno     
- Defender los intereses  5 5 5 
de su partido     
- Elaborar los Presupuestos  6 6 6 
Generales del Estado     
- Representar los intereses  7 7 7 
de su departamento     
NC 9 9 9 
2006 
(P53) 
2010 
(REP3) 
Pensando en el trabajo que desempeña como Diputado, durante su actividad 
parlamentaria, dígame por favor, a qué dos de los siguientes aspectos le da Ud. más 
importancia.  
 Primer Segundo 
 lugar lugar 
- Representar  1 1 
a la nación   
- Elaborar las leyes  2 2 
- Resolver los problemas  3 3 
de Honduras    
- Controlar la actuación  4 4 
del Gobierno    
- Defender los intereses  5 5 
de su partido    
- Elaborar los Presupuestos  6 6 
Generales del Estado    
- Representar los intereses  7 7 
de su departamento    
NC 9 9 
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Chapter 5 
 Bill initiation behaviour in the National Congress 
of  Honduras 
 
 
In Chapter 4 I presented descriptive evidence showing that after the change of 
electoral system from CLPR to OLPR in Honduras, there was an increase in the 
number of bills legislators introduced in Congress, in particular pork-related bills. 
Moreover, we could observe that during the CLPR period a high proportion of 
legislators, especially from the main opposition party, did not introduce any 
proposals. By contrast, that pattern was reversed under OLPR. This chapter is the 
first empirical test of the implications of the theory developed in the present work.  
This chapter consists of four parts. In the first section I set out my hypotheses. 
The following part details the statistical model specification, where I describe the 
dependent variables, the method of estimation, and the independent variables used. 
The third part of the chapter is devoted to the presentation of the results. In the last 
section I discuss the results and their implications for the theory.  
5.1 Hypotheses 
Pork-barrel politics. In the absence of actual spending data that can be directly 
related to individual legislators, the introduction of bills related to projects meant to 
bring benefits for their constituencies is probably the best way to establish a direct 
connection with the pork-barrel behaviour of legislators. In Chapter 2, I provided an 
explanation as to what we could expect in terms of pork-barrelling. Briefly, I stated 
that regardless of ballot structure, the importance attached to pork-barrel politics 
should increase the smaller the district magnitude, because then it is easier for 
legislators to claim credit for projects undertaken in their constituencies. However, 
based on Carey and Shugart’s (1995) argument that preferential voting list systems 
such as OLPR generate more intraparty competition the larger the district magnitude, 
I expect that a change to OLPR will increase the importance of pork in larger 
magnitude constituencies, whereas in small magnitude constituencies there will be 
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virtually no significant differences between the ballot types. Considering this 
argument, I anticipate in the present analysis to find evidence to support the 
following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. Regardless of ballot type, legislators will introduce more district 
bills the smaller the district magnitude.  
Hypothesis 2. Under OLPR, the number of district bills legislators introduce 
as district magnitude gets larger will be bigger than under CLPR. However, even 
under OLPR in larger district magnitude constituencies the number of district bills 
will not be as big as in small district magnitude constituencies.   
Private interests. During their parliamentary work some legislators must 
choose between delivering private goods to interest groups who, especially in the 
OLPR system, can contribute financial support to personal campaigns, and the 
interests of their constituents who, through their votes, can determine whether or 
not a legislator is re-elected (Bawn & Thies, 2003; Denzau & Munger, 1986). As I 
argued at the beginning of this section, in small-M constituencies legislators have 
compelling reasons to be accountable to their constituents. In contrast, as district 
magnitude increases, deputies have more freedom to establish relationships with 
interest groups and be accountable to them. Winning votes in large-M constituencies 
through pork strategies is not as easy as in small-M districts. Therefore, incumbent 
legislators need to attract votes from other electorates, some of whom may vote 
based on policy and ideological proposals and not necessarily pork. To reach those 
voters deputies need campaigns that allow them to bring their message to broader 
publics. Those campaigns can be expensive; therefore, the financial help of private 
groups could be beneficial for the incumbents and increase their chances of re-
election. However, once their re-election has been secured, the legislators will have to 
be accountable to these private groups and protect their interests. We can expect that 
one form of honouring their campaign commitments to interest groups is the 
introduction of bills that generate benefits for them. In CLPR, legislators will still 
represent interest groups, and their importance will be greater the larger the district 
magnitude,69 but the favours legislators might obtain from interest groups are 
                                                 
69 I have argued that, under CLPR, in smaller magnitude districts party leaders will recruit candidates 
who can attract votes for their party; it is very likely, considering the arguments that I have presented 
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primarily for the benefit of the party. In this regard, assuming that once elected 
legislators present bills and advocate for them in representation of interest groups, I 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. Independently of ballot type, legislators will introduce more 
private bills the larger the district magnitude. Furthermore, the rate of increase in the 
introduction of private bills as district magnitude grows should be higher in OLPR 
than in CLPR. 
General public goods. As I explained in Chapter 2, Cox and McCubbins 
(2001) argue that when the electoral system encourages a personal vote, as is the case 
with OLPR, legislators have greater incentives to favour the provision of local public 
goods and private goods. However, that does not necessarily imply that legislators 
will eschew the provision of general public goods. It is worth bearing in mind that in 
constituencies with large portions of urban populations, there are more voters who 
vote on the basis of policy and ideology rather than simply for pork. Hence, there are 
still strong incentives to provide general public goods. Because urban populations are 
more common in larger magnitude districts, I expect that legislators in this sort of 
constituency will be more likely to favour national legislation over pork. For example, 
according to one legislator interviewed for the present work, incumbents in large 
constituencies do not necessarily win elections appealing to pork-barrel politics. In 
the words of this deputy from Francisco Morazán (where M is 23 seats):  
In the largest constituencies, practically speaking, it is legislation work 
that increases your popularity as a deputy. Strengthening popularity via 
constituency service is very difficult because the constituency is too big. 
Therefore, the main reason you get re-elected is because of your public 
image rather than your constituency service work. In the countryside, 
which is less politically mobilized and smaller, constituency service tends 
to prevail, although public image is still important.70 
Even though the delivery of public goods becomes more important the larger 
the district magnitude, this should be less the case than under CLPR. This effect 
occurs because, as Cox and McCubbins (2001) argue, the creation of public goods, 
                                                                                                                                     
in this work, that the profile of those legislators will be pork-barrel-oriented. Nevertheless, legislators 
in small magnitude districts use personal-vote seeking strategies to seek votes for their parties, and not 
necessarily for themselves (see Chapter 2, p. 23). The same logic applies in terms of private interests: 
some legislators represent interest groups who, in return, finance the campaigns of the party; that is 
more likely to happen in medium and large magnitude districts. 
70 Deputy of the Liberal Party, personal interview, 1st December 2009, own translation. 
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such as those produced via legislation, implies the intervention of many actors, which 
makes it difficult for individual deputies to claim credit for the final outcome. In this 
regard, it makes sense for some of them to take time that they would normally 
dedicate to legislation and use it instead for constituency service purposes. As a 
result, I formulate the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 4. Legislators will be more likely to introduce national bills as 
district magnitude increases. However, the rate of increase in the introduction of 
national bills as district magnitude grows should be lower in OLPR than in CLPR. 
Personal attributes. In the present analysis I am using as proxy of the 
personal attributes of legislators the number of terms for which they have been re-
elected. This indicator can give us information on how legislators use their personal 
attributes to attract votes under different electoral systems. It has been claimed that 
in CLPR senior legislators are more immune to electoral punishments from the 
electorate than their junior colleagues: “[a]s a politician advances within the party 
leadership, her access to power and perks increases dramatically, but her electoral 
vulnerability decreases in a corresponding manner because leaders occupy the top 
positions on closed party electoral lists” (Carey, 2009, p. 8). Therefore, because senior 
legislators are usually party leaders who can more easily secure top positions in their 
party lists, they probably do not have to deliver constituency services to get votes for 
their parties. Instead, they leave that task to backbenchers who need to prove loyalty 
to their party leaders if they wish to seek re-election.  
However, backbenchers may try to free-ride and attract large numbers of 
potential voters so that the party’s selectorate will perceive them as indispensable. 
They might appeal to strategies that help them reach a broader public, such as 
appearing often on television or using their plenary time to discuss key policy issues. 
In some circumstances, these legislators might feel tempted to distance themselves 
from their party’s positions, even in subtle ways. For instance, some bills are more 
unpopular than others, such as those related to tax increases. The discussion of such 
proposals might break a party’s unity in parliament if they have the potential to 
negatively impact on all the legislators at election time; this is particularly the case for 
those legislators who belong to the party in government. It can happen that the party 
leaders might deprive free-riders of the opportunity to run for re-election if they 
believe that these legislators might jeopardize the party’s unity in a future legislature 
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(Carey, 2009, p. 8). Sieberer (2010, p. 485) argues that backbenchers who do not 
expect to be re-elected have little incentive to follow the party line and are more 
likely to deviate from the party’s position. In contrast, senior legislators have more to 
lose by breaking party unity. Therefore, when Honduras used a CLPR system it could 
be expected that, among less experienced legislators, the fewer the number of terms 
they had accumulated in parliament the more time they needed to devote to 
constituency service rather than national politics. As they accumulated more 
experience they could become influential in parliament and able to devote more time 
to national politics. Empirically, we could expect the following: 
Hypothesis 5. In the CLPR system, the higher the number of terms legislators 
have served in office the higher the probability that they will present national rather 
than district bills.  
Under OLPR, because it is difficult to claim individual credit for national policy 
legislation or pork-barrel projects, legislators need to spend their time getting votes 
by legislating, delivering local goods, or a combination of both. I argue that their 
choice of strategy will depend to a great extent on the legislators’ personal attributes 
or, as argued in the present chapter, their experience as parliamentarians. Legislators 
that are well-known, recognized figures can reach broader electorates by introducing 
national bills and by proclaiming their backing for important legislation. They can use 
their plenary time to present and discuss new legislation that, via mass media, will 
reach broad publics. The following quote from a legislator from the department of 
Francisco Morazán exemplifies this: 
When you are a deputy, as in my case, you have an advantage over other 
candidates from your own party, because you are already known. It also 
has its disadvantages because people judge you for what you’ve done. My 
strategy after being elected as a legislator for the first time was to offer a 
constant, systematic, and organized opposition and to make good use of 
the mass media. My presence in the mass media has essentially become 
my electoral campaign during my four years in office. During the 
electoral process, neither I nor my party has the financial means to set up 
a large campaign, so my re-election campaign is based on my legislative 
work.71  
By contrast, new legislators need to fulfil their campaign promises if they want 
to pursue re-election. Because many of them are not well-known public figures, they 
                                                 
71 Deputy of the Democratic Union Party, personal interview, 1st February 2012, own translation. 
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probably need to satisfy the particularistic interests of their constituents and closest 
supporters in order to extend their presence in parliament for additional terms and 
gain more popularity. Considering these arguments, hypothesis 6 reads: 
Hypothesis 6. Legislators with higher number of terms in office are more 
likely to present national bills under OLPR than in CLPR. 
In terms of the presentation of private bills and the seniority of a legislator, it is 
difficult to relate the experience of legislators to the provision of private goods to 
interest groups without making further assumptions, or focusing on the particular 
context of the case study—e.g. country—that is being analysed. In Honduras, party 
leaders are likely to also be part of the economic elite, and they probably have closer 
connections with interest groups for sociological rather than political reasons.72 I 
believe this to be the case because of the apparent correlation between district 
magnitude and the turnover patterns in the Honduran Congress. Under CLPR 
                                                 
72 For instance, people from political and business elite background probably attended the same 
schools and universities, which facilitates networking.  
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Figure 5.1. Average number of terms legislators have served in the Honduran 
Congress, by district magnitude, elections 1981–2001   
District magnitude 
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turnover was very high in small-M constituencies, whereas in medium and larger 
constituencies legislators tend to be re-elected more often (see Figure 5.1).73  
Because small-M constituencies are more pork-barrel oriented, theoretically 
interest groups will be less likely to invest in legislators who have a greater need to be 
accountable to their constituencies than to interest groups.74 Moreover, the financially 
influential business elites are most likely located in urban areas. If urban areas are 
more likely to be found in medium and large-M constituencies, then it is possible that 
there exists a relationship between the re-election prospects of legislators and the 
representation of interest groups. Connections with business elites are beneficial to 
the legislator and to the party in a closed-list PR context. If a legislator can attract 
contributions from private donors—or if she is a donor herself—the party can 
reward her with electable positions on the party list and other advantages that 
reinforce her leadership. In OLPR I expect that the relationship between senior 
legislators and the representation of interest groups will be stronger, because interest 
groups might consider it more likely for experienced incumbents to be re-elected 
than candidates with no previous legislative experience. Therefore, interest groups 
are more likely to contribute to the campaigns of senior legislators, who in return will 
represent their interests when re-elected to congress by introducing bills intended to 
generate private benefits. In this regard, hypothesis 7 reads:   
Hypothesis 7. Under CLPR, the higher the number of terms legislators have 
served in office, the more likely it is that they will introduce private bills. Legislators 
with higher numbers of terms in office will introduce more private bills under OLPR 
than under CLPR.  
5.2 Model specification 
The statistical method that I use for the present analysis is a negative binomial for 
time-series cross-section analysis. This model can tell us whether the explanatory 
variables under consideration can explain the number of bills of a specific type a 
legislator introduces during a given year. The negative binomial has the advantage 
that it can correct for those cases of legislators who tend on average to introduce 
                                                 
73 However, the turnover patterns have not reverted significantly under OLPR. 
74 This is not to say that interest groups do not exist in small-M constituencies; however, those that are 
most likely to contribute to campaigns and become influential nationally are located in larger 
magnitude constituencies. 
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more bills (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 657). In order to conduct this analysis, the bill 
initiation dataset described in Chapter 4 was collapsed, adding the bills—or the 
absence thereof—each legislator introduced per year, in the categories district, 
national, sector, and individual (see Chapter 4). I use three dependent variables: 
district, national, and a combination of individual and sector bills, which, as I have 
already shown, share similar variation. In the present analysis I label this combined 
variable private. In addition, I run a set of different statistical analyses of district, 
sector, and individual bills under the label targetable, which is a replication of the 
dependent variable used by Crisp et al. (2004). Basically, the targetable variable 
combines the district, sector, and private bills into a single variable. The dataset 
structure is unbalanced; this is because what is being analysed is the introduction of 
bills per legislator. In this regard, the patterns of bills introduction vary across and 
within legislators. 
5.2.1 Explanatory variables 
As previously mentioned, I am using the log of district magnitude (logM, see Chapter 
3) for the empirical analysis. OLPR is a dummy variable that equals one starting in 
the year the open-list PR system was adopted (2004 onwards). To assess the 
interaction effects between district magnitude and type of ballot, the interaction 
logM×OLPR is added to the models. Experience accounts for the number of terms 
deputies have served in the Honduran Congress, with the count starting in 1981.75 
The range of variation of this variable depends on the term that is being analysed. 
For example, by 1990 a legislator could have served two terms in office. If the same 
legislator continued to be re-elected for consecutive terms, by 2009, the last election 
considered in this study, the number of terms served by this individual would be 
seven. I introduce an interaction effect of this variable with the electoral system 
(experience×OLPR).  
5.2.2 Controls 
The dummy liberal takes on the value of one for deputies from the PLH. As I 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the PLH tends to be more fragmented and integrates 
members with different ideologies, from conservative to social democrat. Therefore, 
I expect that legislators from this political party to be more inclined towards pork, be 
                                                 
75 The same indicator for experience is used by Taylor-Robinson (2006, p.115). 
 131 
it because of ideological concerns—leftist parties lean more towards social spending 
than conservatives—or because of its lack of unity. To control for electoral business 
cycles I include a count variable, cycles, which ranges between one and four, with one 
being the first year of government and four an election year. Govdeps is a dummy 
variable which takes on the value of one for legislators who belong to the same party 
as the president. Following the argument put forward by Crisp et al. (2004), the 
expectation is that this type of deputy will be more likely to introduce bills than 
deputies from opposition parties. I also include the product govdeps×OLPR to 
observe the interaction effect of this variable with the change of ballot.  
To control for the possibility that legislators target core supporters, especially 
legislators from the party in government—considering the previous argument that 
legislators from the party that holds the presidency are more likely to appeal to 
pork—I include the dummy strong which equals one for the constituencies where the 
party in government is electorally strongest.76 I also include the interaction 
strong×OLPR, since we might expect a different type of behaviour from legislators 
towards strongholds after the change of ballot type.77 
Legislators might focus on less developed constituencies because factors such 
as illiteracy and poverty tend to be correlated with a more clientelistic vote. I control 
for this potential explanatory factor by including a variable for the human 
development index (HDI)―as calculated in 2008 by the Honduran office of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2009)―for each constituency in 
the models that use particularistic bills.78 I chose this indicator because with a 
                                                 
76 To identify those departments—i.e. constituencies—I averaged the percentage of votes earned by 
the PLH and the PHN—which are the only parties that have held the presidential office—from the 
elections that took place between 1981 and 2005. Constituencies where the average of votes for the 
PLH was 50 per cent plus one were coded as strongholds of that political party. By default, the 
remaining constituencies were coded as PNH strongholds. The variable strong equals one for the 
stronghold constituencies of the party in government. 
77 Because these are multi-member constituencies and the variable does not differentiate the dynamics 
at the sub-constituency level, only averages them, one possibility is that legislators from the party in 
government will try to gain as many votes as possible in places where the vote tends to be pivotal, i.e. 
where voters tend to vote strongly for one of the two main parties. Those dynamics could probably be 
observed in the aggregate of the party strongholds at the constituency level.  
78 Because in the early 2000s UNDP changed the methodology used to calculate HDI, to avoid 
inducing errors in the estimations I decided to focus on the cross-section variation in 2008, the year of 
the last report published by this organization, and assume that there has not been any inner variation 
in terms of HDI in the constituencies. 
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Pearson correlation factor of .5 it shows lower levels of correlation with district 
magnitude than other proxies, such as poverty and population.79 
Finally, to control for time dependency, which in turn might be a potential 
cause of endogeneity in the electoral system, I use the cubic splines method for 
discrete data developed by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998). This method consists of 
adding a counter of time units (in the present case years) between events. Hurricane 
Mitch in 1998 and the change to OLPR in 2004 are the major events of concern in 
the present analysis. I have also added the two previous electoral reform changes: the 
separation of the presidential and municipal ballots in 1992 and the separation of the 
legislative from the presidential ballot in 1997. To compute the cubic splines, I ran 
the programme developed by Tucker (1999) in Stata 12.  
5.3 Results 
Table 5.1 presents the results of the time-series cross-section data analysis, using the 
negative binomial method on the three dependent variables in the dataset of bills 
initiation behaviour in the Honduran Congress. The unit of analysis is the number of 
bills introduced by legislator per year. The dependent variables are indicated in the 
headings of each column in the following form: models (1) to (3), district bills; (4) to 
(6), private bills; (7) to (9), national bills. Models (1), (4) and (7) use interactive terms, 
while the rest present the results of regressions for the main components with no 
interactions. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 establish that regardless of the electoral system, legislators 
will tend introduce district bills the smaller the district magnitude, and that under 
OLPR legislators in larger-M constituencies will tend to introduce more bills of this 
type than under CLPR. Model (1) in Table 5.1 above seems to partially confirm these 
hypotheses. As can be observed in this model, when OLPR equals zero the 
coefficient of logM is negative and statistically significant at the five per cent 
probability value; this suggests that under CLPR legislators tend to introduce more 
pork bills the smaller the district magnitude. In contrast, the coefficient of 
logM×OLPR indicates that a change to OLPR, when everything else is held constant,  
                                                 
79 Bear in mind that there is violation of the assumption of no-collinearity when the variables are 
perfectly correlated (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 85). 
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Table 5.1. Random effects negative binomial results for the impact of the OLPR system on the initiation of bills in the 
Honduran Congress 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 District CLPR OLPR Private CLPR OLPR National CLPR OLPR 
          
OLPR 0.622**   0.840**   0.930**                  
 (0.29)   (0.41)   (0.33)                  
logM -0.293** -0.251** -0.076 0.647*** 0.695*** 0.661*** 0.779*** 0.808*** 0.553*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)    
logM×OLPR 0.240**   0.090   -0.227**                  
 (0.11)   (0.14)   (0.12)                  
Experience 0.208*** 0.255*** 0.055 0.201** 0.220** 0.046 0.031 0.146** 0.066    
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)    
Experience×OLPR -0.117**   -0.162**   0.049                  
 (0.06)   (0.07)   (0.05)                  
Liberal 0.150 0.149 0.262* -0.100 -0.138 0.005 -0.126 -0.088 -0.062    
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17) (0.17) (0.11) (0.14) (0.17)    
Cycles -0.188*** 0.048 -0.311*** -0.068* 0.039 -0.193** -0.162*** -0.136*** -0.160**  
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)    
Govdeps 0.980*** 1.037*** 0.540*** 0.821*** 0.852*** 0.218 0.506*** 0.558*** 0.087    
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)    
Govdeps×OLPR -0.344**   -0.418**   -0.256*                  
 (0.15)   (0.18)   (0.14)                  
Strong -0.088 -0.115 -0.123 0.065 0.287** -0.101                   
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16)                   
Strong×OLPR 0.042   0.519**                     
 (0.19)   (0.23)                     
          
(continued on following page) 
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Table 5.1 
(continued from previous page) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 District CLPR OLPR Private CLPR OLPR National CLPR OLPR 
HDI 2.795** 3.366* 1.618 -3.070* -5.786** -2.778                   
 (1.35) (1.80) (1.88) (1.84) (2.53) (2.47)                   
Spline(1) 0.076** 12.735** 0.076** 0.061* -10.425* 0.078 0.055** -9.489** 0.055    
 (0.03) (4.51) (0.04) (0.03) (6.07) (0.05) (0.03) (4.07) (0.04)    
Spline(2) -0.339*** -2.237** -0.441*** -0.188 1.977* 0.032 -0.090 1.824** -0.061    
 (0.10) (0.88) (0.13) (0.13) (1.18) (0.21) (0.10) (0.79) (0.16)    
Spline(3) 0.606** 11.162** 0.700** 0.406 -9.286* 0.144 0.273 -8.410** 0.259    
 (0.19) (4.04) (0.25) (0.25) (5.46) (0.39) (0.20) (3.65) (0.30)    
Spline(4) -0.631** -44.750** -0.649** -0.484* 36.641* -0.418 -0.406* 33.283** -0.414    
 (0.20) (15.86) (0.26) (0.27) (21.37) (0.38) (0.21) (14.32) (0.30)    
Intercept -1.412 -2.071* 0.866 -0.100 1.181 2.111 -1.377*** -1.504*** 0.306    
 (0.87) (1.13) (1.23) (1.13) (1.49) (1.57) (0.30) (0.34) (0.45)    
                         
Parameter α 1.733*** 1.979*** 1.979*** 1.836*** 1.540*** 2.520*** 1.206*** 1.215*** 1.573*** 
 (0.14) (0.22) (0.26) (0.17) (0.21) (0.43) (0.11) (0.14) (0.23)    
                         
Parameter β 0.144 -0.009 0.000 -0.059 -0.337* -0.067 -0.207** -0.277** -0.413**  
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15)    
N 3065 2030 1035 3065 2030 1035 3065 2030 1035    
Chi2 266.99 125.71 106.77 136.16 78.73 39.12 178.66 108.61 61.07    
Log likelihood -2690.352 -1441.552 -1225.623 -1882.877 -1082.873 -800.161 -2878.556 -1760.221 -1114.422    
Note: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. 
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leads to an increase in the number of district bills the larger the district magnitude. 
That result is significant at a five per cent probability value. When looking at models 
(2) and (3), which do not include the interactive terms but calculate the coefficients 
of district magnitude when OLPR equals zero and one respectively, we see that, in 
the first case, increases in logM are clearly associated with decreases in the number of 
bills legislators present in CLPR. In OLPR, however, there are virtually no 
differences across district magnitudes. That result coincides with the observation of 
the predicted probabilities for the interaction logM×OLPR when everything else is 
held constant, as can be observed in Figure 5.1(a). 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 make predictions about the behaviour of legislators 
regarding the introduction of private and national bills. In both cases I have argued 
that the larger the district magnitude the higher the number of these types of bills 
deputies will introduce in the National Congress of Honduras. Nonetheless, a change 
to OLPR should lead to an increase in the number of private bills and a decrease in 
the number of national bills. Note that in models (4) to (9), larger district magnitudes 
are essentially associated with higher numbers of private and national bills, regardless 
of the ballot structure. However, in terms of private bills, OLPR×logM is positive, as 
can be observed in Model (4), indicating a slight increase in the coefficient of logM 
under OLPR. However, in Model (6) the coefficient of logM is smaller than in 
Model (5). Consequently, from these results we cannot conclude that a change to 
OLPR will lead to an increase in private bills. By contrast, the interaction 
logM×OLPR in model (7) is negative and statistically significant at the ten per cent 
probability value, which suggests that a change to OLPR leads to a decrease of .226 
national bills per unit increase in the log of district magnitude. In this regard, notice 
how in model (9) the coefficient of logM decreases slightly in comparison to the same 
coefficient in model (8). 
Graphically, Figure 5.1(b) and 5.3(d) aid the observation of the interaction 
effects of the variables logM and OLPR in the introduction of private and national 
bills. Notice that under the OLPR system (the grey lines) in larger magnitude 
constituencies there is a slight increase in the linear predictions of private bills in 
comparison with CLPR. Similarly, in terms of national bills, even though in the 
CLPR system the number of national bills is always higher the larger the district 
magnitude, it is interesting to note that under OLPR the number of bills seems to 
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increase in small-M constituencies, whereas it decreases the larger the district 
magnitude. 
Regarding experience, the hypotheses state that the higher the number of terms 
legislators have held office the more likely they are to introduce national and private 
bills rather than district bills. However, as can be observed in models (1) and (2) in 
Table 5.1, the more senior the legislator is, the more likely she is to introduce district 
bills under CLPR. This result is not new; Taylor-Robinson (2006) conducted an 
analysis of bill introduction in the Honduran Congress between 1990 and 1997. As in 
the present study, she found that senior legislators were more likely to initiate local 
bills. This, however, does not imply that they are less likely to introduce national bills. 
In fact, as can be observed in all models under CLPR, the higher the number of years 
legislators have accumulated in office, the higher their rate of introduction of private 
and national bills. The results are statistically significant in models (4) and (5) of 
private bills, and model (8) of national bills. Notice though that the interaction 
experience×OLPR is negative and statistically significant for private bills and positive 
for national bills.80 I believe that the loss of importance in the variable experience under 
OLPR is a sign of increased intraparty competition. In other words, under CLPR the 
seniority of a legislator was an indicator of access to power perks, such as pork and 
initiating new legislation discussions.81 However, under OLPR, while more senior 
legislators may still have more or less the same privileges, junior legislators are not as 
easily prevented from trying to procure pork for their constituencies or from 
introducing legislation.  
It is worth discussing the impact of other controls on the patterns of bill 
introduction. The variable liberal is positive in models (1), (2), (3) and (6) but it is 
statistically significant only in model (3), under OLPR; however, it must be taken into 
consideration that most observations for the OLPR period coincide with a Liberal 
                                                 
80 Table 5A.2 in the appendices I present robustness checks results for models with no cubic-spline 
covariates. It is found that after removing this time dependency control the coefficient of experience in 
the main component model under OLPR is .105 and not .066 as in the original model. Moreover, it is 
statistically significant at the five per cent probability value.  
81 It could be argued that the determining factor in the bill introduction behaviour of legislators is 
position on the list rather than number of terms in office. In the appendix to this chapter, in Table 
5A.1, I present results using, instead of the variable Experience, the position on the list the legislator 
occupied in the elections when she was elected. It was found that the results using that alternative 
proxy do not contradict the results presented in Table 5.1 above. As a matter of fact, it seems that 
Experience has more explanatory power than position on the list.   
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party government. Therefore, in these models the fragmentation and the ideological 
orientation of the party are not strong predictors of the legislators’ behaviour. The 
dummy govdeps is positive and statistically significant at a one per cent probability 
value in all models except for (9). This result confirms that legislators from the party 
in government are more likely to introduce bills of any type. However, in the models 
with interaction terms, a change to OLPR leads to a decrease in the coefficient for 
this variable. This does not necessarily mean that legislators from the party in 
government introduce fewer bills under OLPR. As noted in Chapter 4, legislators 
from both the party in government and from the opposition tend to introduce more 
bills than in CLPR. Therefore, what that coefficient is telling us is that legislators 
from the opposition feel more confident introducing bills of any kind under OLPR 
than under CLPR. 
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Figure 5.1. Predicted probabilities of OLPR over the number of bills initiated across 
the log of district magnitude. 95 per cent confidence intervals are denoted by the vertical 
capped lines. Graph (c) uses as dependent variable the combination of district and private 
bills. 
Finally, the cubic splines are statistically significant in all of the district bills 
models, which suggests that the institutional changes and Hurricane Mitch have had  
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lasting effects on the pork-barrel behaviour of legislators. For private and national 
bills the splines are statistically significant under the CLPR electoral system. 
Figure 5.1(c) above presents the results for targetable bills. As I mentioned 
previously, this is a combination of district and private bills. In their analysis of the 
introduction of bills, Crisp et al. (2004) distinguish between targetable and non-targetable 
bills. The former refers to the combination of private and local bills and the latter to 
national bills. In the present analysis, for the case of the targetable bills model, I follow 
the same estimation procedure that I used for the previous models, i.e. the negative 
binomial method for time-series cross-sections.  
In Figure 5.1(c) we observe that, under CLPR, increases in the log of M have a 
negative effect on the number of bills introduced per legislator. By contrast, under 
OLPR, as the log of M grows so too does the number of bills introduced per 
legislator. Those results are not very strong in the case of CLPR, considering that the 
curve is very close to zero, therefore the effect is not statistically significant. In 
contrast, the interaction of logM and OLPR does differentiate from zero, and because 
there is no overlapping in the confidence intervals between the predictive 
probabilities plots of CLPR and OLPR, we can be more confident that there are 
clear differences between the two models. The regression results for this interaction 
effect are presented in model (10) in Table 5.2 below. Note that the coefficient of the 
interaction logM×OLPR is significant at the five per cent probability value. The results 
for targetable bills with no interactions (models 11 and 12) are not significant; 
however, their resulting signs are as predicted.  
Table 5.2. Random effects negative binomial results for the impact 
of the OLPR system on the initiation of targetable bills in the 
Honduran Congress 
 (10) (11) (12) 
 Targetable CLPR OLPR 
    
OLPR 0.635**   
 (0.27)   
logM -0.116 -0.071 0.050 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
logM×OLPR 0.209**   
 (0.10)   
Experience 0.197*** 0.261*** 0.038 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
(continued on following page) 
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Table 5.2 
(continued from previous page) 
 (10) (11) (12) 
 Targetable CLPR OLPR 
Experience×OLPR -0.115**   
 (0.05)   
Liberal 0.077 0.053 0.198 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) 
Cycles -0.168*** 0.060 -0.269*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Govdeps 0.932*** 1.013*** 0.521*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Govdeps×OLPR -0.288**   
 (0.13)   
Strong -0.066 -0.044 -0.098 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) 
Strong×OLPR 0.181   
 (0.18)   
HDI 2.117* 1.992 1.158 
 (1.27) (1.73) (1.75) 
Spline(1) 0.077*** 8.689** 0.070** 
 (0.02) (4.17) (0.03) 
Spline(2) -0.295** -1.461* -0.371** 
 (0.09) (0.81) (0.12) 
Spline(3) 0.528** 7.507** 0.606** 
 (0.17) (3.75) (0.23) 
Spline(4) -0.581** -30.472** -0.582** 
 (0.18) (14.69) (0.24) 
Intercept -1.230 -1.476 1.037 
 (0.81) (1.09) (1.14) 
Parameterα 1.760*** 1.921*** 2.079*** 
 (0.13) (0.20) (0.25) 
Parameterβ 0.267** 0.029 0.147 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) 
N 3065 2030 1035 
Chi2 280.94 138.65 98.60 
Log likelihood -3012.950 -1636.386 -1352.239 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant 
at 0.01. 
The models specified above provide evidence that the change from CLPR to 
OLPR in Honduras had an impact on legislators’ behaviour, especially in terms of 
pork-barrel politics. Despite the autocorrelation controls added to the models, some 
methodologists argue that the statistical control of aspects such as time dependency 
does not eliminate the influence of confounders (for a discussion see Dunning, 
2012). In this regard, to ensure greater robustness of the results, I ran a different 
analysis focusing only on municipalities that did not report personal or infrastructure 
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damage as a result of Hurricane Mitch.82 To minimize the possibility of including 
municipalities that were affected by Mitch, which could have been targets by deputies 
and the government, I focused on 12 indicators of information on damage. Seven of 
these indicators are related to personal damage: number of deaths, missing people, 
the wounded or sick, evacuees, and those relocated; also, homes affected and homes 
completely destroyed. The other five cover damage to infrastructure and agriculture: 
damaged roads, crops and woods, livestock, educational centres, and health centres. 
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82 To identify those municipalities I used official data compiled in the Disaster Inventory System 
(DesInventar), which is an online repository of information on disasters. In the case of Honduras, this 
database has been fed with data generated by the Permanent Contingency Commission of Honduras 
(COPECO), which is the official body in charge of managing natural disaster situations in the country. 
The DesInventar database cannot provide exact information for municipalities where there was no 
damage at all. Some municipalities reported zero damage but others simply did not report anything at 
all. In this latter case, that a municipality did not report any damage does not mean that it was not 
affected. It could mean that the municipality did not have precise estimates of the damage caused by 
the hurricane when the data was recorded in 1999. 
Figure 5.2. District bills in municipalities targeted by legislators, according to 
whether municipalities reported damage after Hurricane Mitch or not. From left to 
right, the first vertical dotted line in each of the graphs is for the year 1998, when Hurricane 
Mitch hit the country. The second vertical line is for year 2004, when the electoral system 
changed to OLPR. Note that the scales for the average total of district bills are not the same 
between graphs. 
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For the robustness tests, I selected municipalities that did not report any 
damage in these areas. As can be observed in Figure 5.2, this method greatly reduces 
the number of observations that could have been targeted by legislators because of 
Hurricane Mitch, lessening considerably the potential for an endogeneity problem. 
Some business groups—especially in the agricultural sector—might have been 
affected by Hurricane Mitch, and therefore deputies and the government could have 
supported their recovery. After examining the trends it was noticed that the data was 
sensitive to the effects of Mitch in four sub-categories of private bills: bills that 
created benefits for agrarian business activities, tax exemptions, debt relief bills, and 
bills that regulated guilds such as the board of chartered lawyers and the teachers’ 
unions (see Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3. Average of private bills by excluded and non-excluded sub-categories. The 
excluded categories are agrarian business activities, tax exemptions, debt relief, and bills for 
specific guilds. 
In Table 5.3 I present the results for models that exclude the municipalities that 
did not report damage after Mitch and the results for private bills that do not fall into 
the agrarian, taxes, debt relief, and guilds categories. As can be observed in 
model (13), when everything else is held constant, under CLPR logM is negative and 
statistically significant at the one per cent probability value—the same as in the 
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original models. A change to OLPR is not statistically significant this time; however, 
the positive sign of the coefficient of logM×OLPR indicates that legislators from larger 
constituencies tend to introduce more district bills under OLPR than they would 
have under CLPR. That effect is observed when the CLPR and OLPR models are 
contrasted without interactive terms, as can be seen in (14) and (15). We see that the 
coefficient of logM tends to be slightly closer to zero under OLPR than under CLPR.  
In terms of private bills, the exclusion of observations in the selected categories 
does not generate a statistically significant effect in the number of private bills 
legislators introduce. Nevertheless, in the original set of models the coefficient of 
logM was very close to zero for private bills, indicating no interaction effect. In 
contrast, in model (16) in Table 5.3, a significant increase in the coefficient of that 
variable can be observed. Moreover, we notice that in models (17) and (18), which do 
not have interactive terms, there are increases in the log of district magnitude that 
seem to indicate more private bills per legislator. The coefficient of logM is higher in 
OLPR than in CLPR; however, the standard errors of the model’s intercept in (18) 
indicate that the model does not efficiently estimate the coefficient parameters, 
probably because of a smaller number of observations for the OLPR period. Models 
(19) to (21) combine the district bills for municipalities that did not report any 
damage after Mitch with private bills, excluding categories for sectors probably 
affected by the hurricane. As in the original set of models presented in Table 5.1 the 
resulting variable has been labelled targetable. Notice that very similar patterns to 
those found in Table 5.1 hold in this other set of models. In this regard, the 
coefficients of logM and logM×OLPR are not statistically significant, but both follow 
the predicted signs: negative under CLPR and positive in OLPR—that result is 
confirmed in models (20) and (21) with no interaction terms. 
Figure 5.4 presents the predicted probability results for the interaction effects 
between logM and OLPR in district, private, and targetable bills. Regarding district 
bills, it can be noticed that the change to OLPR produces an increase in the number 
of district bills each legislator introduces in most constituencies regardless of district 
magnitude. The pattern for OLPR is significantly different from that observed in the 
original models presented in Figure 5.1. However, judging by the decreasing 
overlapping of the confidence intervals on the curves as logM grows, one could argue 
that the effect of a change in ballot type is stronger in larger magnitude 
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Table 5.3. Random effects negative binomial results for the impact of the OLPR system on the initiation of bills in the 
Honduran Congress, selected observations 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
 District CLPR OLPR Private CLPR OLPR Targetable CLPR OLPR 
          
OLPR 0.724   0.817   0.668   
 (0.51)   (0.71)   (0.42)   
logM -0.692*** -0.627*** -0.479** 0.766*** 0.666** 1.062*** -0.172 -0.172 0.095 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) 
logM×OLPR 0.176   0.235   0.216   
 (0.20)   (0.24)   (0.15)   
Experience 0.221** 0.205* 0.013 0.194* 0.160 0.034 0.139* 0.126 -0.010 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Experience×OLPR -0.190*   -0.205   -0.150*   
 (0.11)   (0.14)   (0.09)   
Liberal 0.560** 0.426* 0.780** -0.133 -0.049 -0.175 0.255* 0.161 0.391** 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.25) (0.18) (0.25) (0.24) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) 
Cycles -0.088* 0.231** -0.255*** -0.105 0.064 -0.251** -0.122** 0.162** -0.291*** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
Govdeps 1.096*** 1.145*** 0.744*** 0.912*** 0.936*** 0.275 1.021*** 1.097*** 0.569*** 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.24) (0.21) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) 
Govdeps×OLPR -0.254   -0.613**   -0.353   
 (0.29)   (0.30)   (0.22)   
Strong -0.011 0.044 0.046 0.184 0.158 0.062 0.028 0.107 -0.003 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) 
Strong×OLPR 0.314   0.091   0.224   
 (0.28)   (0.32)   (0.22)   
HDI -8.753** -9.097** -10.830** -6.632** -4.104 -8.245** -6.701** -5.939** -9.819** 
 (2.77) (3.64) (4.03) (2.80) (3.74) (3.94) (2.12) (2.86) (3.18) 
          
(continued on following page) 
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Table 5.3 
(continued from previous page) 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
 District CLPR OLPR Private CLPR OLPR Targetable CLPR OLPR 
Spline(1) 0.007** 0.458** 0.005 0.001 0.024** -0.000 0.003 0.031** 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
          
Spline(2) 0.134** 0.998*** 0.058 0.021 0.255** 0.002 0.061 0.366*** -0.002 
 (0.06) (0.28) (0.07) (0.05) (0.13) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) 
          
Spline(3) -0.097** -1.292** -0.046 -0.015 -0.211** -0.001 -0.043 -0.291*** -0.001 
 (0.04) (0.43) (0.05) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) 
          
Intercept 5.217** 5.097** 7.920** 1.240 -0.864 16.837 3.684** 2.919* 7.181*** 
 (1.68) (2.24) (2.43) (1.67) (2.21) (1116.49) (1.28) (1.72) (1.93) 
          
Parameterα 1.291*** 1.651*** 1.303*** 2.157*** 1.717*** 15.225 1.547*** 1.707*** 1.686*** 
 (0.18) (0.30) (0.28) (0.29) (0.33) (1116.49) (0.16) (0.25) (0.28) 
          
Parameterβ -0.482** -0.402 -0.709** -0.140 -0.149 -0.492* -0.096 -0.176 -0.391** 
 (0.19) (0.30) (0.25) (0.24) (0.40) (0.28) (0.15) (0.23) (0.20) 
N 2706 1812 894 2706 1812 894 2706 1812 894 
Chi2 165.18 79.25 73.81 91.33 36.25 37.60 159.18 70.22 68.43 
Log likelihood -1092.899 -554.343 -528.945 -830.227 -452.037 -371.618 -1597.704 -841.113 -744.763 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. The regression analysis excludes municipalities 
that reported personal and infrastructure damage from Hurricane Mitch; in addition, it excludes bills that created benefits for private individuals and 
organizations in the categories agrarian, taxes, debt relief, and guilds. 
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constituencies, as the theory predicts. Similarly, when looking at Figure 5.4(b), we can 
see that unlike the behaviour previously reported, the predicted probability curve 
grows higher under OLPR than CLPR as district magnitude gets larger. Finally, 
Figure 5.4(c) presents the results for the combined variable targetable. In this case, the 
patterns of the lines are as expected, i.e. declining as M grows in CLPR and rising as 
M gets bigger in OLPR. However, the effect of OLPR is smaller than reported in the 
original set of models.  
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Figure 5.4. Predicted probabilities of OLPR over the number of bills initiated across 
the log of district magnitude, selected observations. 95 per cent confidence intervals are 
denoted by the vertical capped lines. The regression analysis used to calculate the figures in 
this graph excludes municipalities that reported personal and infrastructure damage from 
Hurricane Mitch. In addition, it excludes bills that created benefits for private individuals and 
organizations in the categories agrarian, taxes, debt relief, and guilds. 
5.4 Discussion 
In the analysis presented in this chapter, evidence was found that seems to confirm 
the theory that the interaction of ballot type with district magnitude generates 
incentives for legislators to seek personal votes. The variation between CLPR and 
OLPR was very small in terms of the number of national and private bills legislators 
decided to introduce. However, when it comes to district bills, there was a strong 
interaction effect between ballot type and the logarithmic form of district magnitude. 
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As hypothesized, the evidence confirms that under CLPR, the smaller the district 
magnitude the more likely legislators are to introduce larger numbers of district bills 
than any other type. In a sample of bills that included municipalities that did not 
report any damage from Mitch, a significant increase in the number of pork-barrel 
bills introduced by legislators was noticed, but that increase tended to be 
proportional to the district magnitude. In other words, small-M constituencies tend 
to favour pork more than larger-M constituencies. Nevertheless, for pork-barrel bills, 
legislators from larger magnitude constituencies were more sensitive to the electoral 
system change than legislators from smaller constituencies. 
The theory did not anticipate an increase in pork-barrel bills where district 
magnitude equals one. However, it was found that even in those constituencies there 
was an increase in the number of this type of bill. Moreover, it was not expected that 
legislators from small constituencies would show an interest in general public goods, 
in this case the presentation of national bills, but this was in fact the case. There are 
two possible explanations for this. One is that the inclusion of legislative candidates’ 
photographs in the legislative ballot under OLPR increases the incentives for 
legislators to be accountable to their constituencies. Another explanation for this 
unexpected result could be related to the form of government, which in Honduras 
consists of a presidential system with a fixed four-year term for the president, and the 
fragmentation of the country’s main political parties. Faction leaders in the main 
political parties are usually presidential candidates, and it usually is they who, with the 
help of leaders from the constituency, identify potential legislative candidates to join 
the faction. Under CLPR these actors had a determining influence on the re-election 
prospects of legislators in small-M constituencies, where seats are scarcer (see Figure 
5.1 above). I will discuss this topic again in the conclusion, after the analysis of the 
elite survey data (Chapter 6). 
Regarding experience of legislators, the results show that experience matters 
and that there is an interaction effect between seniority and the type of electoral 
system. It was found that senior legislators are more likely to introduce district bills 
under CLPR than under OLPR. Furthermore, in CLPR, these legislators are more 
likely to introduce district bills than junior legislators. Taylor-Robinson (2006) 
conducted a similar analysis of the fused-CLPR period in Honduras and achieved 
comparable results. Her interpretation of this phenomenon was that “those deputies 
are likely to be party and Congress leaders, and they may be sponsoring bills for 
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backbenchers that think that pork has a greater likelihood of being delivered to their 
district if a party leader initiates the bill” (p. 117). The reason this factor fails to 
explain a major increase in pork and private bills in OLPR might be due to the 
increased number of competitors in parliament (not only from within the same party 
but from the other political parties as well) who feel more confident about 
introducing this kind of bill by themselves. However, in spite of the fact that the 
evidence is not very strong, it is found that senior legislators are more likely than 
their junior colleagues to introduce national bills in both the CLPR and OLPR 
systems. Overall, the results have withstood additional robustness checks (see 
Appendix 5.1). 
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Appendix 5.1 Robustness checks 
Hypothesis 5 stated that the higher the number of terms legislators have served in 
office, the higher the probability that they will present national rather than district 
bills. The evidence supports this claim, but in addition it was found that under CLPR 
senior legislators tend to introduce district and private bills more often than 
freshmen. One could argue that longer-serving legislators will have higher positions 
on the list and hence under CLPR need to spend less time cultivating personal 
constituency support. If the key, determining factor is position on the list, then this 
could be a better indicator than the number of terms a legislator has served in office. 
In Table 5A.1 I test Hypothesis 5 using position on the list (variable List) instead of 
the number of terms legislators have served in office.83  
Table 5A.1. Random effects negative binomial results of the effects 
of position on the party list on bill introduction in the Honduran 
Congress, CLPR electoral system period 
 (38) (39) (40) 
 District Private National    
    
List -0.087** -0.098** -0.096*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)    
logM 0.076 0.908*** 1.008*** 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.14)    
Liberal 0.294* 0.164 0.078    
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.17)    
Cycles 0.017 -0.015 -0.180*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)    
Govdeps 1.282*** 1.029*** 0.724*** 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.12)    
Strong -0.107 0.218                 
 (0.14) (0.15)                 
HDI 3.178 -6.861**                 
 (2.08) (2.79)                 
Spline (1) 12.794** -8.922 -7.587*   
 (5.28) (6.67) (4.57)    
Spline (2) -2.313** 1.732 1.514*   
 (1.03) (1.30) (0.89)    
Spline (3) 11.345** -7.997 -6.813*   
 (4.74) (6.00) (4.11)    
    
(continued on following page) 
                                                 
83 In this particular case, the analysis only considered bills introduced by permanent legislators. 
Observations for those cases where substitute legislators introduced the bills were not included 
because it is difficult to defend the assumption that substitutes will adopt the behaviour of permanent 
legislators when they have to cover for them under special circumstances (e.g. sick leave). In this 
regard, substitutes have a different hierarchical status; sometimes they can even have more seniority 
than permanents but they could also have been included on the list just to fill a position. 
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Table 5A.1 
(continued from previous page) 
 (38) (39) (40) 
 District Private National    
Spline (4) -45.064** 31.371 26.655*   
 (18.59) (23.50) (16.10)    
Intercept -2.638** 1.632 -1.804*** 
 (1.30) (1.62) (0.37)    
Parameter α 1.640*** 1.364*** 1.029*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.15)    
Parameter β -0.173 -0.351* -0.393**  
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.15)    
N 1789 1789 1789    
Chi2 108.80 70.34 108.47    
Log likelihood -1147.317 -902.289 -1443.345    
Note: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant 
at 0.01. 
 
It can be observed that the hypothesis is partially rejected. As is discernible in 
Model (38), the evidence suggests that the effect of position on the list is very small 
in terms of district bill introduction. Contrary to the expectation, the lower ranked 
the legislator the less likely she is to introduce district bills. The result is significant at 
a five per cent probability value. The results do support the hypothesis that those 
legislators elected to top positions on the party list are more likely to introduce 
national and private bills. In this regard, the magnitude of the coefficients is very 
small in comparison to the beta coefficients resulting in regression analyses using the 
number of terms as control (see Table 5.1). However, the statistical significance and 
the signs confirm the assumption that position on the list and number of terms 
served in office are similar proxies of the influence of a legislator. However, judging 
by the impact each of these indicators has, the latter seems to be a better predictor 
than position on the list. This is not surprising, considering that district magnitude 
tends to be correlated with position on the list (the Pearson correlation factor 
between the two is .5706), whilst the correlation factor between district magnitude 
and number of terms in office is only .0172.   
In Table 5A.2 I check whether the exclusion of the other political controls 
alters the coefficients of the key independent variables. In other words, I keep only 
OLPR, logM, the interaction term logM×OLPR, Experience and its interaction with 
logM, as well as the variables that control for autocorrelation. Overall, the results are 
quite similar to those for all models presented in Table 5.1, which suggests that other 
explanatory factors for which I control do not significantly alter the influence of the 
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Table 5A.2. Random effects negative binomial results for the impact of the OLPR system on the initiation of bills in the 
Honduran Congress, with no controls 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
 District CLPR OLPR Private CLPR OLPR National CLPR OLPR 
          
OLPR 0.308   0.551   0.614*   
 (0.27)   (0.38)   (0.31)   
logM -0.233** -0.200** -0.097 0.507*** 0.494*** 0.583*** 0.733*** 0.746*** 0.573*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) 
logM×OLPR 0.171   0.086   -0.199*   
 (0.11)   (0.14)   (0.12)   
Experience 0.169** 0.133** 0.082 0.162** 0.156** 0.052 0.030 0.118** 0.079 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Experience×OLPR -0.095*   -0.163**   0.038   
 (0.06)   (0.07)   (0.05)   
Spline(1) 0.027 11.134** 0.010 0.033 -11.077* 0.031 0.006 -6.140 0.016 
 (0.02) (4.70) (0.03) (0.03) (6.24) (0.04) (0.03) (4.12) (0.03) 
Spline(2) -0.363*** -2.010** -0.651*** -0.184 2.028* -0.111 -0.088 1.269 -0.185 
 (0.10) (0.92) (0.13) (0.14) (1.22) (0.20) (0.10) (0.80) (0.16) 
Spline(3) 0.607** 9.850** 1.059*** 0.382 -9.740* 0.367 0.218 -5.575 0.447 
 (0.19) (4.23) (0.26) (0.26) (5.63) (0.36) (0.20) (3.71) (0.29) 
Spline(4) -0.473** -39.184** -0.690** -0.382 38.854* -0.418 -0.204 21.614 -0.411 
 (0.20) (16.54) (0.28) (0.27) (22.00) (0.38) (0.21) (14.50) (0.30) 
Intercept 0.338 0.585* 1.151*** -1.476*** -1.536*** 0.313 -1.509*** -1.554*** -0.100 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.34) (0.32) (0.35) (0.69) (0.28) (0.31) (0.41) 
Parameter α 1.482*** 1.683*** 1.561*** 1.681*** 1.338*** 2.613*** 1.154*** 1.142*** 1.575*** 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.19) (0.15) (0.18) (0.50) (0.11) (0.14) (0.23) 
Parameter β 0.119 -0.002 -0.060 -0.051 -0.265 -0.159 -0.144 -0.184 -0.443** 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) 
N 3067 2032 1035 3067 2032 1035 3067 2032 1035 
Chi2 102.94 33.71 41.72 80.30 31.16 28.93 115.11 64.73 53.86 
Log likelihood -2775.709 -1492.054 -1257.109 -1915.296 -1109.458 -805.451 -2912.587 -1785.089 -1118.060 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01.  
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main dependent variables.84 In this regard, it can be noticed that the signs of the 
coefficients in all cases are the same as those present in the counterpart to these 
models, i.e. the coefficient of log of M is negative when it comes to pork bills and is 
positive for private and national bills, as well as for the product of logM and OLPR in 
the district bills model. Nevertheless, there are differences in the levels of statistical 
significance. While the main term OLPR is significant for the district and private bills 
models in Table 5.1, it is not in Table 5A.2, nor is it in the coefficients for 
logM×OLPR in the latter case. As I mentioned previously, this is related to the 
likelihood that the legislators are from the party in government, who are more likely 
to introduce district bills than deputies from other parties. 
I conducted an analysis of the robustness of the previous results excluding the 
political control variables. It was found that the outcomes presented in Table 5.1 did 
not change significantly, which suggests that the key independent variables account 
to a large extent for the variation in the legislators’ behavioural patterns. The 
magnitude of the coefficients is very similar; moreover, their sign remained the same 
(see Appendix 5.1). However, in terms of district bills, the interaction logM×OLPR is 
not significant in this other set of models. The reason the result is not significant 
seems to be associated with the absence of the variable govdeps. In presence of that 
variable the coefficient of logM×OLPR is significant at the ten per cent probability 
value (those results are not reported in the present work). This is not surprising 
considering that legislators from the party in government probably believe that they 
have greater chances of getting their pork-barrel bills passed than legislators from the 
opposition. 
In Table 5A.3 above I replicate the models presented in Table 5.1 but have 
ruled out the cubic-splines, which are the control variables for time dependency. In 
terms of logM and the interaction logM×OLPR, it is observed that after the exclusion 
of the cubic splines the coefficients of these two variables remain almost the same. 
The most noticeable change that is of interest for the present analysis can be seen in 
model (37). In this model, the coefficient of the variable experience is .105 and is 
statistically significant at the five per cent probability value. In the original set of 
                                                 
84 I also conducted two different sets of statistical tests: one for the analysis of ballot type and district 
magnitude, and another for the analysis of ballot type and the experience of legislators. In both cases I 
kept the controls for autocorrelation. The results, which are not reported in the present work, did not 
differ significantly from those presented in Table 5A.2. 
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Table 5A.3. Random effects negative binomial results for the impact of the OLPR system on the initiation of bills in the Honduran 
Congress, with no time dependency controls 
 (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (34) (35) (36) (37) 
 District CLPR OLPR Private CLPR OLPR National CLPR OLPR 
          
OLPR 0.523*   0.877**   0.983**   
 (0.29)   (0.41)   (0.33)   
logM -0.327*** -0.271** -0.087 0.531*** 0.545*** 0.576*** 0.771*** 0.797*** 0.523*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) 
logM×OLPR 0.255**   0.084   -0.243**   
 (0.11)   (0.14)   (0.12)   
Experience 0.251*** 0.299*** 0.070 0.225*** 0.266*** 0.051 0.067 0.155** 0.105* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Experience×OLPR -0.130**   -0.175**   0.041   
 (0.06)   (0.07)   (0.05)   
Liberal 0.160 0.076 0.318** -0.123 -0.177 0.011 -0.156 -0.088 -0.127 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.18) (0.17) (0.11) (0.14) (0.17) 
Cycles -0.149*** 0.018 -0.240*** -0.055 0.057 -0.136** -0.155*** -0.121*** -0.161*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Govdeps 0.960*** 0.984*** 0.524*** 0.846*** 0.889*** 0.211 0.508*** 0.545*** 0.106 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Govdeps×OLPR -0.310**   -0.434**   -0.227   
 (0.15)   (0.18)   (0.14)   
HDI 2.859** 3.655** 1.557       
 (1.34) (1.85) (1.86)       
Intercept -1.438* -2.116* 0.650 -1.724*** -2.132*** 0.214 -1.404*** -1.653*** 0.262 
 (0.85) (1.16) (1.20) (0.36) (0.41) (0.60) (0.30) (0.34) (0.42) 
          
(continued on following page) 
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Table 5A.3 
(continued from previous page) 
 (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (34) (35) (36) (37) 
 District CLPR OLPR Private CLPR OLPR National CLPR OLPR 
Parameter α 1.661*** 1.846*** 1.822*** 1.774*** 1.473*** 2.465*** 1.173*** 1.184*** 1.451*** 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.22) (0.16) (0.20) (0.40) (0.11) (0.14) (0.21) 
Parameter β 0.115 -0.067 -0.009 -0.124 -0.381** -0.070 -0.194* -0.257* -0.392** 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) 
N 3065 2030 1035 3065 2030 1035 3065 2030 1035 
Chi2 244.08 95.14 88.26 122.36 63.97 34.17 160.89 99.05 46.19 
Log likelihood -2701.953 -1455.533 -1234.779 -1890.243 -1090.286 -803.077 -2885.636 -1764.726 -1120.287 
       Note: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01. 
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models its value was lower (.066) and not significant. This result offers evidence that 
supports my initial expectations.  
I also conducted robustness tests removing the cubic splines for the 
municipalities that did not report damage after Mitch and which were targeted by 
legislators. But the results were, practically speaking, the same as in the models with 
cubic splines.  
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Chapter 6 
Parliamentarian elite survey analysis 
 
 
The Latin American Parliamentarian Elites Project (PELA) at the University of 
Salamanca provides a very rich source of information on the perceptions and 
attitudes of Honduran legislators in relation to their work. In addition, PELA is of 
particular value for approximating the influence of legislators’ individual attributes on 
their behaviour, something that is relevant for the theory developed in the present 
work but for which I lack primary data to control. Furthermore, to my knowledge, 
the analysis that I present in this chapter has not been conducted before. Therefore, 
the aim of the present chapter is twofold. First, it is expected to reinforce the 
evidence found in the analysis of legislators’ bill presentation behaviour (Chapter 5). 
Second, it aims to empirically study the influence of legislators’ personal attributes on 
their personal vote-seeking behaviour. 
In the first part of this chapter the hypotheses are set out. Section two presents 
the model specification for the statistical analyses, and in section three I discuss the 
statistical results. 
6.1 Hypotheses 
In the preceding chapters of this thesis it has been shown useful to classify the 
behaviour of legislators is into targetable and non-targetable types of behaviour. That 
was the case in Chapter 5 for targetable and non-targetable bills in particular. 
Similarly, in the present chapter, one can talk about targetable and non-targetable 
attitudes, and the orientations or preferences of legislators. The present study 
replicates to a great extent the analysis conducted in Chapter 5, the obvious 
difference being the dependent variables used. With survey data I am not analysing 
the actual behaviour of legislators, but their attitudes, which can provide information 
about their preferences and some indication of their actual behaviour. In this chapter 
I test hypotheses for pork-barrel politics, the representation of interest groups, the 
formulation of non-targetable public goods, and the personal attributes of legislators.  
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Pork-barrel politics. Between 1998 and 2010 the PELA surveys asked 
legislators, “What degree of importance—a great deal, a good deal, little, none at 
all—do you attach, during the course of your parliamentary duties, to providing 
resources for your department?” My argument states that regardless of the ballot 
structure, pork-barrel politics should be more important the smaller the district 
magnitude. This is because the larger the district magnitude the more difficult it 
becomes for legislators to claim individual credit for projects that have benefited 
their constituencies. Not to mention that larger magnitude districts are more likely to 
have bigger portions of urban populations, where some voters will vote not for pork 
but according to ideology and policy. However, the OLPR system will generate 
incentives for some legislators in larger M constituencies to appeal to pork-barrelling 
as a form of attracting personal votes. Thus, there will be an increase in pork-barrel 
politics activities in larger magnitude constituencies, but these will not be as 
important as they are for legislators in smaller M constituencies. In this regard, I have 
formulated the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1. Legislators will attach more importance to pork-barrel politics 
activities the smaller the district magnitude.  
Hypothesis 2. Under OLPR, pork-barrelling increases in importance across all 
district magnitudes in comparison with CLPR, but legislators will still tend to attach 
more importance to pork-barrelling the closer the district magnitude is to one.  
Private interests. I have argued that the importance legislators give to interest 
groups should be greater the larger the district magnitude because legislators can be 
less accountable to their constituencies as M grows. Taking into consideration that in 
larger-M constituencies some voters cast their votes on the basis of policy and 
ideology, to reach those voters parties and legislators may need to run expensive 
campaigns. This means that they may require the financial help of interest groups. In 
return, legislators will represent the interests of private organizations through 
different facets of their parliamentary work. In Chapter 5 we had the opportunity to 
analyse one of those facets, the introduction of bills with the potential to benefit 
interest groups. The indicator I am using in the present analysis is more general. The 
PELA surveys asked legislators to what extent they take into consideration the 
opinions of interest groups during their parliamentary work. We can expect their 
behaviour in this regard to be consistent with the following hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 3. Legislators will attach greater importance to the opinions of 
interest groups the larger the district magnitude. Moreover, the level of importance 
attached to the opinions of interest groups in larger-M constituencies will be greater 
under OLPR than CLPR. 
General public goods. Similar to the representation of interest groups in 
CLPR, I argue that legislators will be more likely to attach greater importance to law 
making the higher the district magnitude. By contrast, under OLPR, while 
formulating laws should be still more important the larger the district magnitude, 
legislators will be less likely to privilege law formulation than in CLPR. This is 
because of the increased incentives to procure pork for their constituencies. Thus, 
some legislators might think that they have better chances of re-election if they 
deliver pork than if they provide general public goods. In the PELA surveys 
legislators were asked to indicate the degree of importance they attach to formulating 
laws in the course of their parliamentary activities. I predict the following:85  
Hypothesis 4. Legislators will attach higher levels of importance to the 
formulation of laws the larger the district magnitude. However, the importance that 
legislators give to law formulation should decrease in OLPR in comparison with 
CLPR. 
Personal attributes. In Chapter 5 I used the number of terms legislators have 
served in office as a proxy of their personal attributes. In this chapter I replicate that 
analysis but instead of the number of terms, I used as a proxy the number of years 
legislators declared having served in office when the surveys were conducted. 
Therefore, the hypotheses for the present analysis do not differ from those stated in 
the preceding chapter, except for the unit of observation, which in this case is the 
number of years served.86 The hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 5. Under CLPR, the higher the number of years legislators have 
served in office the more likely they are to privilege national legislation over pork-
barrel politics.  
                                                 
85 Bear in mind that this question has had three similar formats across the different rounds of PELA 
surveys. 
86 For a reminder of the arguments, go to page 33. 
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Hypothesis 6. Legislators with higher number of years in office are more likely 
to present national bills under OLPR than in CLPR. 
I also take into consideration two personal attributes that the relevant 
theoretical contributions suggest produce significant outcomes in terms of legislators’ 
behaviour: local background and business elite background.87 In a CLPR context, 
Gallagher (1988a, p. 251) suggests that of the different characteristics legislators can 
possess, party leaders will almost invariably prioritize candidates’ local roots. This is 
not only because party leaders want their parties to have representation throughout a 
constituency, but also because they want local leaders who can gain local votes for 
the party.  
Under OLPR some legislators with local backgrounds may have the advantage 
of having built personal reputations as local leaders, which they can use to attract 
votes, especially in those places where they are well-known among the voters 
(Shugart, Valdini & Suominen, 2005). Moreover, this type of deputy will probably 
base her work in office on providing pork more than any other strategy in order to 
maintain their local support (Ames, 1995). However, legislators with other 
backgrounds will also use pork to attract new voters. As such, we can expect in the 
survey data to see little variation in the importance legislators give to pork under the 
OLPR system.88 Based on these considerations, I formulate the following two 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7. Under CLPR, legislators with local backgrounds will be more 
likely to attach importance to pork-barrel politics. 
Hypothesis 8. Under OLPR, the local backgrounds of legislators will not be an 
indicator of the degree of importance legislators give to pork-barrel politics. 
                                                 
87 Ames (1995) also discusses the role of legislators who have had executive experience in government 
(e.g. as ministers or directors) and who had previously managed pork resources, and could therefore 
use their personal reputations as former providers of projects to increase their chances of re-election. 
Thinking of the particular case of Honduras, one could also add media figures, such as footballers and 
television celebrities, to the analyses. As I showed in Chapter 1, the number of legislators with 
government executive and media figure backgrounds has significantly increased since the change to 
OLPR. However, the number of legislators who had those two characteristics is too small in the 
CLPR sample to include it in the analysis. Thus, the decision to restrict the analysis to the local and 
business background is based on the variation they have across different survey rounds, in addition to 
the theoretical attention they have received. 
88 Variation could be found at the sub-constituency level, as the theory by Ames (Ames, 1995) 
suggests. At the municipal level legislators will focus on targeting certain municipalities depending on 
their public experience background.  
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Ames (1995) also takes into consideration the role of legislators with a business-
related background. For him, these politicians have contradictory incentives:  
The electoral support of business candidates is more fickle than the 
support enjoyed by local politicians. Better offers sway bosses loyal to 
the highest bidder. Thus businessmen face contradictory incentives. 
While opportunities are clearly better for candidates unconstrained by 
local careers, businessmen can lose support as quickly as they gain it 
(Ames, 1995, p. 417). 
In terms of legislators with a business-related background, I expect that 
regardless of the electoral system these legislators will be more focused on the 
provision of general public goods and private goods than pork-barrel politics because 
firms and large businesses in general are believed to influence important political 
economy outcomes (Bernhagen & Bräuninger, 2005). Under OLPR, I anticipate that 
legislators with a business-related background will stress the provision of general 
public goods and private goods. Thus, contrary to Ames (1995), I believe that their 
support of local public goods, such as pork, will be minor in comparison to the 
provision of the other two types of goods. As I have argued, it is very likely that 
legislators supported by interest groups will have conflicting interests with regard to 
their constituencies. If deputies with a business background are more likely to be 
closely connected to interest groups, as I expect, then they will be less likely to 
provide service to their constituencies. In addition to representing private interests 
they will probably focus on introducing national legislation, considering that they will 
need to gain as many votes as possible in order to win elections. If they do not get 
votes via constituency service, then they probably get them from policy and 
ideologically-driven voters. In this regard, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 9.  Legislators with a business-related background will be more 
likely to favour interest groups and the formulation of national laws than pork-
barrelling. Furthermore, they will tend to exhibit that behaviour more under OLPR 
than CLPR.  
6.2 Model specification 
For the present analysis the dataset has been set according to the survey data analysis 
functions available in Stata 12. In this sense, the strata are the years in which the 
surveys were held, the sampling unit is the political party, and the finite population 
correction factor is the total number of seats in the Honduran Congress, which 
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remains constant (see Table 4.4 in Chapter 4 for details). In total, the dataset 
comprises 355 observations. The sample of legislators surveyed under CLPR is 173, 
and 182 for OLPR. The sample design model leaves out 13 degrees of freedom, six 
in CLPR and seven for OLPR. I use three dependent variables: pork, representation of 
interest groups, and making laws. The questions and the answer scales used to construct 
these variables are briefly described in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Dependent variables 
Dependent 
variable 
Question Answer scale Surveys 
Pork What degree of importance do you 
attach, during the course of your 
parliamentary activities, to providing 
resources for your constituency? 
(4) A great deal 
(3) A good deal 
(2) Little 
(1) None at all 
1998–
2010  
Representation 
of interest 
groups* 
To what extent you do you take into 
consideration the opinion of each of 
the following groups, individuals, or 
institutions when making policy 
decisions?—Interest groups 
(4) To a great extent 
(3) To some extent 
(2) To little extent 
(1) Not at all 
1998–
2006 
Making laws* Thinking about your work as a deputy, 
what is the degree of importance you 
attach during your parliamentary 
activity of the following?—Making 
laws 
(3) High 
(2) Medium 
(1) Low 
1998–
2010 
Notes: *As noted in Chapter 4, the questions and the answer scales for these variables 
changed throughout the different survey rounds. In the case of the variable representation of 
interest groups only the surveys from 1998 and 2006 could be considered. Regarding making 
laws, the questions and the scales changed, but their range of variation suggests 
unidimensionality; it was therefore rescaled. 
Because these are ordinal scale variables, an appropriate statistical method for 
dealing with this type of categorical dependent variable is the ordinal logit, which is 
an extension of the logit model in the sense that each category is a simple logit whose 
cumulative probabilities are then added into a single coefficient.89  
                                                 
89 According to Agresti (2007), “[w]hen response categories are ordered, the logits can utilize the 
ordering. This results in models that have simpler interpretations and potentially greater power than 
baseline-category logit models” (p. 180).89 The logit is a binary-choice model in which 1=iy  
if 0>*iy , where the coefficient of the latent variable
*
iy denotes the point where the set of 
parameters βix  intersect iy  (Agresti, 2007; Baum, 2006). In the ordinal logit model, as Baum (2006) 
explains, “[i]f *y ≤ k1, we observe 1=y ; if k1 < *y ≤ k2, we observe y = 2; if k2 < *y ≤ k3, we 
observe y = 3, and so on, where the k values are the thresholds” [emphasis is from the original] 
(p. 257). Stata 12 reports the coefficients of those thresholds under the label cut points. 
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Some researchers use linear regression models to conduct analyses with survey 
data.90 However, this method requires having a considerable amount of variation in 
the ordinal scale so it can be treated as if it was a continuous variable (de Vaus, 
1991). Sometimes, researchers combine different survey items into indexes to obtain 
a single continuous variable that can be analysed afterwards using linear regression 
analysis. However, one of the disadvantages of this method is that the selected items 
should be able to measure the same attributes the researcher intends to analyse 
(Weisberg et al., 1996). This inconvenience could result in very few variables to 
aggregate and lead to heteroscedastic distributions of the observations. In any case, 
one of the advantages of conducting an ordinal logit rather than an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) analysis is that with the former method one can calculate the marginal 
effects. By aggregating the data into indexes and then analysing the models using 
OLS regressions, it is possible that other aspects of interest, such as marginal effects, 
will not be observable (de Vaus, 1991, p. 220). 
6.1.1 Explanatory variables 
OLPR is a dummy that equals one for the surveys conducted when the open-list PR 
system was adopted (the legislatures of 2006–2010 and 2010–2014) and 0 otherwise. 
As previously explained, logM is the logarithm to base ten of district magnitude. To 
test for the interaction effects between district magnitude and type of ballot, the 
interaction logM×OLPR is added to the models.  
One of the proxies of legislators’ personal attributes is experience, which is a 
counter for the number of years legislators declared having served in office. The 
range of variation in this variable is zero to 12 years. Two dummies were created to 
test the hypotheses regarding the legislators’ local and business backgrounds. The 
first of these is local, which equals one for deputies who had previously been elected 
to municipal government positions. The second, business, equals one for legislators 
who reported having a business-related background.91 These three last variables are 
interacted with OLPR. The Pearson correlation coefficients for these variables, which 
                                                 
90 In Stata the use of different statistical models for survey data analysis implies the inclusion of the 
prefix svy: before the command. 
91 To construct this variable I focus on four professions as coded in the PELA databases: farmers, 
cattle ranchers, business people, and finance people. According to Meza et al. (2007), farmers, cattle 
ranchers, people working in business and finance are very influential in the economic and political 
realms of Honduran society. See Appendix 6.1 for a more comprehensive account of the legislators’ 
careers as reported in the PELA surveys considered in the present analysis. 
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are related to the legislators’ personal attributes—hence one might suspect that they 
are highly correlated—range between .00 and .09; therefore, there is no 
multicollinearity and all three can be included simultaneously in the analysis. 
6.1.2 Controls 
In addition to these potential explanatory factors for the targetable and non-
targetable orientations of legislators, the ideology of the party could also contribute 
to explaining the legislators’ preferences. To control for this intervening factor I 
include the dummy liberal, which equals one for legislators who belong to the Liberal 
Party of Honduras (PLH). Bear in mind that the PLH and the National Party of 
Honduras (PNH) dominate in Honduran politics. As in Chapter 5, I include the 
dummy govdeps, which equals one for legislators who belong to the same party as the 
president, in order to hold constant the partial effect this factor might have on the 
legislators’ behaviour. I also include the product govdeps×OLPR to observe the 
interaction effect of this variable with the change of ballot. 
6.3 Results 
Pork-barrel politics. Table 6.2 presents the ordinal logit results for the degree of 
importance Honduran legislators attach to pork barrelling, according to the PELA 
surveys of 1998–2010. Model (1) includes the key variables plus the additional 
control variables and their interactions. It is found that, consistent with the 
predictions, during the CLPR period the larger the log of M the less likely it is that 
legislators will show preferences for pork-barrel politics; however, that result is not 
statistically significant. When the electoral system changes to OLPR, even though it 
is not significant, the interaction logM×OLPR indicates that a change of ballot 
structure marginally increases the probability that legislators will favour pork-barrel 
politics as district magnitude gets larger. The predicted probabilities for this model 
when other factors are held constant at their means are displayed graphically in 
Figure 6.1.92 It can be observed that under the CLPR electoral system it is almost 
certain that legislators from small-M constituencies will 
                                                 
92 Notice that for the present analysis I have omitted the confidence intervals (CI) from the marginal 
effects figures, while in chapters 5 and 7 I decided to report them. The reason I do not display those 
results here is to reduce the amount of information displayed in the graphs. Considering the 
significant overlapping between categories, the inclusion of CI would make the interpretation of the 
results very difficult. 
  
163 
Table 6.2. Ordinal logit analysis of explanatory factors for the variable pork 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
          
OLPR -1.204   -1.220   -0.295   
 (1.00)   (0.77)   (0.37)   
logM -0.565 -0.616* -0.302 -0.654** -0.634** -0.311    
 (0.33) (0.28) (0.18) (0.25) (0.23) (0.20)    
logM×OLPR 0.381   0.354      
 (0.33)   (0.32)      
Experience 0.037 0.035 -0.009    0.037 0.035 -0.000 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)    (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) 
Experience×OLPR -0.041      -0.034   
 (0.06)      (0.06)   
Local 0.514 0.120 -0.128    0.842** 0.193 -0.083 
 (0.46) (0.22) (0.13)    (0.35) (0.21) (0.12) 
Local×OLPR -0.047      -0.074**   
 (0.04)      (0.03)   
Business -0.085 -0.095 -0.751**    0.055 0.068 -0.764** 
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.26)    (0.37) (0.39) (0.29) 
Business ×OLPR -0.648      -0.817   
 (0.47)      (0.47)   
Liberal 0.707** 0.517 0.889***    0.733** 0.589 0.896*** 
 (0.18) (0.37) (0.12)    (0.18) (0.37) (0.12) 
Govdeps 0.289 0.282 0.977***    0.293 0.295 0.993*** 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.13)    (0.32) (0.32) (0.14) 
Govdeps×OLPR 0.658*      0.670*   
 (0.31)      (0.32)   
          
(continued on following page) 
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Table 6.2 
(continued from previous page) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
          
Cut point 1 -7.226*** -6.388** -3.462*** -7.820*** -6.831** -3.789*** -5.838*** -4.801** -2.713*** 
 (1.40) (1.38) (0.43) (1.15) (1.17) (0.64) (1.08) (1.16) (0.34) 
          
Cut point 2 -6.423*** -5.576*** -0.954 -7.017*** -6.023*** -1.450** -5.037*** -3.993*** -0.218 
 (0.79) (0.68) (0.51) (0.57) (0.51) (0.56) (0.53) (0.52) (0.24) 
          
Cut point 3 -4.020** -3.742**  -4.640*** -4.206***  -2.642*** -2.187**  
 (1.01) (0.90)  (0.50) (0.39)  (0.37) (0.42)  
          
Cut point 4 -1.956* -2.173*  -2.675*** -2.659**  -0.588 -0.650  
 (1.04) (0.92)  (0.54) (0.51)  (0.35) (0.34)  
N 355 173 182 355 173 182 355 173 182 
Design df 13 6 7 13 6 7 13 6 7 
               Note: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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pick a great deal as their answer. As the log of M decreases that probability decreases. 
When the system changes to OLPR, we see that the probability that legislators from 
small-M constituencies will answer a great deal drops in comparison to the CLPR 
system. Still, it is more likely that this type of deputy will choose that answer than a 
legislator from a larger constituency. However, as the log of M gets larger the slope 
for a great deal decreases at a much slower rate in comparison with the CLPR system.  
Overall, one can conclude that Honduran legislators demonstrate a high level of 
commitment to pork-barrel politics. As Figure 6.1 shows, the probability that 
legislators will select the option a good deal as an answer is very low (around 20 per 
cent), and is practically null for options that disregard the role of pork-barrelling.  
Models (2) and (3) present the results of (1) without interactions. The first of 
these models analyses the impact of the set of covariates on the degree of importance 
given to pork when the electoral system is CLPR. It is observed that logM is negative 
as expected and statistically significant at the five per cent probability value. In the 
OLPR system, that variable is no longer significant and its impact decreases slightly, 
but is still negative. Models (5) and (6) reproduce the structure of models (2) and (3), 
only taking into consideration the interaction between district magnitude and type of 
ballot and excluding the other controls. It is found that the results are still consistent 
with the expectations. 
Regarding the analysis of the variables related to the legislators’ personal 
attributes, in hypotheses 5 and 6 the expectations are that under CLPR the higher the 
number of years legislators have served in office the less likely they will be to 
privilege pork-barrel politics, while under OLPR they should give even higher 
importance to the formulation of laws than to pork-barrel politics. The results are 
not significant for any of the models. Interestingly, as in Chapter 5, judging by the 
sign of the coefficients of the variables experience and experience×OLPR, under CLPR 
the more experienced the legislator is, the more likely she is to privilege pork. By 
contrast, the interaction of the number of years of experience with OLPR indicates 
that when the ballot is open-list, senior legislators are less likely to support pork-
barrel politics. 
It was stated in hypotheses 7 and 8 that the local political background of a 
legislator is a predictor of pork-barrel politics under CLPR, whereas this is not the 
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case in OLPR. Despite the fact that the variable local is not significant, the sign of its 
coefficient in models (1) and (2) suggests that legislators with a local background are 
more likely to privilege pork-barrel politics. When logM is ruled out as part of the 
regressors, the results are statistically significant at the ten per cent probability value 
in model (7). Surprisingly, under OLPR there is a decrease in the coefficients for the 
variable local, which seems to imply that under OLPR legislators with a local political 
background are less likely to place pork at top of the list of their strategic 
preferences. 
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Figure 6.1. Effects of logM and OLPR on pork.  This graph was calculated using an 
ordinal logit model; other factors were held constant at their means. The line connected by 
hollow circles indicates that in CLPR, the lower the district magnitude the more likely it is that 
a legislator will pick a great deal as her answer. As the log of district magnitude increases, the 
probability of choosing that answer decreases. Instead, selection of the answer a good deal is 
more likely the larger the district magnitude (see the black dashed line with exes). When the 
system changes to OLPR, as can be noticed in the solid grey line with hollow diamonds, the 
degree of importance that legislators attach to pork-barrelling falls in most constituencies; 
nevertheless, it is still more likely that legislators from small-M constituencies will pick a great 
deal over any other answer. The rate at which the slope decreases is much slower in 
comparison with the CLPR system. Something similar happens when legislators choose the 
option a good deal as an answer but in the opposite direction (see the dashed line with 
crosses). 
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With regard to legislators with business backgrounds, hypothesis 9 states that 
this type of deputy will be more likely to favour interest groups and the formulation 
of national laws than pork-barrel politics, and that that behaviour should be more 
pronounced under OLPR than CLPR. The results for the variable business suggest 
that these legislators are less likely to prioritize pork, especially under OLPR, as can 
be observed in models (1) to (3) and (7) to (9). 
Representation of interest groups. The ordinal logit results for the extent to 
which legislators take into consideration the opinions of interest groups are reported 
in Table 6.3.93 My expectation is that legislators will tend to attach greater 
importance to interest groups the larger the district magnitude, and that those 
preferences should be more pronounced in medium and large-M constituencies 
under OLPR than CLPR. Overall, by simply looking at the regression results in 
models (10) to (15), it is found that logM and the interaction logM×OLPR do not 
produce changes to legislators’ estimation of the opinions of interest groups; this 
could be related to district magnitude and the change in the ballot type. However, the 
sign of the interactions suggests that it is likely that there has been a small shift in the 
opinions of legislators in this matter between the two types of electoral systems. 
Nevertheless, if that were the case, the results would belie the proposed hypotheses. 
Graphically, in Figure 6.1, it can be observed that the linear predictions do not 
significantly differ from zero, which confirms that the effects if any are very small. 
The interactions show that, as expected, under CLPR legislators tend to privilege 
interest groups more the larger the district magnitude. But, contrary to the 
expectations, under OLPR that pattern seems to reverse.  
With regard to the personal attributes of legislators, the results are significant 
only for the variable experience. Notice in models (12) and (18) that under OLPR the 
results for this variable are statistically significant at the ten per cent probability value, 
which partially confirms my expectations. In terms of the variable business, the signs 
of the coefficients provide some support for the hypothesis that this type of 
legislator will privilege interest groups, particularly under OLPR. However, the 
results are not statistically significant. 
                                                 
93 Because these models exclude the observations of the 2010 survey, there were fewer degrees of 
freedom. Therefore, the controls liberal and govdeps were not included in this analysis. 
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Table 6.3. Ordinal logit analysis of explanatory factors for the variable representation of interest groups 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
          
OLPR -0.033   0.336   -0.255   
 (0.92)   (0.77)   (0.35)   
logM 0.095 0.071 -0.003 0.088 0.090 -0.087    
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23)    
logM×OLPR -0.096   -0.192      
 (0.36)   (0.33)      
Experience 0.017 0.016 0.049*    0.017 0.017 0.049* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)    (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Experience×OLPR 0.039      0.038   
 (0.05)      (0.05)   
Local 0.443 0.+191 0.369    0.378 0.186 0.369 
 (0.36) (0.21) (0.27)    (0.36) (0.22) (0.31) 
Local×OLPR -0.016      -0.010   
 (0.03)      (0.03)   
Business -0.084 -0.098 0.032    -0.118 -0.124 0.032 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.23)    (0.16) (0.17) (0.23) 
Business×OLPR 0.098      0.134   
 (0.33)      (0.29)   
          
Cut point 1 -0.489 -0.609 -0.361 -0.556 -0.603 -0.765 -0.712* -0.776* -0.355* 
 (0.89) (0.86) (0.46) (0.67) (0.72) (0.54) (0.34) (0.36) (0.13) 
          
Cut point 2 0.804 0.741 0.829* 0.732 0.745 0.411 0.582** 0.575** 0.835* 
 (0.79) (0.73) (0.31) (0.59) (0.60) (0.40) (0.24) (0.21) (0.27) 
          
(continued on following page) 
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Table 6.3 
(continued from previous page) 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
          
Cut point 3 2.038** 2.089** 1.861** 1.956** 2.090** 1.427* 1.815*** 1.922*** 1.867** 
 (0.78) (0.74) (0.39) (0.62) (0.64) (0.46) (0.25) (0.19) (0.55) 
N 264 173 91 264 173 91 264 173 91 
Design df 9 6 3 9 6 3 9 6 3 
  Note: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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The reason the results did not support the hypotheses for the analysis of 
interest groups could be due to the phrasing of the question used in the PELA 
surveys. It is possible that most legislators interpreted the term interest group as 
referring to business-related groups only, which may have negative connotations. 
Also, it most be borne in mind that for the present analysis the observations for the 
2010 survey could not be included in the models. 
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Figure 6.1. Effects of logM and OLPR on representation of interest groups. This graph 
was calculated from an ordinal logit analysis; other factors were held constant at their means. 
As can be noticed in the vertical scale, the linear predictions are very close to zero, which 
suggests that there is no significant interaction effect between the log of district magnitude 
and the ballot type. Still, the lines for CLPR and OLPR fork in very small magnitude 
constituencies and the separation between them increases as magnitude grows, both of 
which suggest an interaction effect. In that regard, under CLPR the larger the district 
magnitude the more likely it is that legislators will privilege interest groups; the effect is the 
opposite under OLPR. That effect is observed for all the categories of the variable except for 
the response to little extent, which does not change between the two electoral system types. 
Making laws. In the remainder of this section I will analyse the influence of 
the predictors on the degree of importance Honduran legislators give to law creation. 
Consistent with the predictions, in Table 6.4 we can see that regardless of ballot 
structure, the larger the district magnitude the more importance legislators attach to 
making laws. The interaction with type of ballot is not significant (model 19); 
however, models (21) and (24) are statistically significant at the five per cent 
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Table 6.4. Ordinal logit analysis of explanatory factors for the variable making laws 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
          
OLPR -0.893**   -0.254   -0.444   
 (0.38)   (0.50)   (0.36)   
logM 0.136 0.217 0.441** 0.280 0.277 0.373**    
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20) (0.13)    
logM×OLPR 0.184   0.090      
 (0.23)   (0.23)      
Experience 0.033 0.032 0.041**    0.032 0.030 0.031* 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.01)    (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Experience×OLPR 0.006      -0.002   
 (0.05)      (0.05)   
Local -0.802** -0.382 -0.140    -1.073** -0.415 -0.212 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.25)    (0.40) (0.43) (0.23) 
Local×OLPR 0.052      0.075**   
 (0.03)      (0.03)   
Business -0.536** -0.504** 0.048    -0.582** -0.584* 0.031 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.31)    (0.22) (0.27) (0.31) 
Business×OLPR 0.567*      0.614*   
 (0.32)      (0.34)   
Liberal -0.012 0.402 -0.405**    -0.024 0.375 -0.400* 
 (0.29) (0.50) (0.16)    (0.29) (0.47) (0.18) 
Govdeps 0.021 0.035 0.482**    0.014 0.025 0.413* 
 (0.57) (0.48) (0.17)    (0.56) (0.48) (0.18) 
Govdeps×OLPR 0.434      0.408   
 (0.62)      (0.62)   
          
(continued on following page) 
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Table 6.4 
(continued from previous page) 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
          
Cut point 1 -0.130 0.251 0.910* 0.357 0.364 0.605* -0.469 -0.291 -0.176 
 (0.32) (0.34) (0.40) (0.39) (0.37) (0.31) (0.34) (0.37) (0.24) 
          
Cut point 2 0.993** 1.345** 2.071*** 1.451** 1.425** 1.733*** 0.648** 0.
797** 
0.
962** 
 (0.35) (0.48) (0.31) (0.45) (0.50) (0.25) (0.28) (0.30) (0.22) 
N 355 173 182 355 173 182 355 173 182 
Design df 13 6 7 13 6 7 13 6 7 
                Note: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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probability value. The calculation of the marginal effects of that interaction reveals 
that in the CLPR system legislators in small-M constituencies are very likely to assign 
low degrees of importance to making laws (see Figure 6.2). As district magnitude 
increases, the probability that legislators will pick low responses for that item 
substantially decreases. In OLPR there are slight changes, but overall it can be 
noticed that in small-M constituencies the importance legislators give to making laws 
is greater in the same segments of logM than in the CLPR system. Similarly, in large-
M constituencies, the level of importance decreases when compared to the CLPR 
model. These results are consistent with the expectations.  
The analysis of the variable experience is consistent with the expectations and the 
findings of Chapter 5, and shows that under OLPR senior legislators are more likely 
to ascribe higher degrees of importance to making laws than in the CLPR system. 
This result is only significant, though, when the constitutive term is analysed, as can 
be observed in model (21).  
For the variable local, it was expected that in both electoral systems the signs of 
its coefficient would be negative, indicating that legislators with a local background 
are less likely to favour making laws. That expectation is clearly met under both types 
of system, as can be observed in the models with no interactions. However, it is 
interesting to note in the interacted models (19) and (25) that a change to OLPR 
causes deputies with a local background to be more inclined to favour the 
formulation of laws. This result is significant at a ten per cent probability value in 
model (25). 
Finally, it is found that in the CLPR system legislators with a business-related 
background are less likely to regard the creation of laws as one of their most 
important parliamentary activities. In the OLPR system, although the effect is not 
significant, the positive sign suggests that they are more likely to assign greater 
importance to this activity. While it was not expected that legislators with a business 
background would be likely to disregard the creation of laws under CLPR, the 
behaviour in relation to this item in OLPR is consistent with the expectations. 
Because the variable making laws was rescaled to match the different survey 
rounds, it is important to bear in mind that the question used in 1998 was different 
to the one included in the surveys of 2002 and 2006, and that in 2010 the question 
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changed again. These changes could induce biased results. To test for this possibility, 
I ran an additional set of models using these two survey rounds only. Even with this 
shortened dataset we are able to achieve the variation in OLPR, which is one of our 
key independent variables. However, by excluding observations there is a loss in the 
number of degrees of freedom, making it necessary to take some covariates out of 
the analysis. The results of that analysis are presented in Appendix 6.2. In those 
results it is found that the coefficients of business under CLPR are the only set of 
coefficients that show levels of statistical significance. The reason the other 
covariates are not significant might be because by excluding the surveys of 1998 and 
2010, the models do not capture the influence of other factors that could have 
affected the attitudes of legislators. For example, the behaviour of legislators was 
probably more institutionalized in 2010 than it was in 2006. In all, the signs of the 
coefficients of logM, experience, and business are the same in both sets of models, and 
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Figure 6.2. Effects of logM and OLPR on making laws.  This graph was calculated from 
an ordinal logit analysis; other factors were held constant at their means. The solid lines 
indicate that the larger the district magnitude the more likely it is that the response of a 
legislator will fall into the category high. By looking at the light grey solid line, we can see that 
the curve of the predicted probability for the category high under OLPR is slightly lower than 
the equivalent curve under CLPR—see the black solid line—which indicates that under 
OLPR the preferences of legislators toward making laws decrease across all district 
magnitudes. 
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their magnitudes (smaller in CLPR and larger in OLPR) are very similar. This 
suggests that despite the rescaling process, the models can provide a robust test of 
factors that explain variation in making laws. 
6.4 Discussion 
The results in this chapter confirm those outlined in Chapter 5, namely that in the 
CLPR system Honduran legislators tend to privilege pork politics more the smaller 
the district magnitude. However, in the present analysis, with the amount of data 
available, it is difficult to confidently rule out endogeneity between the electoral 
system change and the legislators’ behaviour, which might in turn have been 
influenced by Hurricane Mitch. This is partly because with survey data which is 
collected every four years, trends are not as easily observed as if they were recorded, 
for example, yearly. Also, taking into consideration that observations fluctuate in an 
ordinal scale no larger than four, and the importance that legislators in Honduras 
attach to pork, the skewness of the data towards responses that favour pork-barrel 
politics does not reveal any extraordinary patterns. 
Nevertheless, the results presented in Appendix 6.3 suggest that the electoral 
system change in Honduras in 2004 has had an impact on the way legislators behave, 
which is consistent with the expectations and the results presented in this chapter. 
Certainly, in terms of pork-barrel politics there has been a significant change in 
legislators’ behaviour, which is probably due to the impact Hurricane Mitch had on 
Honduran politics. In this regard, it was observed that in the survey conducted 
before Mitch, most responses from legislators indicated a tendency to privilege pork-
barrelling and that in the largest constituencies there was more variation in the 
responses. That pattern changed in the survey of 2002, a shift that seemed to 
continue in the subsequent survey rounds. Still, despite the fact that the results are 
not significant for the survey of 2010, the coefficients are closer to zero than in the 
preceding years, which might be an indication that legislators from larger district 
magnitude constituencies are attaching greater importance to pork under OLPR.  
Other indicators presented in the robustness test in Appendix 6.3 provide 
evidence that the changes in the behaviour of Honduran politicians, which in the 
present work are attributed to the electoral system reform, occurred independently of 
the influence of Mitch. According to this survey analysis, the local background of 
legislators was a strong predictor of pork in 2002, i.e. in the first legislature elected 
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after Hurricane Mitch. This coincides with the reconstruction period and it makes 
sense to think that at that time the country was still recovering from the aftereffects 
of that natural disaster. It should be noted, though, that in the subsequent survey 
rounds the local backgrounds of legislators seem to lose importance as an 
explanatory factor for pork, which occurs in more or less the same way as before 
Mitch. Similar behaviour is observed for deputies who are business people. In the 
aftermath of Mitch they gave relatively more importance to pork, but according to 
the data from the survey rounds conducted in 2006 and 2010, the significance they 
attach to this activity returned to practically the same levels as before Hurricane 
Mitch. However, this type of legislator had clearly differentiated behaviour across the 
two electoral systems in terms of how they valued the formulation of laws. Under 
CLPR, regardless of the effect of Mitch, they were less likely to prioritize law making, 
whereas under OLPR their position on this activity seems to be ambiguous. 
The results suggest that legislators from larger magnitude constituencies are 
more likely to favour pork-barrel politics under OLPR, but not to the same extent as 
legislators from smaller magnitude constituencies. This is consistent with the theory, 
because it is expected that larger magnitude constituencies will generate more 
intraparty competition, as predicted by Carey and Shugart (1995). However, it must 
be borne in mind that pork is not an attractive prospect for all legislators in those 
constituencies, firstly because it is more difficult to claim credit for projects, and 
secondly because in those territories there are more likely to be considerable but 
disperse groups of voters who are attracted by policy rather than pork.  
I expected to find stronger support for interest groups from legislators who 
belong to larger constituencies; however, the results contradict the hypotheses. It is 
not clear whether the negative results are because the dependent variable that was 
chosen for the analysis does not capture the phenomena that I intended to explain, 
or whether it is because of a lack of observations, which if present would allow for 
more confidence in the results.   
In terms of the analysis of the importance legislators give to the formulation of 
laws, the regression results for the interaction logM×OLPR do not support the claim 
that under OLPR there should be a decrease in the degree of importance legislators 
attach to making laws during their parliamentary work. However, the analysis of 
marginal effects revealed that there has been a decrease which, even though it is not 
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very significant, follows the predictions. It was also found that legislators’ 
backgrounds are important when it comes to formulation of laws. As in Chapter 2, I 
argue that legislators with more experience in parliament can use their personal 
reputations to attract party votes, i.e. votes based on ideology or policy positions. In 
addition, legislators with a business background should be more likely to give 
preference to the formulation of laws under OLPR. In both cases, the explanations 
are similar. In the first case, these legislators are more likely to be found in medium 
and large magnitude districts, where pork tends to be less important. And in the case 
of legislators with business backgrounds, they are more likely to be connected with 
business elites, who might help them to gain party votes through the financing of 
expensive campaigns. 
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Appendix 6.1  Legislators’ careers as reported by PELA 
Table 6A.1. Legislators’ past public experience by electoral system, 
according to the PELA surveys 
 CLPR OLPR Total 
 N % N % N % 
Lawyer 17 9.83 25 13.74 42 11.83 
Health Services 13 7.51 11 6.04 24 6.76 
Farmer/cattle rancher 31 17.92 18 9.89 49 13.80 
Business 33 19.08 43 23.63 76 21.41 
Teacher 12 6.94 3 1.65 15 4.23 
Journalist/media/entertainer 1 0.58 12 6.59 13 3.66 
Merchant 20 11.56 14 7.69 34 9.58 
Engineer 7 4.05 11 6.04 18 5.07 
Finance services 10 5.78 1 0.55 11 3.10 
Other – professional 17 9.83 23 12.64 40 11.27 
Other – non-professional 4 2.31 6 3.30 10 2.82 
Mayor 1 0.58 1 0.55 2 0.56 
Public servant 4 2.31 3 1.65 7 1.97 
Construction 3 1.73 2 1.10 5 1.41 
Minister 0 0.00 1 0.55 1 0.28 
Party executive 0 0.00 2 1.10 2 0.56 
NGO/advocacy 0 0.00 6 3.30 6 1.69 
Total 173 100.00 182 100.00 355 100.00 
Source: own, based on Alcántara (1994-2010). 
Appendix 6.2  Analysis of the importance of making laws, surveys 
of 2002 and 2006 only 
In this robustness test I run an analysis of explanatory factors for the variable making 
laws using only the surveys of 2002 and 2006—which did not have any changes to 
the phrasing of the question or the answer scales. By restricting the analysis to those 
two survey rounds, there is a loss in the number of degrees of freedoms available for 
conducting inferences. Because of this, I excluded some of the variables to gain 
leverage. I ran different tests using the covariates local, experience, and business 
separately from the explanatory variables. Of these, the only one that provided 
significant results was business under CLPR, affecting the partial effect logM had on 
the variable making laws. In models (28) to (30) in Table 6A.2 it can be noticed that 
including the variable business slightly reduces the partial influence logM has on making 
laws under CLPR. Notice that the directions of the coefficients do not vary, in 
contrast with the models presented in Table 6.4, and the magnitude and levels of 
significance for business are very similar in the CLPR models. 
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Table 6A.2. Ordinal logit analysis of explanatory factors for the variable making laws, surveys of 2002 and 2006 only 
 (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
          
OLPR -0.574   -0.066   -0.181   
 (0.75)   (0.85)   (0.27)   
logM×OLPR 0.046 0.046 0.222 0.108 0.108 0.203    
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.15) (0.27) (0.28) (0.18)    
 0.178   0.096      
 (0.34)   (0.33)      
Experience       0.003 0.003 0.017 
       (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Experience×OLPR       0.014   
       (0.05)   
Business -0.537** -0.540** 0.267    -0.549** -0.552* 0.191 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.46)    (0.17) (0.18) (0.44) 
Business×OLPR 0.806      0.741   
 (0.49)      (0.49)   
          
Cut point 1 0.318 0.315 0.583 0.317 0.313 0.387 -0.130 -0.138 0.057 
 (0.50) (0.48) (0.40) (0.69) (0.66) (0.52) (0.20) (0.23) (0.14) 
          
Cut point 2 1.375* 1.383 1.628** 1.371 1.381 1.427** 0.932*** 0.945** 1.098* 
 (0.62) (0.70) (0.15) (0.81) (0.89) (0.28) (0.15) (0.13) (0.38) 
N 193 102 91 193 102 91 193 102 91 
Design df 6 3 3 6 3 3 6 3 3 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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Appendix 6.3 Analysis of the impact of Hurricane Mitch 
The purpose of the analyses presented in this appendix is to test how robust the 
results are to the influence of Hurricane Mitch. The variation in the data seems to 
suggest that this natural disaster could have affected the way legislators answered the 
survey questions, especially when it comes to pork-barrel politics. As I argued in 
Chapter 5, Mitch could have had a particularly influential effect in terms of pork-
barrel politics and the representation of interest groups. The results for interest 
groups do not vary significantly in a way that could be attributed to Mitch. Therefore, 
I decided not to report that robustness test. Instead, for the present analysis I will 
focus on the variable pork.94  
In Table 6A.3 we see that in the survey of 1998, which was conducted in March 
of that year, seven months before Hurricane Mitch struck Honduras, legislators from 
large district magnitude constituencies were much less likely to put pork at the top of 
the list of their priorities. The extent to which legislators from large-M constituencies 
disregarded pork-barrel politics seems significantly reduced in the 2002 survey. 
Thereafter, with the amount of data produced, it is difficult to ascertain whether the 
effect of district magnitude on the attitudes of legislators towards pork shifted a 
result of the change of ballot type or if it was because of Mitch. Nevertheless, there 
are signs that might suggest that the effect of the change of ballot type on legislators’ 
pork-barrelling preferences is not related to Hurricane Mitch. In this regard, notice 
how in the survey conducted in 2006 the coefficient for logM tends to move away 
from zero, which might be an indication that the legislators’ behaviour was moving 
back towards its old equilibrium, in spite of the electoral change in 2004. Now, notice 
how in the survey conducted in 2010 the coefficient falls closer to zero than ever 
before. This result is probably an indicator of an underlying institutionalization 
process, in which candidates and incumbent legislators have adapted their pork-
barrel practices to the new institutional circumstances imposed by the OLPR system. 
The proxies for legislators’ personal attributes also indicate different behaviour 
in the two electoral systems and are not necessarily related to Hurricane Mitch. In 
this regard, notice how the variable local is positive and statistically significant in 2002, 
                                                 
94 Note that in this set of models, because fewer degrees of freedom were available, I could not 
include control variables. 
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while in the previous survey it was not significant and its sign was negative. This is 
not surprising considering that in 2002 the country was still undergoing a process of 
recovery after Hurricane Mitch. However, in the following two survey rounds the 
magnitude of the coefficient for local decreases. In the 2010 survey the coefficient for 
that variable seems quite similar to that of 1998. A very similar trend is observed for 
the variable business, except that this time is not statistically significant. 
Table 6A.3. Ordinal logit analysis of explanatory factors for pork, 
by survey round 
 (37) (38) (39) (40) 
 1998 2002 2006 2010 
     
     
logM -1.202 -0.433 -0.502 -0.305 
 (0.70) (0.21) (0.21) (0.35) 
     
Experience 0.190 0.014 -0.104 0.033 
 (0.20) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
Local -0.183 0.429** 0.150 -0.276 
 (1.24) (0.06) (0.15) (0.24) 
Business -0.703 0.071 -0.172 -0.757 
 (1.17) (0.22) (0.34) (0.40) 
     
Cut point 1 -7.374** -3.686** -4.182** -4.771** 
 (1.95) (0.30) (0.84) (0.63) 
     
Cut point 2 -6.551** -1.810** -2.183* -1.699 
 (1.49) (0.54) (0.79) (0.86) 
     
Cut point 3 -5.478*    
 (1.96)    
     
Cut point 4 -4.395*    
 (1.68)    
N 71 102 91 91 
Design df   3     3   3   4 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; **significant at 0.05; ***significant 
at 0.01. 
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Chapter 7 
Pork-barrel politics: The case of  the Honduran 
Social Investment Fund 
 
 
The ways in which electoral systems generate incentives for vote-seeking legislators 
to procure projects for their constituencies, even to the detriment of the national 
interest, is the subject of one of the oldest debates in political science. Examples of 
legislators seeking benefits for their constituencies for re-election purposes. For 
instance, the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system in Japan has been signalled 
as one of the main drivers of pork-barrel behaviour among members of the Diet (the 
Japanese lower house of parliament) (Hirano, 2006; McCall-Rosenbluth & Frances, 
1996).95 There are several cases in Japan where national funds were used for the 
construction of roads and bridges, projects that, from a technical viewpoint, could 
not be said to serve the common good but which are seen as being the result of 
pork-barrel politics (Diaz-Cayeros, McElwain & Romero, 2009; Fukui & Fukai, 
1996).96  
In the case of Honduras, qualitative evidence suggests that often political rather 
than technical criteria prevail in decisions related to the allocation of national public 
funds. I have provided several examples in the preceding chapters. I also received 
confirmation of this fact from a member of staff at the Department of Public Works, 
in the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Housing (SOPTRAVI), which is in 
charge of the maintenance and construction of civil works such as bridges, buildings, 
                                                 
95 As explained by Gallagher and Mitchell (2005a), under the single SNTV system “there are several 
seats to be filled in each constituency, but voters are not faced with a choice among party lists. 
Instead, they vote for a candidate—and the seats go to the candidates with the most votes.” (p. 592). 
96 For instance, Fukui and Fukai (1996) report that “if a local problem or project requires new 
legislation, one or more Diet members from the area takes charge of the action needed to get a law 
enacted or amended. A lower house member from Toyama Prefecture, Kotar Tachibana, serving on 
the Transportation Committee, is credited with the committee’s approval of the prefecture’s plan to 
build outer harbor docks with an 1,800-meter breakwater capable of handling four million tons of 
cargo per year.” (p. 278). 
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and airports. According to this staff member, pork is the main driver behind 
decisions to prioritize projects in her department: 
Here [in Honduras] things are managed by zones [i.e. constituencies]. Say 
there is a deputy working in a particular zone; the community 
approaches the deputy they helped or the deputy working in the zone to 
‘give weight’ to their application for projects. The deputy approaches the 
ministry with the proposal, and then the proposal comes from the 
minister to us… that’s the way it works here: political clientelism.97  
While qualitative evidence can lend important empirical support to the theory 
to be tested, it fails to provide more precise details about the impact of electoral 
systems on pork-barrel politics. Because budget decisions usually pass through the 
hands of several different decision makers before they materialize into projects, it is 
difficult to directly measure the pork-barrel influence of a legislator on government 
outcomes. However, very often political scientists and economists approximate that 
influence through the statistical study of aggregate data on the geographical 
allocation of public spending from common pool resources. For example, 
Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder (2002) study the transfers made from the state 
governments to counties in the United States before and after the Supreme Court 
ordered the redistricting of several constituencies in a series of cases in the 1960s, 
finding evidence of a diversion of moneys from formerly overrepresented counties to 
counties that were underrepresented before the Supreme Court decision. Similarly, 
Golden and Picci (2008) find evidence that, under OLPR in Italy, MPs’ personal 
attributes could influence decisions on where infrastructure projects should be 
constructed and the amount of spending that should be assigned to them.   
The present chapter utilizes data from the Honduran Social Investment Fund 
(FHIS) which, as noted in Chapter 4, is an institution created in the early 1990s to 
tackle poverty and whose main source of finance comes from international donors 
and lenders, but also from the national budget. FHIS is not the only institution of its 
kind in the world. Social investment funds (SIFs) have been implemented in the 
                                                 
97 Member of staff at the Department of Public Works, SOPTRAVI, personal interview, 2nd 
December 2009, own translation. 
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developing world since the late 1980s, aiming to mitigate the impact of structural 
adjustment programmes on the poorest populations in the countries involved.98  
Projects implemented through SIFs generate short-term employment and 
longer-term infrastructure development in the communities where they are 
implemented. Projects and spending allocation are usually audited by private firms 
and not by the public sector. Siri (1996) speculates that, even though politicians want 
to give international donors the impression that their decisions in relation to 
spending allocation are not politicized, spending at SIFs is susceptible to political 
manipulation. There is evidence that this might indeed be the case in some countries. 
For example, Schady (2000) analyses the distribution of spending at the Peruvian 
Social Investment Fund (FONCODES) during the 1991–1995 period. He confirms 
that in this institution spending tended to increase before national elections. His 
findings also indicate that the geographical allocation of spending benefited 
municipalities where the ruling party hoped to gain more votes. Similarly, 
Bruhn (1996) argues that the Mexican government in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
used SIFs from the National Solidarity Programme (PRONASOL) to privilege those 
states where the Institutional Revolutionary Party was electorally strong.   
In this chapter I use an original dataset on spending allocation at FHIS that 
covers spending from February 1990 to December 2009 in the 298 municipalities 
into which the country is divided. Because that time frame covers the electoral 
reform and the allocation of spending was made across all municipalities, I can test a 
set of hypotheses regarding the influence of electoral systems on pork-barrel 
outcomes while controlling for factors at the sub-constituency level. Because scrutiny 
from the international funding lenders has gradually increased, to avoid the influence 
of this factor I focus on national sources of spending only, which I have already 
proved are susceptible to the influence of legislators (see Chapter 4). 
This chapter consists of four parts. In the first section I present the hypotheses 
to be tested. In the following part I explain the estimation strategy used and describe 
                                                 
98 Structural adjustment programmes have been implemented throughout the world since the 1980s. 
They were first applied in Latin American countries in order to tackle the difficult fiscal conditions 
governments were facing at that time and to enhance the economic growth prospects of their 
societies. In this regard, according to Corbo & Fischer, a series of market-oriented reforms to policies 
and institutions were made “with the goals of restoring a sustainable balance of payments, reducing 
inflation, and creating the conditions for sustainable growth in per capita income” (1995, p.2847). 
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the variables. Section three presents the results. I conclude this chapter with a 
discussion of the findings. 
7.1 Hypotheses 
Because the data is aggregated at the sub-constituency level—i.e. by municipality—
the relationship between legislators and geographical spending allocation cannot be 
directly established. Thus, hypotheses that are associated with the legislators’ 
personal attributes cannot be tested. Instead, I focus on the interaction between 
district magnitude and ballot type. Following Carey and Shugart’s (1995) theory, 
under CLPR, the value of the personal reputation of legislative candidates increases 
as district magnitude decreases. Applying that logic to the pork-barrel behaviour of 
legislators, one could expect that under a closed-list PR electoral system legislators 
will demand more pork-barrel resources the smaller the district magnitude. In this 
regard, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Holding other factors constant, under CLPR, spending per 
capita at FHIS will increase as district magnitude decreases. 
As I have argued, despite the incentives that OLPR generates for legislators to 
look for personal votes, because it is more difficult to claim credit for projects in 
larger constituencies, pork-barrel politics will tend to be of more importance for 
legislators in smaller constituencies (Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, 2006). 
Practically speaking, the best way of winning elections in these constituencies is by 
providing favours to constituents and securing projects for the community. I have 
explained that this is not only because in this type of electoral district legislators are 
more easily identified as providers of patronage and pork. There is also a 
socioeconomic factor inherent to these constituencies in PR systems, which is that 
they tend to have more rural and perhaps poorer populations, who very often cast 
their vote driven by particularistic interests, such as pork for their communities. The 
influence of that socioeconomic factor tends to become weaker as district magnitude 
increases, while at the same time the number of seats increases and it becomes more 
difficult for legislators to claim credit for projects. Nevertheless, larger magnitude 
constituencies are not necessarily free of voters who are likely to be motivated by 
pork. This is especially the case in Honduras, where there still exist large groups of 
urban poor populations in medium and large magnitude constituencies, a factor 
which deputies use for re-election purposes (Taylor-Robinson, 2010). Incumbent 
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legislators, especially from the party in government, have greater access to the state’s 
resources than challenging candidates. Therefore, under OLPR in medium and large 
constituencies, I expect that the provision of pork will increase in comparison with 
CLPR: 
Hypothesis 2. Holding other factors constant, under OLPR, spending per 
capita at FHIS will be higher the smaller the district magnitude; however, the rate at 
which it decreases, as district magnitude increases, will be slower than under CLPR.  
7.2 Model specification 
The FHIS database has been organized by source of funding, which facilitates the 
identification of whether projects are funded from national sources, international 
sources, or a combination of both.99 As previously mentioned, for the purposes of 
the present analysis I focus on projects funded from national sources. These are 
more likely to be subject to the influence of pork-barrel politics, as the qualitative 
evidence presented in Chapter 4 suggests.  
The dependent variable of this study is the tenth logarithm of spending per 
capita at FHIS, in constant lempiras, per municipality per year.100 Using data 
disaggregated at the municipality level allows me to control for socioeconomic 
factors. This is especially important considering that, even though some departments 
have higher levels of poverty than others, they all have very poor regions. Besides, in 
Honduras, the number of deputies representing a constituency should reflect the size 
of the population (Chapter 3). Even though the population may have changed, this 
requirement has not been revised since the 1980s, so it is expected that there will be a 
correlation between district magnitude and the size of population. By using data 
disaggregated at the municipality level that association between the two variables is 
avoided.  
The dataset forms an unbalanced panel incorporating 298 municipalities and 20 
years, from 1990 to 2009.101 The total number of observations is 5,935. Some 
municipalities did not receive any funding from FHIS in certain years. The FHIS 
                                                 
99 When a project used combined sources of funding I recorded that project as being international. 
100 To get the per capita figures I divided spending by the population of the municipality as reported in 
the census of 2001. 
101 Seven new municipalities were created at different stages during the period of study. 
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database does not include observations for municipalities that did not receive any 
funding, making it an incomplete dataset (Hug, 2003). Most methodologists agree 
that in order to make reliable inferences from incomplete datasets, a Heckman model 
is the most suitable choice (Heckman, 1979; Sigelman & Zeng, 1999; Wooldridge, 
2002). The two-step Heckman procedure (Heckit model) corrects for selection bias 
in linear models due to variables omitted from observations not being included in the 
sample (Heckman, 1979; Wooldridge, 2002). As its name suggests, this model 
consists of two stages. In the first stage, the inverse Mills’ ratio, 
iλ (lambda), is 
obtained from a probit regression, where the outcome of the dependent variable is 
the probability that a municipality i receives spending, given a 1×L vector x of 
explanatory factors and a 1×L vector of selection variables, which contribute to 
explaining why some municipalities get funded and others do not. The second stage 
consists of incorporating lambda into the linear model without the selection variables. 
As explained in Chapter 3, I use a time-series cross-section (TSCS) analysis with a 
random-effects method, considering that one of the key explanatory variables in this 
analysis, district magnitude, keeps constant over the period of study. The models are 
reported with robust standard errors. 
7.2.1 Explanatory variables 
As in the previous two chapters, I use the tenth logarithm of district magnitude 
(logM, see Chapter 3). OLPR is a dummy that equals one starting in the year when the 
open-list PR system was adopted (2004). In addition, the interaction effect between 
district magnitude and type of ballot, logM×OLPR, is added to the models. 
7.2.2 Selection variables 
The spending in the form of projects allocated to a municipality is a function of 
different factors. Apart from the political variables, whether a municipality receives 
funding or not and the amount it receives might depend on its level of poverty—
because of policies targeting the poorest populations—and whether the municipality 
is in receipt of international sources of spending and the amounts it receives from 
this type of funding—because the government might finance projects in 
municipalities that are not eligible for international funds. To control for these two 
factors, I include the variable extreme poor in the first stage of the estimation model 
(probit model). This variable is an indicator of extreme poverty, and consists of the 
percentage of the constituency’s population with three or more unsatisfied basic 
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needs.102 I also incorporate the log of spending per capita from international sources, 
in constant lempiras, that FHIS allocated to each municipality during the period of 
study (variable int. spending), and its lag, considering the possibility of serial 
correlation.103 
7.2.3 Controls 
To control for autocorrelation I use the framework proposed by Beck and 
Katz (2011). In addition to a lagged dependent variable whose variation in time could 
be induced by an omitted variable, I include lags for other covariates that change 
over time and which could be correlated with the omitted variable—i.e. serial 
correlation.104 
To control for the possibility that spending is targeted at core supporters of the 
party in government, core supporters of the opposition, or swing voters, I identified 
the municipalities in which the Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH) and the National 
Party of Honduras (PNH) won a plurality of votes in the legislative elections held 
between 1981 and 2005. If a party won in the same municipality in all of the seven 
elections held during that period, that municipality was classified as a stronghold of 
that party. Once the PLH and the PNH electoral strongholds were identified, a set of 
two dummy variables was created. Govstrong equals one if the municipality is an 
electoral stronghold of the party in government, and oppstrong takes a value of one if 
the municipality is an electoral stronghold of the main opposition party. For swing 
voter municipalities I created the variable swing, which equals one for municipalities 
in which the party in government lost at least one legislative election but their 
average of votes in the elections held between 1981 and 2005 was 50 per cent or 
more. These variables are interacted with type of ballot. Govstrong×OLPR measures 
the effect of government strongholds on national spending when the electoral system 
is OLPR and oppstrong×OLPR does the same for opposition strongholds; 
                                                 
102 The data for this variable was taken from the 2001 census (National Institute of Statistics of 
Honduras, 2002).  
103 In the following sub-section I explain in more detail why this lag was included. 
104 As explained in Chapter 3, the addition of a lag dependent variable in time-series cross-section 
models is controversial because the effect of the lag can suppress the influence of other factors that 
might be correlated with the same omitted variables that contribute to inducing autocorrelation in the 
dependent variable (Achen, 2000). Beck and Katz (1995; 2011) consider that argument misleading, 
especially in the political science field, where the data generation process produces different dynamics 
to the data generated in the economics field, where much of the work on time-series analysis has been 
produced. 
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swing×OLPR is used for municipalities where the vote was pivotal. Bear in mind that 
in Chapter 5 I used a binary outcome variable to identify core strongholds of the 
party in government at the constituency level. To contrast the results in that chapter 
with those from the present analysis, I also include the variable strong constituency 
which, as its name suggests, is a dummy for constituency strongholds. Its interaction 
with OLPR is also added into the analysis. 
Two additional political controls are included in the models. To hold constant 
the effect of electoral business cycles I include a count variable, cycles, which ranges 
between one and four, with one being the first year of government and four an 
electoral year. The variable liberal is a dummy for years when the PLH held the 
presidential office. As I explained in Chapter 3, it is possible that this political party is 
likely to attach more importance to pork than the other party that has held the 
presidency, the PNH, hence the importance of including a statistical control for this 
potential confounding factor.  
The log of gross domestic product (GDP), in constant lempiras, is included to 
hold constant the partial effect of improvements in the economy.105 I also add a lag 
of GDP which, as I said, could be correlated with the same unknown factors that 
contribute to explaining autocorrelation in the dependent variable.  
7.3 Results 
The results for the TSCS regression analysis with random effects are presented in 
Table 7.1. In model (1), it can be observed that the key explanatory factor logM is 
negative and statistically significant at the one per cent probability value. By contrast, 
the interaction logM×OLPR is positive and statistically significant at the five per cent 
probability value. Therefore, this model supports the hypothesis that under CLPR, 
spending per capita at FHIS will increase as district magnitude gets smaller. The 
results for the interaction term logM×OLPR indicate that a change to OLPR has a 
major impact the larger the district magnitude in terms of the probability that a 
municipality will receive funding and the amount of spending it will receive. 
However, as in the previous two empirical chapters, the positive sign of that 
                                                 
105 The GDP figures were taken from the Ministry of Finance’s annual reports, which are available at 
http://www.sefin.gob.hn/?page_id=1845 
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Table 7.1. Results of Heckman two-step estimations of the logs of 
spending per capita from national sources of funding at FHIS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR 
    
OLPR -0.031   
 (0.39)   
logM -0.665*** -0.580*** -0.214** 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.11) 
logM×OLPR 0.391**   
 (0.16)   
Cycles 0.093 0.167* -3.181*** 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.78) 
Liberal 0.561*** 0.878*** -25.689*** 
 (0.13) (0.17) (6.55) 
Govstrong 0.098 0.099 -0.277 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.19) 
Govstrong×OLPR -0.199   
 (0.27)   
Oppstrong 0.191 0.034 0.121 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) 
Oppstrong×OLPR -0.142   
 (0.24)   
Swing 0.047 -0.066 0.070 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.15) 
Swing×OLPR 0.053   
 (0.26)   
Strong constituency -0.050 -0.261** 0.040 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) 
Strong const.×OLPR -0.034   
 (0.17)   
Log of GDP 2.215** -3.963 -4.599** 
 (0.92) (3.34) (1.78) 
Lag of log of GDP -3.650*** 6.162* 72.169*** 
 (0.97) (3.71) (18.95) 
Lagged dep. variable -0.060*** -0.067*** 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Selection variables    
Extreme poor (%) 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log of int. spending -0.074*** -0.102*** -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Lag of log int. spend. 0.032*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Lambda 0.617** 0.316 1.371** 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.42) 
Intercept 19.050** -21.854* -757.668*** 
 (6.16) (13.11) (197.22) 
N (selection) 1191   500   691 
N 5634 3846 1788    
R2 within 0.05 0.17 0.08 
R2 between 0.169 0.188 0.136 
R2 overall 0.124 0.214 0.126 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; **significant at 0.05; 
***significant at 0.01. 
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interaction does not mean that the larger the district magnitude the more spending it 
will get, just that there is more intraparty competition. As can be observed in models 
(2) and (3), only for the main components, under OLPR the coefficient of logM tends 
to get closer to zero as M gets larger, in contrast to CLPR. Nevertheless, as expected 
in Hypothesis 2, the closer M is to one single-member constituency the more 
spending it gets, even in OLPR. Graphically, that relationship can be observed in the 
predictive effect when other factors are held constant at their means (Figure 7.1). 
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Regarding the analysis of other political controls, in spite of the fact that it is 
not statistically significant, the coefficient of the covariate for the party in 
government’s core supporters, govstrong, is positive under CLPR and becomes 
negative under OLPR. The coefficient of oppstrong is positive under CLPR and 
OLPR; however, in the interacted model it becomes negative. The coefficient of 
swing is negative under CLPR but positive under OLPR. Finally, notice that strong 
constituency is negative and statistically significant in model (2), which estimates the 
parameters of the covariates under CLPR for the main components only. In 
Figure 7.1. Effects of OLPR and logM on the distribution of the log of national 
spending per capita at FHIS. 95 per cent confidence intervals are denoted by the vertical 
capped lines. Other factors are held constant at their means. Notice that regardless of the 
electoral system, the closer logM is to zero, the more funding the municipality will get. 
Nevertheless, under OLPR in large-M constituencies there is an increase in the predicted 
probability that municipalities belonging to those electoral districts will receive spending 
from FHIS. 
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model (3), i.e. under OLPR, it becomes positive but is very close to zero. The log of 
GDP and its lag are statistically significant, as is the lagged dependent variable. 
Lambda is statistically significant in models (1) and (3), as are the selection variables—
extreme poverty, the log of international spending, and its lag. These results suggest that the 
Heckman method corrects for biases due to incomplete datasets. 
Table 7.2 reports the results of a TSCS analysis with random effects excluding 
the municipalities that reported damage after Hurricane Mitch, which is intended to 
reduce the influence of that competing explanatory factor (see Chapter 5). In models 
(4) and (5), it can be observed that the coefficient of logM is still negative under 
CLPR; however, in comparison with the results presented in Table 7.1 above, the 
magnitude of the coefficient is smaller and statistically significant in both (4) and (5) 
at a five per cent probability value. In other words, there is a loss of efficiency in the 
estimator parameters for logM under CLPR; however, the results still lend empirical 
support to the hypothesis that spending will increase as district magnitude decreases. 
Similarly, the results support the expectation that under OLPR there will be an 
increase in spending in larger district magnitude constituencies, but that that increase 
will not be as big as in the smallest constituencies. The evidence in this regard could 
be considered weak in the sense that the coefficient of logM×OLPR in (4) is positive 
but not statistically significant. That behaviour is better explained through the 
analysis of predicted probabilities, as presented graphically in Figure 7.2. Notice that 
Table 7.2. Results of Heckman two-step estimations of the logs of 
spending per capita from national sources of funding at FHIS, 
municipalities unaffected by Mitch only 
 (4) (5) (6) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR 
    
OLPR 0.616   
 (0.48)   
logM -0.317** -0.398** -0.198 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) 
logM×OLPR 0.171   
 (0.18)   
Cycles -0.138 -0.029 -0.816 
 (0.11) (0.15) (1.14) 
Liberal 1.229*** 1.327*** -3.919 
 (0.18) (0.22) (9.08) 
Govstrong 0.354 0.078 -0.187 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.36) 
Govstrong×OLPR -0.599*   
 (0.34)   
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Table 7.2 
(continued from previous page) 
 (4) (5) (6) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR 
Oppstrong -0.258 -0.296 0.334 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) 
Oppstrong×OLPR 0.501*   
 (0.30)   
Swing -0.019 -0.124 0.208 
 (0.30) (0.28) (0.26) 
Swing×OLPR 0.196   
 (0.40)   
Strong constituency -0.271 -0.185 0.048 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) 
Strong const.×OLPR 0.433   
 (0.29)   
Log of GDP 0.843 1.062 -0.216 
 (1.69) (5.60) (2.29) 
Lag of log of GDP -5.362*** 0.457 8.821 
 (1.56) (6.38) (25.64) 
Lagged dep. variable -0.074*** -0.056** -0.081** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Selection variables    
Extreme poor (%) 0.013** 0.018** 0.011 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log of int. spending -0.091*** -0.098*** -0.044** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Lag of log int. spend. 0.029** 0.051** 0.081*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Lambda -0.446 -0.220 0.016 
 (0.30) (0.33) (0.54) 
Intercept 55.379*** -13.457 -91.731 
 (9.60) (23.60) (273.37) 
N (selection)   460   194 266 
N 2305 1573 732 
R2 within 0.08 0.16 0.18 
R2 between 0.031 0.148 0.027 
R2 overall 0.060 0.130 0.105 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; **significant at 0.05; 
***significant at 0.01. 
for this sample, there has been an increase in spending under OLPR that is almost 
proportional to district magnitude; in other words, municipalities of all district 
magnitudes that did not report any damage after Mitch received comparatively more 
spending from FHIS under OLPR than CLPR. Nevertheless, the slope is less 
pronounced under OLPR. Moreover, we see that there is less overlapping of the 
confidence intervals of both curves the larger the district magnitude, which is an 
indication that the change to OLPR most affected medium and large constituencies. 
Finally, note that the results presented in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2 are very similar to 
the results from the analysis of pork-barrel bills for the same sample of municipalities 
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that did not report damage and that were targeted by legislators (see p. 145 in 
Chapter-5). 
The signs of the coefficients of the control variables in Table 7.2 are similar to 
the signs of the coefficients for the same variables presented in the original set of 
models in Table 7.1. In fact, it is worth noting that in this subset of models, the 
coefficient for the interaction govstrong×OLPR is statistically significant at the ten per 
cent probability value and its magnitude is greater than in the original set of models. 
This suggests that municipalities that are strongholds of the party in government 
tend to receive less spending under OLPR than they do under CLPR. By contrast, 
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the interaction oppstrong×OLPR was negative in Table 7.1 but this time it is positive 
and statistically significant at the ten per cent probability value. In the case of swing 
voter municipalities, like in the original set of models, neither of the results is 
statistically significant, but the signs are the same and the magnitudes of the 
Figure 7.2. Effects of OLPR and logM on the distribution of the log of national 
spending per capita at FHIS, municipalities that did not report damage after 
Hurricane Mitch only. 95 per cent confidence intervals (CI) are denoted by the vertical 
capped lines. Other factors are held constant at their means. Notice that regardless of the 
electoral system, the closer logM is to zero, the more spending a municipality will get. 
However, under OLPR the slope tends to be less inclined towards small-M constituencies 
than under CLPR. It can be observed that there is less overlapping of CI in medium and 
large constituencies, which suggests that the change to OLPR affects how municipalities in 
medium and large constituencies in particular receive spending.  
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coefficients are slightly bigger. The coefficient of strong constituency is not statistically 
significant in any of the models but, contrary to the models presented above, the 
interaction strong constituency×OLPR is positive, which suggests that a change to 
OLPR probably leads to an increase in spending allocated to constituencies where 
the party in government is electorally strong, something already observed in Chapter 
5 in relation to pork-barrel bills initiation. Lambda is not statistically significant in this 
subset of models, which suggests that the selection problem might be not very 
harmful and a linear regression model can be performed.106 
7.4 Discussion 
This chapter has provided evidence that supports the hypothesis that, regardless of 
the ballot type, spending per capita tends to be greater the smaller the district 
magnitude. It was found that, after controlling for different factors, a change to 
OLPR is associated with increases in spending, particularly in medium and large 
district magnitude constituencies, as was expected. After excluding from the analysis 
municipalities that were more likely to have received spending after Hurricane Mitch, 
it was found that there was a decrease in the magnitude of the coefficients of the 
variables of interest and the predicted probabilities in the post-estimation tests. 
Overall, however, the results from the analyses that excluded those observations still 
supported the hypotheses. These results are robust to a series of tests, including the 
exclusion of political control variables and the removal of lags. Generally, the same 
patterns emerged, i.e. that spending tends to be greater the smaller the district 
magnitude but spending in larger magnitude constituencies is more sensitive to a 
change to OLPR (see Appendix 7.2). In a different vein, it is worth noting the 
similarities in the coefficients of the log of district magnitude in the regression 
outputs in all three empirical chapters, and especially in the marginal effects 
presented in this chapter and in Chapter 5. I will broadly discuss these findings in 
Chapter 8, which is dedicated to the conclusions of this dissertation.  
It is worth commenting on the findings in relation to the controls govstrong, 
oppstrong and swing. Evidence was found that might be an indication that the 
                                                 
106 In Appendix 7.1 I present the results for this same set of models using a TSCS with random-effects 
model, i.e. excluding the selection equation from the analysis. In Table 7A.1 it can be observed that 
the signs of the coefficients of logM, as well as logM×OLPR, are the same. Notice also that the 
magnitude of these coefficients is almost the same, even in the main component models. Similar 
results to those presented in Table 7.2 can be observed for the control variables.  
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government’s municipal strongholds are likely to receive less spending under OLPR 
than CLPR. By contrast, the opposition’s strongholds are likely to receive more 
spending under OLPR than in CLPR. In addition, municipalities where the vote 
tends to be pivotal will probably receive less spending under CLPR than OLPR. 
Furthermore, swing voter municipalities seem to attract more attention under OLPR, 
and the opposition’s municipality strongholds are more likely to receive spending in 
OLPR than in CLPR. While more research is needed before reaching any conclusion, 
these results might suggest that the electoral system affects the way the Honduran 
government allocates spending to the municipalities. One explanation of the fact that 
the coefficients for government strongholds are positive in CLPR and then turn 
negative in OLPR could be related to the intraparty fragmentation that OLPR 
produces and the difficulties in reaching to agreements that derive of this system. In 
chapters 4 (see pp. 96–96), we observed that it is more difficult to pass bills under 
OLPR than in CLPR. It was also noted that legislators from the opposition seem to 
be more proactive under OLPR. In Chapter 5, I presented evidence that this is the 
case, when it was observed that a change to OLPR led to an increase in the number 
of pork-barrel bills introduced by legislators from the opposition, which could make 
sense of the finding that under OLPR opposition strongholds are more likely to 
receive spending.  
In terms of swing voter municipalities, the results are consistent with the theory 
put forward by Taylor-Robinson (2010, p. 117), who suggests that when the closed-
list PR system was used in Honduras, municipalities where the party in government 
lost the election were punished through pork-spending deprivation. However, in an 
OLPR context, the logic of punishing a municipality by depriving it of pork is 
probably less appealing to personal vote-seeking legislators. They would be more 
likely to look for personal votes firstly, and primarily, in the party’s core-voter 
municipalities, provided these are not the territory of party leaders competing for 
legislative seats (Ames, 1995), and secondly where the vote is pivotal, rather than in 
core voter constituencies of the opposition. 
It was not the objective of this chapter to analyse the allocation of spending to 
party strongholds; instead, this was used as a control variable. Nevertheless, these 
results must raise awareness of the need to investigate the impact electoral systems 
have on this issue, a topic rather neglected in the electoral systems literature.  
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Appendix 7.1 TSCS random-effects analysis of spending allocated 
to municipalities that did not report damage after Hurricane Mitch 
The models presented in Table 7A.1 are exactly the same as those from the second 
stage of the Heckman two-step procedure presented in Table 7.2 above, i.e. they 
were calculated using a TSCS analysis with a random-effects estimation method, 
ruling out the selection variables and focusing only on the selection dataset. Bear in 
mind that these models exclude observations for municipalities where there were 
reports of damage after Hurricane Mitch. It can be noticed that the results do not 
differ significantly to those presented in Table 7.2. There is an increase in statistical 
significance for the variable logM and the coefficients in both models are very similar. 
In addition, the magnitude of the coefficient for the interaction govstrong×OLPR is 
almost the same as in Table 7.2, but it is not statistically significant. 
Table 7A.1. Results of TSCS random-effects estimations of the logs 
of spending per capita from national sources of funding at FHIS, 
municipalities unaffected by Mitch only 
 (7) (8) (9) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR 
    
OLPR 0.567   
 (0.49)   
logM -0.341** -0.422*** -0.196 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) 
logM×OLPR 0.177   
 (0.18)   
Cycles -0.067 0.033 -0.792 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.62) 
Liberal 1.113*** 1.327*** -3.724 
 (0.17) (0.22) (4.19) 
Govstrong 0.307 0.055 -0.185 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.36) 
Govstrong×OLPR -0.537   
 (0.33)   
Oppstrong -0.220 -0.288 0.332 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) 
Oppstrong×OLPR 0.518*   
 (0.30)   
Swing -0.011 -0.118 0.208 
 (0.29) (0.28) (0.26) 
Swing×OLPR 0.223   
 (0.40)   
Strong constituency -0.211 -0.158 0.048 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) 
Strong const.×OLPR 0.323   
 (0.29)   
    
(continued on following page) 
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Table 7A.1 
(continued from previous page) 
 (7) (8) (9) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR 
    
Log of GDP 1.385 1.452 -0.172 
 (1.66) (5.52) (1.56) 
Lag of log of GDP -5.215*** 1.247 8.257 
 (1.55) (6.38) (11.00) 
Lagged dep. variable -0.073*** -0.058** -0.081** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Intercept 46.837*** -27.243** -85.858 
 (7.60) (13.53) (126.63) 
N 460 194 266 
R2 within 0.17 0.34 0.19 
R2 between 0.060 0.201 0.022 
R2 overall 0.121 0.257 0.108 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; **significant at 0.05; 
***significant at 0.01. 
Appendix 7.2 Robustness checks 
Because the key independent variables OLPR, logM, and logM×OLPR can be 
correlated with other explanatory factors included in the models presented in tables 
7.1 and 7.2, these models are reproduced in Table 7A.2 excluding the political 
control covariates. The selection variables as well as the log of GDP and the lagged 
variables have been kept, considering that they explain to a great extent the variation 
in spending per capita and whether a municipality is likely to receive spending. 
Models (10) to (12) in the table below include all observations for municipalities i in 
the selected sample and for those that did not receive spending in year t. Models (13) 
to (15) exclude the municipalities that reported damage after Hurricane Mitch in both 
the selected sample and the N dataset.  
According to Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), main terms usually do not 
require interpretation in interacted models. That is why I have avoided making 
reference to the independent variable OLPR in the interacted models. However, in 
the present case it is worth mentioning that with political controls OLPR reports a 
coefficient of -.031, and without them the coefficient is -.431. The difference 
between both coefficients seems to be big but in neither case is the result statistically 
significant. This result might suggest that a change to OLPR produces different 
political dynamics that are not necessarily related to district magnitude but rather to 
the change in ballot type. The coefficients for the key independent variables in 
models (10) and (12) report very small differences. However, in model (13), which 
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Table 7A.2. Results of Heckman two-step estimations of the logs of spending per capita from national sources of funding at FHIS, with no 
political statistical controls 
 All observations Did not report damage 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
       
OLPR -0.461   -0.068                   
 (0.35)   (0.47)                   
logM -0.692*** -0.657*** -0.247** -0.329** -0.301** -0.193 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) 
logM×OLPR 0.409**   0.153                   
 (0.16)   (0.20)                   
Log of GDP 1.488* -7.613** 0.097 -1.506 -9.347 -1.092 
 (0.86) (2.89) (0.87) (1.56) (6.22) (1.50) 
Lag of log of GDP -1.906** 7.346** -1.931** -0.023 5.839 -0.708 
(0.71) (2.63) (0.71) (1.22) (6.09) (1.20) 
Lagged dep. variable -0.048*** -0.039** -0.066*** -0.066** -0.036 -0.096** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) 
Selection variables 
Extreme poor (%) 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.013** 0.018*** 0.008    
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)    
Log of int. spending -0.079*** -0.106*** -0.002 -0.093*** -0.103*** -0.019    
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)    
Lag of log int. spend. 0.015** 0.044*** 0.072*** 0.018** 0.045*** 0.098*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)    
Lambda 0.584** -0.098 1.071** -0.340 -0.990** 0.138 
 (0.19) (0.25) (0.34) (0.30) (0.38) (0.47) 
Intercept 8.324* 7.807 23.850*** 21.839** 45.304 24.416** 
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Table 7A.2 
(continued from previous page) 
 All observations Did not report damage 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
       
 (4.39) (16.55) (4.98) (7.42) (29.45) (8.55)    
N (selection) 1191   500   691   460   194 266    
N 5634 3846 1788 2305 1573 732 
R2 within 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.16 
R2 between 0.127 0.079 0.106 0.010 0.038 0.003 
R2 overall 0.095 0.097 0.097 0.051 0.061 0.066 
                     Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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reports the results for the main components of CLPR with no interactions, the 
coefficient for logM in Table 7.1 is -.580 and in Table 7A.2 it is -.657. In both cases 
the results have the same levels of statistical significance. Likewise, models (13) to 
(15) show very similar results to their counterparts in Table 7.1 for the coefficients of 
logM and logM×OLPR and their levels of significance. Again, the main difference 
seems to occur in OLPR in model (13). In the original set of models the coefficient 
of this variable, despite the fact that it is not significant, is positive and its value is 
.616. In model (13) below its value is -.068.  
The predicted probabilities for both the interacted models (10) and (13) above 
are displayed in Figure 7A.1. The slopes in Figure 7A.1(a) suggest a decline in the 
spending received in smaller magnitude constituencies after the change to OLPR, 
whereas spending allocated to larger magnitude districts increased at a comparative 
rate. As in the original set of models, the small overlaps in the confidence intervals as 
logM gets larger suggest that the change is significant in larger magnitude 
constituencies. Figure 7A.1(b) also indicates a decline in the predicted probability 
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Figure 7A.1. Effects of OLPR and logM on the distribution of the log of national 
spending per capita at FHIS, with no political controls. 95 per cent confidence 
intervals (CI) are denoted by the vertical capped lines. Other factors are held constant at 
their means. Figure (a) illustrates the marginal effects results using all observations in the 
selected sample. Figure (b) uses observations only for municipalities that did not report 
damage after Hurricane Mitch.  
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that small-M constituencies will receive more spending after a change to OLPR. This 
differs from the results shown in the model presented in Figure 7.2 above, an 
important difference since the original model predicted increases in moneys allocated 
to small-M constituencies. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the overlapping of 
the confidence intervals in (b) below warns us that the results are not statistically 
significant and that we cannot have confidence in these results, the slopes of the 
curves seem to confirm the expectation that a change to OLPR will lead to an 
increase in spending in larger magnitude constituencies in particular. 
As I previously mentioned, the inclusion of lagged dependent variables in panel 
data models is a controversial and unresolved issue in the political science 
methodology literature. In the following robustness tests I present two sets of results. 
In Table 7A.3 the results for Heckman two-step estimations without lagged variables 
of any kind are reported. As in the previous robustness tests, the first three models in 
this table include all observations, whereas the second set of models excludes 
municipalities that reported damage after Hurricane Mitch. Because researchers who 
include lagged variables in panel data models commonly incorporate lagged 
dependent variables only, this subset of models is reported in Table 7A.4. In Figure 
7A.2 the predicted probabilities graphs for the interaction terms of these models are 
presented.  
The results presented in Table 7A.3 suggest that leaving out lagged dependent 
variables and lagged independent variables from other time-variant factors changes 
the magnitude and significance of the coefficients, especially in the OLPR model 
with no interaction terms for all observations, model (18). Nevertheless, the variation 
is in line with the expectations. As a matter of fact, with a coefficient of -.096 (even 
though it is not significant) that result suggests that spending in larger-M 
constituencies increased to a point where the differences across district magnitude 
almost cancel each other out. In terms of the models that exclude municipalities that 
received spending after Mitch, the coefficient of OLPR becomes negative and 
statistically significant, indicating a general reduction in spending after the electoral 
system change. The coefficients of logM do not undergo any major variations in 
comparison with the original set of models. The coefficient of logM×OLPR is not 
statistically significant in either of the models; however, in Table 7.2 its value is .171 
and in model (19), with no lags, it is .296, which indicates that ruling out lags actually 
increases the magnitude of the coefficient. 
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Table 7A.3. Results of Heckman two-step estimations of the logs of spending per capita from national sources of funding at FHIS, with no 
lagged variables 
 All observations Did not report damage 
 (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
       
OLPR -0.174   -0.859*   
 (0.34)   (0.52)   
logM -0.521*** -0.421*** -0.096 -0.386** -0.310** -0.256 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) (0.19) 
logM×OLPR 0.240*   0.296   
 (0.13)   (0.22)   
Cycles 0.279*** 0.014 -0.045 0.224** -0.116 -0.375** 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16) 
Liberal 0.217* 0.978*** -1.372*** 0.794*** 1.460*** -1.230** 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.28) (0.18) (0.20) (0.63) 
Govstrong 0.000 0.092 -0.365** 0.131 0.178 -0.272 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.28) (0.22) (0.29) 
Govstrong×OLPR -0.014   -0.259   
 (0.25)   (0.39)   
Oppstrong 0.078 -0.053 0.170 -0.114 -0.247 0.523* 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.26) (0.20) (0.32) 
Oppstrong×OLPR -0.050   0.249   
 (0.24)   (0.34)   
Swing 0.072 0.059 0.131 -0.255 -0.088 0.254 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.25) (0.19) (0.29) 
Swing×OLPR 0.060   0.441   
 (0.24)   (0.36)   
Strong constituency 0.055 -0.192* 0.012 0.015 -0.039 -0.084 
       
(continued on following page) 
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Table 7A.3 
(continued from page) 
 All observations Did not report damage 
 (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
       
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.15) (0.23) 
Strong const.×OLPR -0.223   0.249   
(0.16)   (0.28)   
Log of GDP 0.257 2.276*** 1.375 -0.078 3.248*** 0.535 
 (0.39) (0.41) (0.90) (0.62) (0.61) (1.52) 
Selection variables 
Extreme poor (%) 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.012** 0.015** 0.009    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)    
Log of int. spending -0.078*** -0.149*** -0.005 -0.092*** -0.155*** -0.030**  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Lambda 0.587*** 0.541*** 2.196*** -0.518** -0.012 1.323 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.32) (0.26) (0.20) (1.13) 
Intercept -0.591 -23.065*** -13.884 4.518 -33.304*** -1.998 
 (4.34) (4.56) (10.25) (6.88) (6.78) (17.45) 
N (selection) 1381   690   691   536   270 266 
N 5634 3846 1788 2305 1573 732 
R2 within 0.08 0.38 0.04 0.14 0.60 0.08 
R2 between 0.165 0.248 0.144 0.090 0.294 0.033 
R2 overall 0.121 0.305 0.112 0.124 0.443 0.074 
                 Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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With the inclusion of only one lagged dependent variable, the most noticeable 
differences between the models with no lags presented in Table 7A.3 above are 
observed in municipalities that did not report damage as a result of Hurricane Mitch. 
While in the previous models OLPR is negative and statistically significant, in model 
(25) in Table 7A.4 it is positive and not statistically significant. In spite of that result, 
the differences between the coefficients of logM and logM×OLPR are minimal. In 
other words, the evidence still suggests the effects of a ballot change are greater the 
larger the district magnitude. While there was evidence of a change in the levels of 
statistical significance of the variables related to the party in government’s 
strongholds and the opposition’s strongholds in both sets of models presented in 
tables 7A.3 and 7A.4, the magnitudes and directions of the coefficients do not vary 
significantly.  
In Figure 7A.2 it can be observed that the exclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable affects in particular those municipalities in smaller magnitude constituencies 
that did not report any damage after Mitch, where it seems that a change to OLPR 
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Figure 7A.2. Predictive marginal effects of OLPR and logM on the distribution of the log 
of national spending per capita at FHIS, with no political controls. 95 per cent confidence 
intervals (CI) are denoted by the vertical capped lines. Other factors are held constant at their 
means.  
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Table 7A.4. Results of Heckman two-step estimations of the logs of spending per capita from national sources of funding at FHIS, with a 
lagged dependent variable 
 All observations Did not report damage 
 (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
       
OLPR -0.151   0.417   
 (0.36)   (0.54)   
logM -0.654*** -0.510*** -0.116 -0.337** -0.484** -0.257 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.17) (0.15) (0.20) 
logM×OLPR 0.419**   0.167   
 (0.14)   (0.23)   
Cycles 0.206*** 0.252** -0.039 0.005 0.197 -0.343** 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.16) 
Liberal 0.163 0.974*** -1.355*** 0.751*** 1.374*** -1.177* 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.28) (0.17) (0.21) (0.60) 
Govstrong 0.026 0.059 -0.338* 0.218 -0.013 -0.177 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.31) (0.26) (0.29) 
Govstrong×OLPR -0.119   -0.336   
 (0.27)   (0.40)   
Oppstrong 0.219 -0.053 0.148 -0.164 -0.274 0.515 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.29) (0.24) (0.32) 
Oppstrong×OLPR -0.159   0.457   
 (0.26)   (0.36)   
Swing 0.053 -0.079 0.100 -0.060 -0.117 0.273 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.17) (0.29) (0.24) (0.28) 
Swing×OLPR 0.062   0.245   
 (0.26)   (0.39)   
       
(continued on following page) 
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Table 7A.4 
(continued from previous page) 
 All observations Did not report damage 
 (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
 Interactions CLPR OLPR Interactions CLPR OLPR 
       
Strong constituency 0.019 -0.258** 0.039 -0.220 -0.083 -0.030 
(0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.23) (0.19) (0.22) 
Strong const.×OLPR -0.171   0.396   
(0.18)   (0.30)   
Log of GDP -0.603 6.603*** 1.432 -3.425*** 6.517** 0.447 
 (0.51) (1.40) (0.89) (0.79) (2.85) (1.46) 
Lagged dep. variable -0.054*** -0.052** -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.063** -0.099*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Selection variables       
Extreme poor (%) 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.013** 0.018*** 0.009    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)    
Log of int. spending -0.067*** -0.090*** -0.005 -0.084*** -0.090*** -0.030**  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Lambda 0.910*** 1.306*** 1.919*** -0.264 0.696 1.008 
 (0.17) (0.25) (0.32) (0.29) (0.45) (1.10) 
Intercept 9.222 -73.637*** -14.350 42.827*** -71.895** -0.921 
 (5.95) (16.34) (10.17) (9.10) (33.08) (16.70) 
N(selection) 1381   690   691   536  270 266 
N 5634 3846 1788 2305 1573 732 
R2within 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.32 0.18 
R2between 0.178 0.258 0.146 0.042 0.224 0.029 
R2overall 0.118 0.272 0.127 0.095 0.269 0.112 
                  Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 0.1; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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led to a decrease in the log of spending per capita. However, we can also see that 
there has been an increase in spending in municipalities in the largest magnitude 
constituencies since the change from CLPR to OLPR. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
 
 
One of the main objectives of this dissertation was to test Carey and Shugart’s (1995) 
theory on the effects on legislators’ behaviour of the interaction between ballot type 
and district magnitude. Assuming that legislators seek re-election, these scholars 
expect that under CLPR the incentives to seek personal votes are greater the smaller 
the district magnitude, whereas under OLPR there should be greater incentives for 
legislators to seek those votes the larger the district magnitude. Given the level of 
attention paid by the scholarly community to pork-barrel politics as the main re-
election strategy of incumbents in presidential systems, one obvious way to begin a 
test of this theory was to measure the impact of electoral systems on pork-barrel 
behaviour. However, one of the first findings of this dissertation is that while pork is 
a very important strategy, it is not the only possible approach to personal-vote 
seeking. The provision of private and non-targetable goods are two other personal-
vote seeking strategies that legislators can use. Thus, it was necessary to create a more 
comprehensive framework to study the influence of electoral systems on different 
aspects of legislators’ behaviour. 
Cox and McCubbins (2001) suggest that, holding other factors constant, under 
party-centred electoral systems there will be fewer incentives for legislators to 
provide targetable local and private goods, whereas the incentives to supply those 
types of goods should be greater under candidate-centred systems. The work by 
Crisp et al. (2004) constitutes a first approach to investigating how district magnitude 
interacts with ballot type to influence legislators’ choices to provide targetable goods 
or non-targetable public goods. That interaction between ballot type and district 
magnitude is based on Carey and Shugart’s (1995) idea that the incentives to seek 
personal votes are greater the smaller the district magnitude in closed-list PR systems, 
whereas in preferential list systems the larger the district magnitude the greater the 
incentives will be for this kind of behaviour. In line with these scholars, I set 
expectations about the different ways legislators might target voters and private 
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groups depending on the electoral system in use. However, I have shown that how 
legislators actually generate targetable public and private goods and non-targetable 
public goods under different electoral formulas is more complex than the arguments 
of these scholars suggest. In this regard, I aimed to trace the causal mechanism that 
binds electoral systems to personal vote seeking incentives and the provision of 
public and private goods.  To this end I used the case study of Honduras, which 
provides quasi-experimental conditions to test the empirical implications of the 
theory that I developed in this thesis. 
8.1 Main findings 
In general, the results presented in this dissertation are not statistically significant as 
to allow for a confident conclusion that a change to OLPR generates incentives for 
legislators to seek personal votes, in the way suggested by Carey and Shugart (1995) 
and later examined by Crisp et al. (2004) in a cross-country comparison. The results 
revealed that under CLPR legislators are more likely to provide targetable local and 
private goods the smaller the district magnitude. Under OLPR legislators across all 
constituencies tend to attach more importance to pork-barrel politics and to the 
provision of private goods. However, while larger magnitude constituencies seem to 
have been more sensitive to the ballot type change, no significant cross-sectional 
variation was found that could lead to the conclusion that OLPR increased intraparty 
competition in larger magnitude districts, or that, as a consequence, the provision of 
private and local public goods increased in line with the number of seats per 
constituency.  
As mentioned, the results show that the effects of the change to OLPR were 
more significant in larger magnitude constituencies. This was particularly the case 
with regard to pork-barrel politics (chapters 5 and 7). As explained, in this case my 
expectation was that the amount of pork-related outcomes, regardless of the 
dependent variable used, was going to be always higher the smaller the district 
magnitude. This is because it is more difficult to claim credit for projects in larger 
magnitude districts and because in this type of constituency voters tend to be more 
heterogeneous, giving some legislators the opportunity to target voters who vote on 
the basis of policy and ideology. In this regard, the expectations were confirmed: the 
evidence presented in the three empirical chapters demonstrates that after the change 
to OLPR in Honduras there has been a significant increase in pork-related outcomes, 
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particularly among legislators from medium and large magnitude constituencies. 
However, the importance attached to pork remains greater in small-M constituencies. 
The results were noteworthy for two of the proxies of pork-barrel behaviour that I 
used in the present work: the number of bills aimed at generating benefits for 
constituencies introduced by each legislator in the Honduran National Congress and 
the geographical distribution of social spending by the Honduran Social Investment 
Fund. Despite the fact that these are two different sources of data, the evidence 
presented for both indicators of personal vote-seeking behaviour shows very similar 
patterns. Even though the results are not as similar in the case of bill initiation and 
the geographical allocation of spending, the evidence on survey data supports the 
theorized expectations. 
As predicted, regardless of the ballot type used, in Chapter 5 I found that 
legislators will provide more non-targetable public goods as district magnitude 
increases. The explanation of this behaviour is that, in proportional representation 
systems, the larger the district magnitude the more heterogeneous voters are likely to 
be. This relationship is more prominent in CLPR, where legislators do not have to 
compete against one another and use their personal reputations to attract votes for 
their party. The basis for competition is different: in CLPR, legislators have to be 
accountable to their party leaders and there might be internal arrangements within 
the party to designate which legislators will focus on legislation and which should 
concentrate on providing constituency service. I have argued that, under CLPR in 
larger magnitude constituencies, what makes party leaders and legislators decide who 
will focus on constituency service and who will work on legislation depends on the 
legislators’ personal attributes. I will discuss this particular issue towards the end of 
this section.  
Considering that larger magnitude constituencies tend to be more varied, the 
preferences of the electorate will be more heterogeneous. Because under OLPR 
intraparty competition increases, some legislators will specialize in pork-barrel 
politics while others will be more likely to appeal to the provision of broader public 
goods. But, overall, I put forward that under OLPR the provision of non-targetable 
public goods should be smaller than under CLPR. The findings presented in this 
dissertation are not very strong, but they are sufficient to support the theory. Two 
proxies for non-targetable goods were used. One was the number of national bills 
that legislators introduced in the Honduran Congress and the other was the survey 
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data on the attitudes of legislators towards making laws. In both cases it was found 
that legislators are more likely to support non-targetable goods the larger the district 
magnitude. In terms of national bills, there was a decrease in the number of national 
bills presented by legislators from larger district magnitude constituencies. In the 
survey data, the finding was not as expected in my theory, since the legislators 
registered more positive attitudes towards making laws under OLPR.  
Assuming that interest groups want to see their interests represented in 
parliament and that legislators will seek the financial support of these groups for their 
electoral campaigns, it was hypothesized that once in office, legislators would be 
more likely to favour interest groups the larger the district magnitude. This is because 
legislators from small-M constituencies are more likely to be accountable to their 
constituents than legislators from larger magnitude constituencies. In contrast, as 
district magnitude grows the greater the need legislators will have to reach 
heterogeneous electorates, some of whom are interested not in pork or private 
favours but in policy and party ideology. Because reaching such publics requires 
more expensive campaigns, alliances between legislators and interest groups can be 
beneficial to both parties since, once elected, the deputies can represent the interests 
of such groups in congress. In this regard, the evidence compiled for the present 
analysis is not very strong. The analysis of the initiation of bills revealed that 
legislators are more likely to introduce bills with the potential to benefit interest 
groups the larger the district magnitude. A change to OLPR is not statistically 
significant, but the results suggest that there could have been a small increase in this 
type of bill among deputies from larger magnitude constituencies under this electoral 
system. The analysis of the survey data, however, was contrary to the expectations. In 
this latter case, as I explained, the negative finding could have been due to the 
phrasing of the question included in the questionnaire created by the team of 
researchers at the University of Salamanca, which could have induced biased 
responses from the legislators surveyed. Unfortunately, in the survey conducted in 
2010 the question was considerably rephrased and the observations collected in that 
survey round could not be used in this work. Nevertheless, I remain agnostic about 
the effects and further studies are needed. 
The final aspect related to the relationship between electoral systems and 
legislators’ personal vote-seeking behaviour that was examined in this dissertation is 
the ways in which the personal attributes of legislators interact with the two types of 
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electoral systems under consideration. I proposed that under OLPR the influence of 
the personal attributes of legislators should outweigh that of the party or institutional 
features. In this regard, I focused on three personal attributes: (1) the seniority of the 
legislators, (2) whether they had previous experience in local elections, and (3) 
whether they had a background in business. Contrary to the expectations put forward 
in the theory, it was found that under CLPR senior legislators are more likely to 
procure pork for their constituencies than junior legislators. According to Taylor-
Robinson (2006), who achieved similar results in a previous analysis of bill initiation 
in the Honduran Congress, this might be because senior legislators sometimes 
sponsor bills for backbenchers. However, I believe that the provision of pork is 
important for senior legislators to maintain their leadership within congress and 
within their party (see section 8.3 below).  
The evidence from the analysis of the survey data showed that the local 
experience of legislators was strongly associated with pork-barrel politics in CLPR, 
but under OLPR, contrary to the expectations, there is not a strong association and 
in some cases legislators with a local background seem to disregard the role of pork. 
The reasons for this behaviour require further investigation; however, a potential 
explanation is that under CLPR legislators with local background have defined roles 
established by the party leadership. These roles coincide with district magnitude; i.e. 
smaller district magnitude constituencies are more likely to have legislators with a 
local background. In contrast, under OLPR legislators with a local background are 
not as common in small-M constituencies as they were under the previous system, 
but tend to get elected more frequently in medium and large district magnitude 
constituencies.  
Finally, findings from the survey data revealed a positive correlation between 
legislators with a business background and their preferences towards the 
representation of business groups and the formulation of laws. That relationship was 
stronger under OLPR than in CLPR. 
8.2 The case of Honduras 
As I have shown, despite the fact that most studies of the consequences of electoral 
reforms are presented as natural experiments, they are rarely able to meet the criteria 
that one would desire of this kind of research design. In controlled experiment 
conditions, the researcher can randomly select control and treatment groups and 
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isolate the explanatory variable from other confounding factors. The problem lies in 
the potential for endogeneity that exists between the causes that led to a change of 
electoral system and its derived consequences. For example, in a candidate-centred 
system there could be an underlying process that has made legislators more 
particularistic; this in turn could create conditions that would facilitate an electoral 
system reform. As such, the particularistic behaviour of legislators is the result not of 
the electoral system itself, but of the underlying process. Advocates of the study of 
the consequences of electoral reforms suggest that the endogeneity problem is 
inherent to virtually any study of the effects of electoral systems, and that in spite of 
that shortcoming this kind of study offers better possibilities to control for different 
factors that cannot be accounted for in small-N and large-N studies. 
The case of Honduras, I have argued, provides unique quasi-experimental 
conditions to test the argument of this dissertation. I have explained that Hurricane 
Mitch, which caused terrible damage in Honduras in October 1998, is a variable that 
contributes to explaining the change to OLPR six years later. However, the linkage 
between both events is not direct. I showed that the hurricane and its after-effects 
generated increased demand from civil society groups for transparency from the 
government and political parties. It was a result of these appeals from civil society, 
rather than from the politicians, that discussion began in the political system about 
changing the closed-list ballot system for a nominal system, where legislative 
candidates would be identifiable by voters. In fact, it has been shown that in the 
beginning the political parties were reluctant to change the electoral system and that 
it was the proximity of the general elections and the constant advocacy work of non-
political party actors that recast electoral system reform as a presidential rather than 
legislative campaign issue. Also, considering that with competitive elections, 
incumbent politicians would have to face a randomization of the election process, by 
adopting the OLPR, they were assuming the risk of losing their re-election bids. 
Therefore, it can neither be claimed that there was a self-selection process at work in 
this case study, nor that politicians changed the system expecting benefits in the ways 
predicted by the theory that is proposed here. In this regard, the case study of 
Honduras resembles very much the as-if random conditions of natural experiments 
endorsed by Dunning (2012). 
There were challenges to the present research design as elaborated throughout 
the thesis. Given the magnitude of the damage caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998, 
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the years that followed saw important recovery actions undertaken by different actors 
in Honduran society, including politicians. This certainly creates non-random 
conditions that sceptics could argue threaten the validity of the results of this 
dissertation. Nevertheless, there are several factors that minimize the potential for 
Mitch as an explanatory factor. One is that there was a gap between both events; 
while Mitch hit Honduras in 1998, the electoral system change took place in 2004. 
Moreover, as I demonstrated, the effects of the change to OLPR are discernible from 
2006, i.e. when the first legislature elected under the new electoral system was 
inaugurated. Another reason I argue Mitch does not sufficiently account for a change 
of behaviour in Honduran politicians is that the areas affected by the hurricane and 
the distribution of district magnitude are independent. In other words, some areas in 
small, medium and large district magnitude constituencies were affected and others 
not. Thus, one could expect that pork-barrel patterns should vary across time, but 
that the variation across district magnitude should keep constant. I provided 
evidence that that is the case. Furthermore, in two of the three empirical chapters, I 
was able to control for municipalities that reported damage after the hurricane. After 
ruling these municipalities out of the analysis, it was demonstrated that most of the 
hypotheses related to the electoral system held true. 
In summary, I believe that Honduras provides very particular conditions which 
researchers can take advantage of to test relevant theories. The Honduran case is 
particularly suitable for testing Carey and Shugart’s (1995) theory. In this regard, 
closed-list PR and open-list PR systems constitute ideal types of party-centred 
systems and candidate-centred systems respectively (Carey, 2009; Shugart, Valdini & 
Suominen, 2005; Shugart, 2005). In all, confirming the reliability of the conclusions 
of the empirical analyses will require more maturity in the electoral system and the 
legislators’ actions, i.e. it will necessary to observe how fixed these institutions and 
practices are over time and the extent to which they differ from the old practices and 
institutions. Overall, the value of quasi-experiments such as the one I presented in 
this dissertation cannot be denied: in the social sciences sometimes they are the best 
if not the only type of research through which we can establish causal relations with 
confidence, considering that attaining the conditions required in randomized 
experiments is simply not feasible. As different scholars have recommended, in 
studies of this nature, while their value cannot be neglected, one should ideally 
conduct time-series analyses in order to have greater confidence in the explanatory 
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potential of a theory (Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Diamond & Robinson, 2010; 
Norris, 2004). 
Despite their great potential for establishing causal relationships, experiments as 
well as quasi-experiments face a significant challenge, namely the external validity of 
the results. In other words, they have to answer the question how generalizable are the 
results of the experiment? In the social sciences replication is perhaps the most important 
tool that can be used to achieve greater confidence in the validity of the results and in 
turn in the strength of a theory. As I previously mentioned, Crisp et al.’s (2004) 
cross-national comparison that utilizes records of bill initiation in six presidential 
democracies in Latin America―i.e. almost the same proxy as used in Chapter 
5―achieved similar results to those obtained in this dissertation. However, that 
sample of countries cannot control for other factors. For instance, could we get 
similar results in parliamentary regimes? Does political culture have an influence? 
Could we reach similar conclusions in rich economies? Those answers require more 
large-N and small-N investigation, and ideally time-series data analysis of natural and 
quasi-experiments.  
8.3 Recommendations for future research 
Some of the findings in this dissertation go beyond the scope of the research 
question, but deserve more attention. As I observed in the literature review, since the 
mid-1980s political scientists and economists have been debating how members of 
parliament and governments target constituencies. Some argue that these actors are 
most likely to target core supporters (Cox & McCubbins, 1986), while others believe 
that it is more rational for them to target swing voters (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; 
Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987). McGillivray (2004) and Golden and Picci (2008) added 
the electoral system variable to the discussion. But there are other factors that merit 
deeper investigation and the case of Honduras could provide good test conditions 
for conducting such analyses.  
In Chapter 7 I used statistical controls which held constant the effects of core 
voters for the party in government, the opposition’s strongholds, and swing voters. 
Although they were not part of the main analysis, it is worth noting that the partial 
effects for these variables in the regression coefficients revealed that strongholds of 
the opposition were particularly likely to receive increased spending under OLPR. 
Swing voters were also likely to receive more spending under this method of election 
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than under CLPR. This pattern requires further research before any firm conclusions 
can be reached. However, considering that in this dissertation it was found that 
legislators from the opposition are more likely to appeal to pork-barrel politics under 
OLPR than CLPR, it should not be surprising that opposition strongholds receive 
more spending from the government under OLPR than CLPR. Moreover, as I put 
forward, the president probably has more difficulty getting legislation of interest for 
the government passed under the open-list system, as well as encountering more 
obstacles to setting the parliamentary agenda. Therefore, it is possible that she would 
be willing to negotiate with legislators from the opposition, and offer them access to 
perks such as pork in exchange for more cooperation in congress. 
Another aspect of the debate that deserves more attention is the way in which 
the electoral systems interact with the form of government and the levels of 
fragmentation of the political parties. As I put forward at the beginning of this study, 
there are two factors that have remained relatively constant throughout the period of 
study in Honduras. One is the presidential form of government which consists of an 
elected head of the executive who serves for a single term of four years. The other is 
the high levels of fragmentation in the two main political parties. Even years before 
the country’s transition to democracy, that combination and the closed-list PR 
system contributed to the maintaining of a system of rewards and punishments for 
politicians (Taylor-Robinson, 2010). This could contribute to explaining the high 
turnover rates in the Honduran Congress among legislators from small district 
magnitude constituencies, which, even nowadays under OLPR, remain very high. 
However, some legislators from these constituencies have managed to get re-elected 
under the new system while incumbents from larger-M constituencies did not 
achieve re-election. Under CLPR, the support of the presidential candidate and the 
form in which primary elections were conducted were seen as determining factors in 
the selection of candidates, especially in small magnitude constituencies.107 OLPR 
limits the influence of party leaders, even the presidential candidate; it is possible 
then that legislators from small-M constituencies will see their chances of being re-
elected increase.  
 
                                                 
107 Deputy of the National Party, personal interview, 15th February 2012. 
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8.4 Policy implications 
Countries such as Nicaragua in the 1990s and Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s, 
among many other nations in the developing world, have been the recipients of 
electoral engineering advice. Such advice has been provided by non-governmental 
and intergovernmental international organizations, with the sponsorship of 
governments in developed countries (Carothers, 1999; IFES, 2012; International 
IDEA, 2005; NDI, 2012). Parallel to this, a growing number of societies across the 
world, regardless of their level of socioeconomic development, have been discussing 
and adopting candidate-centred electoral systems. This phenomenon seems to be 
associated with a gradual process of voter disengagement and a growing distrust of 
political parties (Renwick & Pilet, 2011). Therefore, understanding the effects of 
electoral systems and their interactions with all aspects of a given society has become 
very relevant for the development of contemporary democracies. Those involved in 
the policy making process—from advocacy groups to advisers and policy makers—
can benefit from studies such as the one presented in this thesis. 
 The results presented in this dissertation show that electoral systems have a 
significant effect on legislators’ behaviour. In particular, it seems that in Honduras a 
change from the party-centred closed-list PR electoral system to the candidate-
centred open-list PR generated incentives for deputies to seek personal votes. This 
has a variety of implications. First, it increases intraparty competition and it also 
seems to raise the likelihood of conflicts between parliamentarians from the same 
party (see Chapter 1). Second, a change to OLPR increases the provision of private 
goods, particularly in large magnitude districts. And third, it leads to a reduction in 
the provision of general public goods from legislators in larger magnitude districts. 
Interestingly, and perhaps related to the form of ballot used in OLPR—which 
includes photographs of the candidates—legislators from small district magnitude 
constituencies tend to engage more in the generation of public goods under this 
system than in CLPR. This can have a number of societal implications. For instance, 
increased pork-barrel demands under a candidate-centred system can bring more 
infrastructure projects to places that are often neglected. Conversely, pork-barrelling 
reduces the incentives to provide national public goods. Legislators will also tend to 
pay greater attention to private interests when accountability mechanisms are weak, 
as seems to be the case more often in PR than in majoritarian systems; this could 
potentially culminate in corruption (Chang & Golden, 2007). This is not to say that 
 219 
one system is better than the other, but rather to emphasize that the adoption of a 
given system requires an examination of the conditions in the country which is to 
adopt the new electoral rules. 
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